Election coverage goes on and on and on...it reminds me of the old Mad Magazine Spy cartoons of spies spying on spies who are spying on spies, etc., etc. Now, we have analysts analyzing analysts who are analyzing analysts, etc., etc.
Yet the story doesn't change much.
Obama improved in Pennsylvania over the past few weeks, thanks to focus and money. He came from being down some 20+% to lose by 9.4 %. Clinton won.
At this point, it's probably important to play out the remaining primaries to the bitter end, then add up the numbers, with "super delegates" declaring sometime in June, repairing the damages in July, and going into the Convention in late August with a united Democratic Party. But, thanks largely to the Republican candidate, John McCain, I wouldn't be too worried if the Democratic nominee was picked on the Convention floor.
Highlight of the day, however, came from Fox News. First they did an interview with Obama, the first in about two years. Chris Wallace (Mike Wallace's son) did the interview for Fox. Obama presumably agreed to the interview as part of a campaign push to win more support among white male blue collar workers.
The interview went far better than I expected. Questions were fair; answers good. Wallace touched upon, but did not dwell on, the three major flaps of the Obama campaign: Reverend Wright, the "bitter" comment, and the ex-Weatherman, Ayers.[See Note below on Ayers]. The interview was followed by 15 minutes of "analysis" by the "Usual Suspects": Brent Hume, Bill Kristol, Juan Williams and a woman commentator from NPR, whose name escapes me at the moment. All but Kristol were reasonably impressed by the interview. If Fox News is slowly and incrementally coming around to accept Obama, he's virtually got it all wrapped up.
Fox followed this interview, several hours later, with a live broadcast of the Reverend Wright's keynote address to a meeting of the Detroit Chapter of the NAACP.
The Reverend took the occasion to show his "nice side." The theme was: different doesn't mean deficient and differences between African American "learning" (right brain) and White/European learning (left brain). It was entertaining and there were ample subtleties in his remarks, but few of the fireworks for which Fox probably hoped.
OK...I'll make an attempt to explain Reverend Wright and why he doesn't bother me as much as may bother others...particularly all those guys in Pennsylvania who voted against Obama, who Obama himself referred to as "bitter."
I am not an expert on African-American history or culture, so most of what follows is simply guess-work and conjecture.
The Reverend likes to distinguish himself as a pastor and definitely not a politician. IMO, this shades the truth a bit. My own observation is that successful Black preachers are, in fact, excellent politicians and, generally, the first group of African Americans to be solicited by White politicians seeking votes in the Black community.
I trace this to the role of the African American Church (in its various denominations) in American history. I suspect that during slavery, while Blacks were not treated as "humans," but property, few slave owners, nominally themselves Christians, could not logically deny Christian Black Churches, even for their slaves, and allowed separate Black Church services.
As such, the Black Church became a central focus of slave culture and consequently became an organizing force for the Black slave community, providing ethnic leadership, preserving African heritage, etc., with a mix of entertainment, religion, cultural heritage, and politics. Perhaps, most of all, it was a place to "vent."
During the civil rights days (the fifties and sixties), it was primarily a coalition of the descendants of northern abolitionists, liberal northern Jews, enlightened White southerners and the Black Churches (together with the NAACP, CORE, and an assortment of other civil rights organizations) that brought about the voting drives and subsequent Civil Rights Act.
Many of the people in the civil rights movement moved into the anti-Vietnam War movement that followed. And, that movement had various elements of its own...some religious in nature (Peace, not War), some political in nature (SDS), and some neither (Make Love Not War...the Flower Children). And, while the divisions between these groups was often fierce, they came together in being anti-establishment, chiefly on the grounds of what they perceived as contradictions and hypocrisy in the society in which they lived.
One could make an argument that the polarization of American society began in the sixties, with a semi, for the most part non-violent, revolution. For those too young to remember Vietnam, today's differences between Clinton and Obama, and Democrats and Republicans, are minute compared to the sixties. Today's hard-core left wing of the Democratic Party came into being during this era: from the Civil Rights Marches to Anti-War Protests, which usually ended with mass arrests, often with violence, and occasionally with deaths.
One movement that emerged from this era was Black Power. Organizations such as the Symbonese Liberation Army and the Black Panthers, many based on an American version of Islam formed the basis of this sub-movement of the times and there was a sort of loose coalition between these strictly Black organizations and the more radical of the largely left wing and White anti-war groups.
What followed was a serious challenge to much of the African American Christian Church establishment, who were viewed by the Black Power extremists as "Uncle Tom's." In part to counter this challenge,many Black Christian Churches re-emphasized African cultural roots...i.e. you could still be a militant Black and remain a Christian.
Here my interpretation gets a bit sticky. The Civil Rights movement was perceived by many Black Americans has having achieved success for relatively few of its members - i.e. generally the Black leadership of the Civil Rights movement, many of whom were pastors of Black Christian Churches. In countering this Black community perspective and the challenge of the Black Muslim's, Christian African American Churches and pastors such as the Reverend Wright moved toward increasing militancy to hold the flock.
Wright is not a stupid person. Perhaps not brilliant; but not dumb. He served in the U.S. Marines; apparently speaks a number of languages; holds various degrees, including a PhD from somewhere, and obvious to a child of the sixties like myself, draws his criticism of America based on that era.
One of the lasting images of the Vietnam War is a small, naked child, maybe six years old, running down a street, screaming, after being burned supposedly by American napalm. I would guess it was this sort of image that Reverend Wright conjured up following 9/11, when he said "God Damn America." He doesn't hate us, he hates his perception of our history...from slavery to Vietnam, to what he perceives as White America's establishment actions that led to 9/11. He's every bit as "bitter" a man as any of those in White blue collar Pennsylvania.
THe United States, Western European Democracies and former communist countries are curiously the "exception" on the issue of separation of church and state. I suspect in MOST of the world, whether via Christian Catholicism in Latin America or Shinto Japan, or Islam there is far more unity between both religion and politics. The Reverend can no more turn his back on what he perceives our faults to be than an Islamic cleric could turn his back on our attempt to "secularize" Iraq. As both pastor and political leader within his community his "duty" is to speak his perceived truth, whether it offends us or not. Fortunately, for him, he lives in a country that respects his right to do so, if not his beliefs.
I think all of the above is basically what Obama means when he says: "He is from a different era." And, of course, one can understand a position even while disagreeing with it. Nor does one have to understand his perspective to respect his right to free speech.
I would hope that the Reverend appreciates at least that much of our society. I suspect that in Shaka's Zulu Kingdom of 19th Century Africa and in far too many countries today, he'd have lost his head.
Note: Next, my view of the recent history of the Democratic Party and the Obama Phenomena.
P.S. The Weathermen were a militant group that practiced a low grade of terrorism (if there is such a thing) in the late sixties and early seventies. It was a splinter group from the left wing Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). They took their name from a line in Bob Dylan's "Subterranean Homesick Blues" ("You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows."). They were anti-war, but also anti-capitalist and advocated a form of communism. They probably never numbered more than 100. They planted bombs, chiefly in government buildings and killed two policemen and a security guard in a Brinks armored car robbery. Three of them blew-up themselves in a botched bomb building exercise in Greenwich Village in 1970. There were two fractions within the group: those who wanted to blow people up and those who wanted to just blow-up buildings. The latter argued that while bombs were OK, they should take care NOT to kill anyone, but practice non-lethal terrorism.
All of this touched recently on the Obama campaign. The Weathermen broke up in the mid-seventies. Most of its members had left of their own accord or been captured, tried and sent to prison for long terms. One member, Bill Ayers, now teaches education at the University of Illinois Chicago campus and remains unrepentant (Charges were dropped against him after he turned himself in in 1980. He apparently was part of the non-lethal faction). Ayers and his also-former Weatherman spouse, Bernardine Dohrin are active in Democratic politics today in Chicago. In 1995, Illinois State Senator Alice Palmer had decided to run for Congress and took Obama around to various meetings (similar to fund-raising coffees) introducing him as her chosen successor. As part of these rounds, Palmer and Obama attended a meeting at the Ayers' home. Ayers and Obama also served on the same board of a Chicago foundation. The curious thing about Ayers is why were charges against him dropped?
I would contend that it would not be unusual for a young and up-coming Black politician coming out of the South Side of Chicago (the largest Black neighborhood in the country) to have the types of relationships Obama had with both Wright and Ayers, who were of the same "sixties generation."
Sunday, April 27, 2008
Wednesday, April 16, 2008
Iraq: Behind the Scenes and What Isn't Covered in the Media
This morning, I've been doing some superficial Internet research on the "legal" aspects of both our initial Iraq invasion and our on-going presence. Here's some of what I discovered.
Based on all of my reading to date, the Bush Administration determined to invade Iraq for the purpose of regime change, shortly before or after 9/11. In fact, one could make an argument that Iraq was always the intended target and that 9/11 and Afghanistan "distracted" the Administration from that purpose.
This is NOT to say, the Administration didn't have some legal basis for this intent. In 1998, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution for Iraqi regime change.
[Note: the Congressional Resolution stopped short of "authorizing" the use of U.S. force to secure regime change. In international law, chiefly through the Charter of the United Nations, "regime change" in itself is not a valid reason for the use of force. If it were, any war, for virtually any reason would be "legal." International law is more theory than substance and is, in part, "made" by actions, not intentions. But treaties, national commitments, etc. are essentially "contracts."]
Having thrown out U.N. inspectors earlier, Hussein was in clear violation of the U.N. cease fire agreement, or contract, signed following Gulf War I.
Following 9/11 and while still "wrapping up" in Afghanistan, the Bush Administration began building the case for forcing Hussein to comply with the U.N. cease-fire agreement and collecting intelligence to build the cause for invasion. In this environment, there were apparently two competing factions within the Administration. One faction, led essentially by Powell and the State Department, believed that it was necessary for the United States to go back to the U.N. to obtain their agreement on potential U.S. action, since the Hussein violations were linked to the U.N. sanctions and Gulf War I cease fire agreement. The second faction - Cheney, Rumsfeld and the neo-cons - argument was two-fold: 1) if the worse interpretation of the intelligence being gathered was true, the United States had the legitimate right to respond unilaterally to "imminent threat." And, 2) even without imminent threat, the U.S. had the "right" under the U.N. Charter to separately and alone determine that Hussein was in violation of the U.N. ceasefire agreement and to independently take action.
Secretary of State Powell believed the safer course of action was to return to the U.N. and obtain their acknowledgement of Hussein's violations and authorization for the use of force, if necessary for compliance. Bush apparently approved Powell's approach and this led to both his speech to the U.N. General Assembly and to Powell's presentation to the U.N. Security Council (the only U.N. body which can authorize the use of force).
The outcome of this was a sort of "last chance" resolution by the U.N. to Hussein, which in turn led to the return of U.N. inspectors. The inspectors returned and subsequently reported back to the U.N. that Hussein was "partially" complying, but that they required additional time to complete their work. With patience running out and "military timing" a factor (invasion before it became too hot for bio-chemical protective suits to be worn by the invading force), Bush began to shift toward the Cheney-Rumsfeld line of thought.
There was a brief final attempt, largely to please Tony Blair and the British, to obtain a U.N. sanction for the invasion. When it was discovered, due to the resistance of France, Russia, Chile (which was serving in a rotating seat on the Security Council at the time) and others, that we didn't have the votes, Bush proceeded.
The invasion went forward, not in defiance of the U.N., but under the tenuous argument that violations of the original ceasefire agreement and subsequent resolutions "authorized" the U.S.-U.K. coalition to act independently.
Had this logic been challenged, it probably would not have stood up to any sort of international judicial review. The U.N. General Assembly had the power to demand an investigation, but ultimately any meaningful condemnation of the invasion would have, under U.N. rules, been returned to the Security Council, where we (and the U.K.) possessed veto authority. Under a cloud of its own due to the Food for Oil U.N. program and largely dependent on the U.S. for operating funds, the U.N. let the invasion issue drop, with the General Secretary frowning and noting that the war was "probably" illegal under the U.N. Charter.
[Note: the Bush Administration was to use similar doubtful legal arguments with the U.S. Congress subsequently on the issues of torture and wiretapping.]
The Administration intended, from all I have read, to be in and out of Iraq in three months. Orders for withdrawal and redeployment had actually been issued, when things began to fall apart. By October 2003, it was becoming apparent that the situation was not going according to plan; the withdrawals were halted and the Administration turned again to the U.N. to get a formal declaration and sanction for our continuing presence. This is a fact largely ignored by American media and, consequently, the general public. The Multinational Force (the U.S., the Brits, Poles, Ukrainians, et al) are presently in Iraq under United Nations authority.
This "authority" has been granted and periodically renewed (annually) in coordination with the Iraq government and therein comes a big glitch.
The new Shite and Kurd dominated Iraqi Parliament apparently has the same sort of problem the U.S. Congress has been having with the Administration. A majority of the Parliament consider the status of the MNF (multi-national force) in Iraq to be, constitutionally, a subject for Parliamentary approval (just as the U.S. Congress believes they have the right of review of U.S.-Iraq agreements, under the advise and consent provisions of our Constitution). And, just as Bush has ignored the Senate's power of advise and consent, Prime Minister Maliki has ignored the Iraqi Parliament.
Apparently, the majority of the Iraq Parliament want a "timetable" for the withdrawal of the MNF, as well as the right to review (advise and consent) the U.N. required request from Iraq for a U.N. resolution authorizing our continued presence. They also want the right to review any agreements between the Maliki government and the Bush Administration regarding the U.S.-Iraq relationship (such as the Declaration of Principles recently signed between the two administrations). Again, this is a point virtually ignored by U.S. media.
This Fall, the Iraqis will hold, as we will, new elections. The present U.N. authorization for MNF presence runs out at the end of the year. The United States cannot confront a hostile Iraqi Parliament, a hostile U.S. Congress and a hostile U.N. over Iraq much longer.
In addition to the "surge" goal of stability, bringing the Sunnis into the Iraqi political system (even by "buying" their support), is essential to these forthcoming events. The Sunnis largely stayed out of the prior Iraqi elections and hence, out of Parliament. If a substantial bloc of Sunnis-Kurdish representatives cannot be created in Parliament in the next election, there will be increasing Shite and U.N. pressure for a timetable for withdrawal. Add to this problem, our own domestic and military problems.
Then, there is Iran. If the Bush Administration comes to believe that we will be "forced out," of Iraq, by either a U.N. resolution, a Shite dominated Iraqi Parliament and/or a new U.S. President/Congress, what action will they take regarding Iran?
Have a nice summer...it may be a very dangerous fall and winter.
Based on all of my reading to date, the Bush Administration determined to invade Iraq for the purpose of regime change, shortly before or after 9/11. In fact, one could make an argument that Iraq was always the intended target and that 9/11 and Afghanistan "distracted" the Administration from that purpose.
This is NOT to say, the Administration didn't have some legal basis for this intent. In 1998, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution for Iraqi regime change.
[Note: the Congressional Resolution stopped short of "authorizing" the use of U.S. force to secure regime change. In international law, chiefly through the Charter of the United Nations, "regime change" in itself is not a valid reason for the use of force. If it were, any war, for virtually any reason would be "legal." International law is more theory than substance and is, in part, "made" by actions, not intentions. But treaties, national commitments, etc. are essentially "contracts."]
Having thrown out U.N. inspectors earlier, Hussein was in clear violation of the U.N. cease fire agreement, or contract, signed following Gulf War I.
Following 9/11 and while still "wrapping up" in Afghanistan, the Bush Administration began building the case for forcing Hussein to comply with the U.N. cease-fire agreement and collecting intelligence to build the cause for invasion. In this environment, there were apparently two competing factions within the Administration. One faction, led essentially by Powell and the State Department, believed that it was necessary for the United States to go back to the U.N. to obtain their agreement on potential U.S. action, since the Hussein violations were linked to the U.N. sanctions and Gulf War I cease fire agreement. The second faction - Cheney, Rumsfeld and the neo-cons - argument was two-fold: 1) if the worse interpretation of the intelligence being gathered was true, the United States had the legitimate right to respond unilaterally to "imminent threat." And, 2) even without imminent threat, the U.S. had the "right" under the U.N. Charter to separately and alone determine that Hussein was in violation of the U.N. ceasefire agreement and to independently take action.
Secretary of State Powell believed the safer course of action was to return to the U.N. and obtain their acknowledgement of Hussein's violations and authorization for the use of force, if necessary for compliance. Bush apparently approved Powell's approach and this led to both his speech to the U.N. General Assembly and to Powell's presentation to the U.N. Security Council (the only U.N. body which can authorize the use of force).
The outcome of this was a sort of "last chance" resolution by the U.N. to Hussein, which in turn led to the return of U.N. inspectors. The inspectors returned and subsequently reported back to the U.N. that Hussein was "partially" complying, but that they required additional time to complete their work. With patience running out and "military timing" a factor (invasion before it became too hot for bio-chemical protective suits to be worn by the invading force), Bush began to shift toward the Cheney-Rumsfeld line of thought.
There was a brief final attempt, largely to please Tony Blair and the British, to obtain a U.N. sanction for the invasion. When it was discovered, due to the resistance of France, Russia, Chile (which was serving in a rotating seat on the Security Council at the time) and others, that we didn't have the votes, Bush proceeded.
The invasion went forward, not in defiance of the U.N., but under the tenuous argument that violations of the original ceasefire agreement and subsequent resolutions "authorized" the U.S.-U.K. coalition to act independently.
Had this logic been challenged, it probably would not have stood up to any sort of international judicial review. The U.N. General Assembly had the power to demand an investigation, but ultimately any meaningful condemnation of the invasion would have, under U.N. rules, been returned to the Security Council, where we (and the U.K.) possessed veto authority. Under a cloud of its own due to the Food for Oil U.N. program and largely dependent on the U.S. for operating funds, the U.N. let the invasion issue drop, with the General Secretary frowning and noting that the war was "probably" illegal under the U.N. Charter.
[Note: the Bush Administration was to use similar doubtful legal arguments with the U.S. Congress subsequently on the issues of torture and wiretapping.]
The Administration intended, from all I have read, to be in and out of Iraq in three months. Orders for withdrawal and redeployment had actually been issued, when things began to fall apart. By October 2003, it was becoming apparent that the situation was not going according to plan; the withdrawals were halted and the Administration turned again to the U.N. to get a formal declaration and sanction for our continuing presence. This is a fact largely ignored by American media and, consequently, the general public. The Multinational Force (the U.S., the Brits, Poles, Ukrainians, et al) are presently in Iraq under United Nations authority.
This "authority" has been granted and periodically renewed (annually) in coordination with the Iraq government and therein comes a big glitch.
The new Shite and Kurd dominated Iraqi Parliament apparently has the same sort of problem the U.S. Congress has been having with the Administration. A majority of the Parliament consider the status of the MNF (multi-national force) in Iraq to be, constitutionally, a subject for Parliamentary approval (just as the U.S. Congress believes they have the right of review of U.S.-Iraq agreements, under the advise and consent provisions of our Constitution). And, just as Bush has ignored the Senate's power of advise and consent, Prime Minister Maliki has ignored the Iraqi Parliament.
Apparently, the majority of the Iraq Parliament want a "timetable" for the withdrawal of the MNF, as well as the right to review (advise and consent) the U.N. required request from Iraq for a U.N. resolution authorizing our continued presence. They also want the right to review any agreements between the Maliki government and the Bush Administration regarding the U.S.-Iraq relationship (such as the Declaration of Principles recently signed between the two administrations). Again, this is a point virtually ignored by U.S. media.
This Fall, the Iraqis will hold, as we will, new elections. The present U.N. authorization for MNF presence runs out at the end of the year. The United States cannot confront a hostile Iraqi Parliament, a hostile U.S. Congress and a hostile U.N. over Iraq much longer.
In addition to the "surge" goal of stability, bringing the Sunnis into the Iraqi political system (even by "buying" their support), is essential to these forthcoming events. The Sunnis largely stayed out of the prior Iraqi elections and hence, out of Parliament. If a substantial bloc of Sunnis-Kurdish representatives cannot be created in Parliament in the next election, there will be increasing Shite and U.N. pressure for a timetable for withdrawal. Add to this problem, our own domestic and military problems.
Then, there is Iran. If the Bush Administration comes to believe that we will be "forced out," of Iraq, by either a U.N. resolution, a Shite dominated Iraqi Parliament and/or a new U.S. President/Congress, what action will they take regarding Iran?
Have a nice summer...it may be a very dangerous fall and winter.
Monday, April 14, 2008
A Quick Postscript
It's 1:00 AM and I've just finished watching a CSPAN panel discussion at some Washington luncheon on the Presidential Campaign. Panelists were the former editor of the NY Times, a prominent Democratic Pollster and Campaign Consultant (who managed Clinton's 1994 campaign) and Karl Rove. Wanted to get this observation down before I forget it and may follow-up with a later post.
In listening to the panel's analysis of the present presidential campaigns and their weaknesses and strengths, it occurred to me that a good political campaign is similar to a good umbrella. It protects you against whatever Mother Nature throws at you and consists of two important parts: the ribs of the umbrella and the cloth the ribs support. The various ribs are the specific policy elements, while the cloth is the overall campaign theme; both are essential to the umbrella's or campaign's purpose. And an umbrella or campaign without both is useless. The Obama campaign suffers from a lack of ribs/policies, but has an excellent theme/cloth; the Clinton campaign suffers from the opposite, sturdy ribs/policies, but a lack of cloth/theme.
Haven't exactly figured out McCain's position in this analogy, since thus far it appears to me as if he's standing in the rain with an umbrella composed of a single rib...Iraq.
Incidently, it took a foreign journalist (a Jordanian) to finally bring up a question I asked in an earlier post: if Obama is 50% African-American and 50% White-American, why do Americans refer to him as the "black" candidate? Somewhat embarrasingly, the ex-Times editor, who was originally from Alabama, had to explain that it may go back to Southern racial laws, which legally defined anyone with 1/64th black heritage to be "black." Ah...the Obama candidacy may be symbolic in showing both how far we've come and little we've come on race. Reminded me of the French proverb: the more things change, the more they remain the same.
P.S. to the P.S. There is, of course, a third element to both umbrellas and political campaigns...the handle, which allows you to use the umbrella and to open it...namely money.
In listening to the panel's analysis of the present presidential campaigns and their weaknesses and strengths, it occurred to me that a good political campaign is similar to a good umbrella. It protects you against whatever Mother Nature throws at you and consists of two important parts: the ribs of the umbrella and the cloth the ribs support. The various ribs are the specific policy elements, while the cloth is the overall campaign theme; both are essential to the umbrella's or campaign's purpose. And an umbrella or campaign without both is useless. The Obama campaign suffers from a lack of ribs/policies, but has an excellent theme/cloth; the Clinton campaign suffers from the opposite, sturdy ribs/policies, but a lack of cloth/theme.
Haven't exactly figured out McCain's position in this analogy, since thus far it appears to me as if he's standing in the rain with an umbrella composed of a single rib...Iraq.
Incidently, it took a foreign journalist (a Jordanian) to finally bring up a question I asked in an earlier post: if Obama is 50% African-American and 50% White-American, why do Americans refer to him as the "black" candidate? Somewhat embarrasingly, the ex-Times editor, who was originally from Alabama, had to explain that it may go back to Southern racial laws, which legally defined anyone with 1/64th black heritage to be "black." Ah...the Obama candidacy may be symbolic in showing both how far we've come and little we've come on race. Reminded me of the French proverb: the more things change, the more they remain the same.
P.S. to the P.S. There is, of course, a third element to both umbrellas and political campaigns...the handle, which allows you to use the umbrella and to open it...namely money.
Sunday, April 13, 2008
Miscellaneous
Before returning to the posts on economics, a little "this and that."
For family members who read this: remember the tommyblog and Alex and Rebecca's new website, with a "family forum." Alex is hoping to start a family forum.
On the campaign. I am over saturated with media coverage, but still have the vague feeling that I don't have a clear picture of where each candidate stands on issues. Media seems to love controversy and will spend days "picking" at a candidate over the smallest misstep, encouraged of course by the other candidates.
On reading: My current interests are in Iraq and the economy. Finished two books during latest trip to Seattle: "The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq," by George Packer, and "Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism," by Ha-Joon Chang. A few words on each.
"Assassins' Gate," was an excellent overview of the whole Iraq mess, from a reporters perspective. There are a lot of different "perspectives" on Iraq: the military perspective ("Cobra II" and "Fiasco"), the intelligence perspective ("In the Center of the Storm,' "The One Percent Doctrine" and "Imperial Hubris"), the American on the ground perspective ("My Year in Iraq" and "Imperial Life in the Emerald City"), the terrorist's perspective ("The Looming Tower"), the Iraqi perspective ("The Occupation of Iraq") and the political perspective (all three Woodward books and Buchanan's books), etc., etc. "Assassins' Gate" touches on each, but is primarily the personal story of the author, as he struggles to make some sense of it all. It's an interesting and comprehensive book, but after 465 pages, there is no final answer, due perhaps to the fact that there are so many "potential answers" from so many conflicting perspectives. It's a tough nut to crack.
For every point of view on Iraq, there is a legitimate counter-point, even if one throws out the crazy neo-con ideas, which contributed so much to our initial invasion.
My own opinion is that our response to 9/11 should have been limited to destroying those who attacked us - Al Qaeda, rather than blowing up the 9/11 event into a "War on Terror." We should have gone into Afghanistan with considerable more force than we did, destroyed Al Qaeda, including its leadership, and left. Period. At the same time, we should have made it crystal clear that our actions were in retaliation for the attack on 9/11 and that such action could be expected in response to any future attacks. Assuming responsibility for the "Afghan people," and nation-building was a commitment that far overreached our resources. [Alternatively, since Bush had decided on the nation-building course, we should have increased taxes and built an imperial military force consistent with that goal. I would not have supported such a course, but it would have made more sense than the mess we have now.]
Regarding Iraq, in my opinion, the proper course would have been to increase pressure on Hussein (much as we did) regarding U.N. inspections and then to have let them run their course, while simultaneously and diplomatically ensuring effective international sanctions. Based on what we NOW know, it is clear to me that had we taken such a course, Hussein would have probably been destroyed from within, in 3-5 years, with aid to insurgent rebels coming from his neighbors: the Saudis, the Turks, the Iranians and the Iraqi exiles, with our own covert assistance.
There is also the fact that within 24 hours of the launch of the invasion Hussein offered to leave the country, along with his family and a great deal of money, via Egypt. The rejection of his offer strikes me as similar to the beginnings of World War I, wherein the act of armed mobilization on the part of all parties concerned made last minute diplomacy impossible and made war inevitable.
While no one can be certain that Hussein's departure and the conditions of that departure could have been successfully negotiated, it seems to me that the offer was worth a delay of 24 to 48 hours to allow time for exploring the alternative to war.
In retrospect, the failure to give "peace" one last chance, has cost us 4,000+ dead, as well as coalition losses and 100,000+ Iraqi dead, and the trillions of dollars which the war and occupation may ultimately cost us. And, a negotiated end to the Hussein regime may have well held our traditional allies, calmed the "neighborhood," and put the U.S. in a better strategic position in the Middle East vis a vie Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, et al than we now have.
Such an outcome would have probably left a Baathist dictatorship of some sort in power and would probably have not avoided the subsequent insurgency (i.e. civil war), but this would have been their problem (and/or a possible international police force), not ours.
Unfortunately, our President's competency (and control) was somewhat akin to Kaiser Wilhelm's in WWI. To paraphrase Churchill, seldom have so few done so much to harm so many.
The Bush Administration's various disasters will shortly become history. The question is really not what we should have done, but what must we do now, with the next Administration?
The definition of "winning in Iraq," seems to change with the wind. There is a vast difference between leaving the country "civilly stable" and "stable in sovereignty." One may imagine the former to be accomplished in 2-3 years. The latter may require generations, in the same sense that we are still in Korea. In Korea, the on-going division between North and South geographically and politically required our continuing presence. In Iraq, the division is both geographic (in Sunni Anbar and the Kurdish semi-autonomous northern state), and religious/political (in the central and southern Shite regions).
Iraq itself is a creation of British/French map makers following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after WWI. It may be both "natural" and advantageous in terms of Western diplomacy, to allow the country to divide itself into three distinct semi-autonomous regions (which seems to be the way things are working out, independent of what we are doing). As of the moment, the removal of the Baathists and Hussein regime seems to have only reconstituted and inflamed sectarian divisions that have been a characteristic of the region for hundreds of years. Unlike Korea, Japan, and Germany, an Iraq analogy may be found closer in Northern Ireland or Bosnia.
What seems often overlooked is the truth that there is, in essence, no natural Iraqi State and that we currently are there, with 160,000 troops, to essentially hold together a British construction of Post WWI colonialism. Aside from exiles and a secular minority, in all likelihood, "self-determination" on the part of the Iraqi people would mean the willing partition of the "country."
Unlike our post WW II occupation of Germany and Japan, we are not dealing with a homogeneous people, nor with the type of complete devastation found in those countries following the war. The situation in Iraq is more of one wherein we play the role of their former conquerors, going back to the Persians, the Ottomans and/or the British; ensuring some minimal level of stability among essentially tribes based on religious affiliations intend on killing one another, as well as the "ruler" of the moment.
If this scenario is accurate, I see no reason for any long-term occupation that would be to our advantage, either in creating some sort of democratic state as a base of sanity in the region, or in terms of our own national security; a democratic state may be impractical given religious differences in the region and our national security may be better ensured by "quarantine" and containment.
Within this context, I believe a timetable for withdrawal to be in the best interests of the United States. The Iraqis have had 5+ years to "put it together" and it is becoming increasingly clear that allowing them to essentially determine their own timetable for our withdrawal is not working and may ensure only the continuing loss of American lives and dollars.
A "reasonable" withdrawal timetable will force the present Iraqi government to either put their own house in order or face civil war. "Reasonable," in this case means 2-4 years, which is roughly the same time period being offered by Obama and Clinton.
With U.S. public opinion running 2 to 1 against our continuing presence in Iraq and given that we are, theoretically still a democracy, I can see only two reasons for remaining: 1) it has to do with the Bush Doctrine of "democratizing" the world, whether they like it or not, or 2) stubbornness in not wanting to admit to a failed policy. Both of these may be misguided, but understandable, reasons for a Bush Presidency, but I'm hard pressed to understand the thinking of John McCain. McCain, to date, has offered no good reason for remaining.
The second book, "Bad Samartians: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism," was essentially a view of the world economy from the view point of the developing countries. It's author is a transplanted Korean, who is now a UK citizen and professor at Cambridge University. "The Secret History of Capitalism" part of the title is a bit overstated. It's there because he believes that the present western world's emphasis (and imposition) on free markets, free trade and laissez faire capitalism is some sort of "conspiracy" to globally enforce western dominance on the global economy. Pat Buchanan fans (of which I count myself as one, in part) will be delighted to discover, in this book, that the developing countries dislike organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization as much as they do. In fact, after reading this book, you might ask: Just who is for these organizations? The answer to that is too complicated to get into here, but what struck me about the book was how many similarities there were regarding populist arguments within the United States and the arguments of the developing countries on free trade and globalization.
At one time I worked for a Fortune 500 company. During the course of that employment, I had occasion to meet once or twice with the CEO of the company (in a group meeting), to discuss the divisional level business strategies, of which I was a part. During one such meeting, the CEO told us (the divisional level people) that what he wanted was a 10% increase in market share annually. This was back in the days when the current fad was "market share." At that time, we held 85% market share. As the guy out on the front lines trying to sell a product, this struck me as self-defeating, because given really basic rules of capitalism, dominating market share would only encourage increased competition. In other words, with that kind of market share, who among our customers would really believe our pricing? Given that my understanding of free markets was that only competition produced the best value, I foresaw actually losing business to smaller competitors that were higher priced than I was, in order for the customer to over the long haul determine true value.
So, rather than achieve a monopolistic market position, which would only encourage additional competition, my strategy was to be the low cost producer in a competitive market. And, beyond that, I believed (as a good capitalist) that a monopolistic position would also lead to internal sloppiness and inefficiencies. In sum, I welcomed competition, believing that it got the best out of both myself and the company.
It strikes me that American "globalization," has taken on many of the attitudes of my former CEO; that our present drive to "dominate" the world economically and militarily is basically counter-productive, over the long haul. "Over the long haul," is a key phrase; what I didn't realize in that meeting is that the CEO and I were at cross-purposes. At the same time, he was planning on selling the company and wanted maximize market share, not for the long term benefit of the company, but to make it an attractive "sale," via Wall Street deal makers. I have similar concerns about the "movers and shakers" of today's U.S. economy - i.e. as long as we "appear" to dominate, we'll be an attractive investment, regardless of the actual state of our assets.
I will get into this more in later posts, but present American economic globalization theory strikes me more as a perverse sort of mercantilism rather than advanced capitalism. I say "perverse" because mercantilism is associated with protectionism and tariffs; in its present perverse way, we are "eating our own" through the sale of overvalued assets, with overvalued dollars.
Finally, for today, a word on Obama's latest gaff; the "bitterness" comment referring to fundamentalist Christians, gun owners, and that loose category of Americans the elites refer to as "rednecks." Although severely criticized for the comment by both Clinton and McCain, it struck me as encouraging regarding his candidacy. I interpret the comment within the context of a general feeling of helplessness in the face of globalization and a dysfunctional government, leading to a feeling of "bitterness" about the "system" and a focus on the things that make up their daily lives. That is the key; it wasn't that they are bitter about their religion or right to own guns, but that these aspects of their lives are the only aspects over which they still feel they have control - i.e. you can take my job; you can take my house; you can open our borders; etc., etc., but don't mess with my right to own a gun or my religion...that's mine. And, if you get to that point, you are bound to be bitter, if not damn angry, about the rest.
The response was sort of: How can he say that, when we're all basically happy, thankful people, participating in the Great Democracy? For me, again, this was rather an example of how in tune Obama is with the actual mood of the majority of the country and the feeling that there is not really much difference between the parties; that there is tremondous dissatisfaction and the bitter feeling of betrayal by the "system," in the "heartland," which largely goes unnoticed by those either figuratively or mentally within the "beltway." I think if you understand this about his comment, you understand the "Obama Phenomena" and if you don't, you're on the outside looking in...or maybe on the inside, looking out.
Enough for today!
For family members who read this: remember the tommyblog and Alex and Rebecca's new website, with a "family forum." Alex is hoping to start a family forum.
On the campaign. I am over saturated with media coverage, but still have the vague feeling that I don't have a clear picture of where each candidate stands on issues. Media seems to love controversy and will spend days "picking" at a candidate over the smallest misstep, encouraged of course by the other candidates.
On reading: My current interests are in Iraq and the economy. Finished two books during latest trip to Seattle: "The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq," by George Packer, and "Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism," by Ha-Joon Chang. A few words on each.
"Assassins' Gate," was an excellent overview of the whole Iraq mess, from a reporters perspective. There are a lot of different "perspectives" on Iraq: the military perspective ("Cobra II" and "Fiasco"), the intelligence perspective ("In the Center of the Storm,' "The One Percent Doctrine" and "Imperial Hubris"), the American on the ground perspective ("My Year in Iraq" and "Imperial Life in the Emerald City"), the terrorist's perspective ("The Looming Tower"), the Iraqi perspective ("The Occupation of Iraq") and the political perspective (all three Woodward books and Buchanan's books), etc., etc. "Assassins' Gate" touches on each, but is primarily the personal story of the author, as he struggles to make some sense of it all. It's an interesting and comprehensive book, but after 465 pages, there is no final answer, due perhaps to the fact that there are so many "potential answers" from so many conflicting perspectives. It's a tough nut to crack.
For every point of view on Iraq, there is a legitimate counter-point, even if one throws out the crazy neo-con ideas, which contributed so much to our initial invasion.
My own opinion is that our response to 9/11 should have been limited to destroying those who attacked us - Al Qaeda, rather than blowing up the 9/11 event into a "War on Terror." We should have gone into Afghanistan with considerable more force than we did, destroyed Al Qaeda, including its leadership, and left. Period. At the same time, we should have made it crystal clear that our actions were in retaliation for the attack on 9/11 and that such action could be expected in response to any future attacks. Assuming responsibility for the "Afghan people," and nation-building was a commitment that far overreached our resources. [Alternatively, since Bush had decided on the nation-building course, we should have increased taxes and built an imperial military force consistent with that goal. I would not have supported such a course, but it would have made more sense than the mess we have now.]
Regarding Iraq, in my opinion, the proper course would have been to increase pressure on Hussein (much as we did) regarding U.N. inspections and then to have let them run their course, while simultaneously and diplomatically ensuring effective international sanctions. Based on what we NOW know, it is clear to me that had we taken such a course, Hussein would have probably been destroyed from within, in 3-5 years, with aid to insurgent rebels coming from his neighbors: the Saudis, the Turks, the Iranians and the Iraqi exiles, with our own covert assistance.
There is also the fact that within 24 hours of the launch of the invasion Hussein offered to leave the country, along with his family and a great deal of money, via Egypt. The rejection of his offer strikes me as similar to the beginnings of World War I, wherein the act of armed mobilization on the part of all parties concerned made last minute diplomacy impossible and made war inevitable.
While no one can be certain that Hussein's departure and the conditions of that departure could have been successfully negotiated, it seems to me that the offer was worth a delay of 24 to 48 hours to allow time for exploring the alternative to war.
In retrospect, the failure to give "peace" one last chance, has cost us 4,000+ dead, as well as coalition losses and 100,000+ Iraqi dead, and the trillions of dollars which the war and occupation may ultimately cost us. And, a negotiated end to the Hussein regime may have well held our traditional allies, calmed the "neighborhood," and put the U.S. in a better strategic position in the Middle East vis a vie Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, et al than we now have.
Such an outcome would have probably left a Baathist dictatorship of some sort in power and would probably have not avoided the subsequent insurgency (i.e. civil war), but this would have been their problem (and/or a possible international police force), not ours.
Unfortunately, our President's competency (and control) was somewhat akin to Kaiser Wilhelm's in WWI. To paraphrase Churchill, seldom have so few done so much to harm so many.
The Bush Administration's various disasters will shortly become history. The question is really not what we should have done, but what must we do now, with the next Administration?
The definition of "winning in Iraq," seems to change with the wind. There is a vast difference between leaving the country "civilly stable" and "stable in sovereignty." One may imagine the former to be accomplished in 2-3 years. The latter may require generations, in the same sense that we are still in Korea. In Korea, the on-going division between North and South geographically and politically required our continuing presence. In Iraq, the division is both geographic (in Sunni Anbar and the Kurdish semi-autonomous northern state), and religious/political (in the central and southern Shite regions).
Iraq itself is a creation of British/French map makers following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after WWI. It may be both "natural" and advantageous in terms of Western diplomacy, to allow the country to divide itself into three distinct semi-autonomous regions (which seems to be the way things are working out, independent of what we are doing). As of the moment, the removal of the Baathists and Hussein regime seems to have only reconstituted and inflamed sectarian divisions that have been a characteristic of the region for hundreds of years. Unlike Korea, Japan, and Germany, an Iraq analogy may be found closer in Northern Ireland or Bosnia.
What seems often overlooked is the truth that there is, in essence, no natural Iraqi State and that we currently are there, with 160,000 troops, to essentially hold together a British construction of Post WWI colonialism. Aside from exiles and a secular minority, in all likelihood, "self-determination" on the part of the Iraqi people would mean the willing partition of the "country."
Unlike our post WW II occupation of Germany and Japan, we are not dealing with a homogeneous people, nor with the type of complete devastation found in those countries following the war. The situation in Iraq is more of one wherein we play the role of their former conquerors, going back to the Persians, the Ottomans and/or the British; ensuring some minimal level of stability among essentially tribes based on religious affiliations intend on killing one another, as well as the "ruler" of the moment.
If this scenario is accurate, I see no reason for any long-term occupation that would be to our advantage, either in creating some sort of democratic state as a base of sanity in the region, or in terms of our own national security; a democratic state may be impractical given religious differences in the region and our national security may be better ensured by "quarantine" and containment.
Within this context, I believe a timetable for withdrawal to be in the best interests of the United States. The Iraqis have had 5+ years to "put it together" and it is becoming increasingly clear that allowing them to essentially determine their own timetable for our withdrawal is not working and may ensure only the continuing loss of American lives and dollars.
A "reasonable" withdrawal timetable will force the present Iraqi government to either put their own house in order or face civil war. "Reasonable," in this case means 2-4 years, which is roughly the same time period being offered by Obama and Clinton.
With U.S. public opinion running 2 to 1 against our continuing presence in Iraq and given that we are, theoretically still a democracy, I can see only two reasons for remaining: 1) it has to do with the Bush Doctrine of "democratizing" the world, whether they like it or not, or 2) stubbornness in not wanting to admit to a failed policy. Both of these may be misguided, but understandable, reasons for a Bush Presidency, but I'm hard pressed to understand the thinking of John McCain. McCain, to date, has offered no good reason for remaining.
The second book, "Bad Samartians: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism," was essentially a view of the world economy from the view point of the developing countries. It's author is a transplanted Korean, who is now a UK citizen and professor at Cambridge University. "The Secret History of Capitalism" part of the title is a bit overstated. It's there because he believes that the present western world's emphasis (and imposition) on free markets, free trade and laissez faire capitalism is some sort of "conspiracy" to globally enforce western dominance on the global economy. Pat Buchanan fans (of which I count myself as one, in part) will be delighted to discover, in this book, that the developing countries dislike organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization as much as they do. In fact, after reading this book, you might ask: Just who is for these organizations? The answer to that is too complicated to get into here, but what struck me about the book was how many similarities there were regarding populist arguments within the United States and the arguments of the developing countries on free trade and globalization.
At one time I worked for a Fortune 500 company. During the course of that employment, I had occasion to meet once or twice with the CEO of the company (in a group meeting), to discuss the divisional level business strategies, of which I was a part. During one such meeting, the CEO told us (the divisional level people) that what he wanted was a 10% increase in market share annually. This was back in the days when the current fad was "market share." At that time, we held 85% market share. As the guy out on the front lines trying to sell a product, this struck me as self-defeating, because given really basic rules of capitalism, dominating market share would only encourage increased competition. In other words, with that kind of market share, who among our customers would really believe our pricing? Given that my understanding of free markets was that only competition produced the best value, I foresaw actually losing business to smaller competitors that were higher priced than I was, in order for the customer to over the long haul determine true value.
So, rather than achieve a monopolistic market position, which would only encourage additional competition, my strategy was to be the low cost producer in a competitive market. And, beyond that, I believed (as a good capitalist) that a monopolistic position would also lead to internal sloppiness and inefficiencies. In sum, I welcomed competition, believing that it got the best out of both myself and the company.
It strikes me that American "globalization," has taken on many of the attitudes of my former CEO; that our present drive to "dominate" the world economically and militarily is basically counter-productive, over the long haul. "Over the long haul," is a key phrase; what I didn't realize in that meeting is that the CEO and I were at cross-purposes. At the same time, he was planning on selling the company and wanted maximize market share, not for the long term benefit of the company, but to make it an attractive "sale," via Wall Street deal makers. I have similar concerns about the "movers and shakers" of today's U.S. economy - i.e. as long as we "appear" to dominate, we'll be an attractive investment, regardless of the actual state of our assets.
I will get into this more in later posts, but present American economic globalization theory strikes me more as a perverse sort of mercantilism rather than advanced capitalism. I say "perverse" because mercantilism is associated with protectionism and tariffs; in its present perverse way, we are "eating our own" through the sale of overvalued assets, with overvalued dollars.
Finally, for today, a word on Obama's latest gaff; the "bitterness" comment referring to fundamentalist Christians, gun owners, and that loose category of Americans the elites refer to as "rednecks." Although severely criticized for the comment by both Clinton and McCain, it struck me as encouraging regarding his candidacy. I interpret the comment within the context of a general feeling of helplessness in the face of globalization and a dysfunctional government, leading to a feeling of "bitterness" about the "system" and a focus on the things that make up their daily lives. That is the key; it wasn't that they are bitter about their religion or right to own guns, but that these aspects of their lives are the only aspects over which they still feel they have control - i.e. you can take my job; you can take my house; you can open our borders; etc., etc., but don't mess with my right to own a gun or my religion...that's mine. And, if you get to that point, you are bound to be bitter, if not damn angry, about the rest.
The response was sort of: How can he say that, when we're all basically happy, thankful people, participating in the Great Democracy? For me, again, this was rather an example of how in tune Obama is with the actual mood of the majority of the country and the feeling that there is not really much difference between the parties; that there is tremondous dissatisfaction and the bitter feeling of betrayal by the "system," in the "heartland," which largely goes unnoticed by those either figuratively or mentally within the "beltway." I think if you understand this about his comment, you understand the "Obama Phenomena" and if you don't, you're on the outside looking in...or maybe on the inside, looking out.
Enough for today!
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