Iraq: Behind the Scenes and What Isn't Covered in the Media

This morning, I've been doing some superficial Internet research on the "legal" aspects of both our initial Iraq invasion and our on-going presence. Here's some of what I discovered.

Based on all of my reading to date, the Bush Administration determined to invade Iraq for the purpose of regime change, shortly before or after 9/11. In fact, one could make an argument that Iraq was always the intended target and that 9/11 and Afghanistan "distracted" the Administration from that purpose.

This is NOT to say, the Administration didn't have some legal basis for this intent. In 1998, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution for Iraqi regime change.

[Note: the Congressional Resolution stopped short of "authorizing" the use of U.S. force to secure regime change. In international law, chiefly through the Charter of the United Nations, "regime change" in itself is not a valid reason for the use of force. If it were, any war, for virtually any reason would be "legal." International law is more theory than substance and is, in part, "made" by actions, not intentions. But treaties, national commitments, etc. are essentially "contracts."]

Having thrown out U.N. inspectors earlier, Hussein was in clear violation of the U.N. cease fire agreement, or contract, signed following Gulf War I.

Following 9/11 and while still "wrapping up" in Afghanistan, the Bush Administration began building the case for forcing Hussein to comply with the U.N. cease-fire agreement and collecting intelligence to build the cause for invasion. In this environment, there were apparently two competing factions within the Administration. One faction, led essentially by Powell and the State Department, believed that it was necessary for the United States to go back to the U.N. to obtain their agreement on potential U.S. action, since the Hussein violations were linked to the U.N. sanctions and Gulf War I cease fire agreement. The second faction - Cheney, Rumsfeld and the neo-cons - argument was two-fold: 1) if the worse interpretation of the intelligence being gathered was true, the United States had the legitimate right to respond unilaterally to "imminent threat." And, 2) even without imminent threat, the U.S. had the "right" under the U.N. Charter to separately and alone determine that Hussein was in violation of the U.N. ceasefire agreement and to independently take action.

Secretary of State Powell believed the safer course of action was to return to the U.N. and obtain their acknowledgement of Hussein's violations and authorization for the use of force, if necessary for compliance. Bush apparently approved Powell's approach and this led to both his speech to the U.N. General Assembly and to Powell's presentation to the U.N. Security Council (the only U.N. body which can authorize the use of force).

The outcome of this was a sort of "last chance" resolution by the U.N. to Hussein, which in turn led to the return of U.N. inspectors. The inspectors returned and subsequently reported back to the U.N. that Hussein was "partially" complying, but that they required additional time to complete their work. With patience running out and "military timing" a factor (invasion before it became too hot for bio-chemical protective suits to be worn by the invading force), Bush began to shift toward the Cheney-Rumsfeld line of thought.

There was a brief final attempt, largely to please Tony Blair and the British, to obtain a U.N. sanction for the invasion. When it was discovered, due to the resistance of France, Russia, Chile (which was serving in a rotating seat on the Security Council at the time) and others, that we didn't have the votes, Bush proceeded.

The invasion went forward, not in defiance of the U.N., but under the tenuous argument that violations of the original ceasefire agreement and subsequent resolutions "authorized" the U.S.-U.K. coalition to act independently.

Had this logic been challenged, it probably would not have stood up to any sort of international judicial review. The U.N. General Assembly had the power to demand an investigation, but ultimately any meaningful condemnation of the invasion would have, under U.N. rules, been returned to the Security Council, where we (and the U.K.) possessed veto authority. Under a cloud of its own due to the Food for Oil U.N. program and largely dependent on the U.S. for operating funds, the U.N. let the invasion issue drop, with the General Secretary frowning and noting that the war was "probably" illegal under the U.N. Charter.

[Note: the Bush Administration was to use similar doubtful legal arguments with the U.S. Congress subsequently on the issues of torture and wiretapping.]

The Administration intended, from all I have read, to be in and out of Iraq in three months. Orders for withdrawal and redeployment had actually been issued, when things began to fall apart. By October 2003, it was becoming apparent that the situation was not going according to plan; the withdrawals were halted and the Administration turned again to the U.N. to get a formal declaration and sanction for our continuing presence. This is a fact largely ignored by American media and, consequently, the general public. The Multinational Force (the U.S., the Brits, Poles, Ukrainians, et al) are presently in Iraq under United Nations authority.

This "authority" has been granted and periodically renewed (annually) in coordination with the Iraq government and therein comes a big glitch.

The new Shite and Kurd dominated Iraqi Parliament apparently has the same sort of problem the U.S. Congress has been having with the Administration. A majority of the Parliament consider the status of the MNF (multi-national force) in Iraq to be, constitutionally, a subject for Parliamentary approval (just as the U.S. Congress believes they have the right of review of U.S.-Iraq agreements, under the advise and consent provisions of our Constitution). And, just as Bush has ignored the Senate's power of advise and consent, Prime Minister Maliki has ignored the Iraqi Parliament.

Apparently, the majority of the Iraq Parliament want a "timetable" for the withdrawal of the MNF, as well as the right to review (advise and consent) the U.N. required request from Iraq for a U.N. resolution authorizing our continued presence. They also want the right to review any agreements between the Maliki government and the Bush Administration regarding the U.S.-Iraq relationship (such as the Declaration of Principles recently signed between the two administrations). Again, this is a point virtually ignored by U.S. media.

This Fall, the Iraqis will hold, as we will, new elections. The present U.N. authorization for MNF presence runs out at the end of the year. The United States cannot confront a hostile Iraqi Parliament, a hostile U.S. Congress and a hostile U.N. over Iraq much longer.

In addition to the "surge" goal of stability, bringing the Sunnis into the Iraqi political system (even by "buying" their support), is essential to these forthcoming events. The Sunnis largely stayed out of the prior Iraqi elections and hence, out of Parliament. If a substantial bloc of Sunnis-Kurdish representatives cannot be created in Parliament in the next election, there will be increasing Shite and U.N. pressure for a timetable for withdrawal. Add to this problem, our own domestic and military problems.

Then, there is Iran. If the Bush Administration comes to believe that we will be "forced out," of Iraq, by either a U.N. resolution, a Shite dominated Iraqi Parliament and/or a new U.S. President/Congress, what action will they take regarding Iran?

Have a nice summer...it may be a very dangerous fall and winter.