Wolfowitz Resignation...Maybe
Wolfowitz seems to have negotiated his deal with the World Bank and will presumably be leaving June 30th, but I wouldn't put real money on it. He apparently wanted to be "cleared" of the ethics charges, despite the Bank's special panel, composed of 7 directors, which found him guilty of same. So, the final (maybe) Board statement was carefully worded, saying in effect: "We accept your position that you believe you did not violate ethical standards." Note, this does not say Wolfowitz did NOT violate ethical standards, but only recognizes that that is his position. Ah, so this leaves room for further debate, which will probably hinge on his severance agreement. Bank's position MAY BE: "OK, since we did not formally accept the Special Panel report and vote you out, we'll agree on normal severance (I believe, in this case, one year's salary)." While Wolfowitz gives up the right to sue, since he was forced to resign without being formally found guilty of ethics violations by the board.
Much to do about nothing? Hardly. A WSJ reporter on CSPAN this morning dismissed the money angle with: "That wouldn't be a concern to someone of Wolfowitz's statue." Ha! Ha! Money is exactly what it was all about (in large measure)...the outlandish salary increase Wolfowitz arranged for his friend. [Granted, there were other issues...the personal staff he brought in at inflated salaries - but who are these guys to complain - generally alienating many of the long term careerists with his management style (I didn't realize he had one), and attacking corruption (when you do the latter, you'd better be like Caesars wife...above and beyond approach)].
Although I don't know Wolfowitz's financial background, I would suspect that he is NOT a wealthy individual. Other than a brief tenure as the Dean of Advance Studies at the John Hopkins School for International Studies, he has been a career civil servant. Civil Service isn't exactly something you get rich at. I also suspect that the $300K + (tax free) he was making at the bank may have been the most he'd made in his entire career. Thus, while the issue has been about "ethics" publically...well...right. Like the people of Iraq were going to greet us with flowers and Iraq oil would pick up our tab. Right. Wolfowitz never impressed me as a great intellect, but apparently - in certain circles, such as former baseball team owners - built his reputation on just that.
New Immigration Bill
The thing that strikes me about this is that it is a compromise agreement between basically two special interest groups: Business interests versus Labor interests.
Both groups want "Amnesty-by-another-name." Business wants to retain the cheap labor; Labor wants to organize the cheap labor. So, the illegal immigrant gets screwed both ways: gets to continue to work for sub-par wages and pay union dues on top! Both sides seem willing to fight it out for the potential vote they represent and both compromised by pushing citizenship out so far that it isn't an immediate issue to either.
My own position is that we do in fact "owe" them something. True, they broke the law; a law generally ignored by both Democrats and Republicans. So, while I believe some penalty needs to be assessed, the assessment almost comes down to a case-by-case situation. The proposed $5,000 fine seems a bit stiff for the hard-working, under paid majority, but will probably be OK for those who are pushing drugs, avoiding taxation, or otherwise carrying on some lucrative criminal activity.
It would seem to me that there are essentially three priorities: 1) re-gain control of the border; 2) get the 12-20M "undocumented aliens," documented - i.e. registered; 3) sort them all out with some criteria that "ranks" those who register. A faster track to citizenship if they'd stayed clean, paid taxes, been gainfully employed, etc. A slower track otherwise. Come down hard on those who do not register. And send the convicted felons home (following their jail time). And maybe send Mexico a bill for their imprisonment expense.
I would also note that the special visas granted to high-tech and professional immigrants was increased from 40,000/year to 110,000/year. A little sugar thrown in that I would guess has very little to do with the vast majority of Mexican illegals. I cannot imagine many Microsoft or Apple employees crossed the U.S.-Mexican border illegally to seek up-scale employment. Ah...but that's what Bush was talking about when he used the phrase, "comprehensive solution."
However, there are positive elements. Border security comes first, before the rather drawn out amnesty process. So, if border security fails, we don't get to the second part. This may dissuade a sudden stepped up invasion of those seeking to cross for the second amnesty phase. Well...maybe.
And, there is a penalty, the $5,000 fine. While I think it too stiff and will discourage a lot of hardworking, honest people from registering, I also think there has to be SOME penalty. [I wonder how they came up with the $5,000 number. I would guess most illegal aliens live close to hand-to-mouth. Wanta bet, if the bill passes the banks will roll-out special programs to loan them the money at...oh...say 40% interest. There is something in this for almost every body...other than the illegal immigrants and U.S. citizens outside of the beltway.] And, there is a point system which takes into account skill levels, family situation, etc.
This is certainly a case of the "devil being in the detail," so my final judgment rests on a better understanding of the bill's proposals.
Alberto
I've never been a big fan of the present Attorney General. Suppose he was a small town attorney, who became Bush's personal legal bag man and just stuck with it. Not quite sure how he and Harriet Meyers divided their responsibilities? Did one work for the other? Did they have separate responsibilities? Whatever. I do think he is/was slightly more astute than Meyers (who seemed like a nice, but limited, lady). I've always wondered that even in the case of Presidential appointments, if you're really smart, why would you want to work for someone really dumb? Well, there are a lot of "memoirs" ahead following GW's departure. I am hoping that people like AG AG (hmmm...hadn't thought of that...do you suppose that's why Bush put him in...as a joke?). Attorney General Alberto Gonzales? Oops...lost train of thought. I am hoping that people such as Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice, Gonzales, et al will keep in mind that the President's favorite reading material consists of "sports biographies" and will feel free to write about their experiences within the Administration.
The latest story is a whopper...but not sure it directly relates to AG's present situation. Waking up John Ascroft in the middle of the night while he was in intensive care, to brow beat him into signing off on the Pres's illegal surveillance program is, true, a bit crass. But then, what did Ashcroft expect out of these people? [To Ashcroft's credit, he told them to get the hell out.] Ho hum...par for the course. But it does seem to me that people are going after Gonzales as a proxy for Bush himself. Other than a travesty to American justice and a kick-in-the-face for those of us outside of the beltway (and we're getting used to that), the people inside the beltway would probably be better off to just leave him where he is and beat him up occasionally over the remaining 18 months or so. Like...who would replace him? Where IS Harriet Meyers? I'd love to see that. But the chances are that if AG left the AG, Bush would have to appoint someone at least close to being perceived as bi-partisan, to get through the appointment scrutiny and that that person would be replaced in 12-18 months. Who would want to disrupt their lives for that? Ah...James Baker. Just for the hell of it...and he might be the only person in American history to have held three cabinet positions (State, Treasury and Justice). Well, I suppose even life long family friendships only go so far.
Internet problems as of late...but back on line...more in the coming days.
Friday, May 18, 2007
Tuesday, May 15, 2007
More on Tenent and Pre-Invasion Intelligence
In my last blog I suggested that in regard to the decision to invade Iraq there may have been a "confluence of interests," rather than a conspiracy. There is an old saying that "there is no one more fanatical than a convert." A history of neo-conservatives traces their origins back to people who were, in the beginning, disaffected Trotskyites. With converts and ideologues the "end" often justifies the "means." If the "truth" is at the end of the road, it matters little how you get there and this may be particularly true of those who have used different paths. Thus, while the specific "interest" may have differed (Israel, Oil, Fundamental Christianity, business interests, etc.) I have little doubt that all of those who influenced the invasion decision thought they were acting in the best interests of the United States. Not questioning the patriotism of Bush, Cheney, et al may be some indication of how significantly the war issue has evolved over the last two-three years.
Tenent's book notes one fact, which if not new, I had not heard before. In discussing his opposition to Bush's famous State of the Union statement concerning supposed Iraqi pursuit of Niger yellow cake uranium, he tells us that in addition to the questionable sources of the intelligence, it made no sense to him since the CIA (and presumably Bush, Cheney, et al) already knew that Iraqi possessed 550 metric tons of the stuff. No one...not Bush, not Cheney, nor any of the Administration's dwindling supporters has heretofore pointed this out. Why? Why rely on questionable intelligence, now pretty much discredited as being based on forged documents, when other intelligence existed that confirmed Iraq's possession of bomb grade uranium? [Note: At the time of the Address, I thought something was wrong. The intelligence had already been questioned in the press and Bush's emphasis on "According to BRITISH intelligence...." struck me as strange. Why, I thought would he take British intelligence and clearly emphasize BRITISH. I thought it a slap in the face to the CIA; now I think it was because he anticipated Tenent's disagreement and was well aware of the CIA's earlier objection. In his book, Tenent claims he'd only looked at the Address casually the night before and did not watch the Address.]
There are possibily two explanations: 1) the other intelligence could not be used without endangering its source or 2) revealing that intelligence would have also in some way have discredited the argument of imminent nuclear threat (e.g. "they've had this stuff for ten years and haven't done anything with it").
Given what everyone believed and has not been disproven regarding Hussein's nature and long term intent, I would tend to side with the former explanation rather than the latter. The mere possession of bomb grade uranium by Hussein would have constituted a serious - if not imminent - threat and gained public support for invasion; in any regard, it would have been seen as more threatening than "British intelligence" suggesting Iraq was merely in the market for such material.
So...pretend to be Dick Cheney for the moment or maybe, at least Scooter Libby. You are aware, presumably based on "good" intelligence, that Hussein possesses 550 metric tons of yellow cake uranium, but can't reveal this due to compromising the sources. Are you justified in going with less creditable intelligence - even fabricated intelligence - to make the same point to the American people? I would argue no, but I can understand, if not agree with, the opposite argument. Did the policy makers, at one level or another, present false and questionable intelligence as the reasons for war in what they believed to be the best interests of the country and to protect other more solid intelligence that could not be revealed? Maybe. But of course the burden of proof for this possibility now rests with those who provided either false or cherry-picked intelligence.
Despite all of my readings, despite being against the Bush Doctrine and the decision to invade, despite all of the rather obvious incompetence, I have not yet come to the point wherein I believe that either Rumsfeld or Cheney lied directly to us, although those who surrounded them in all likelihood did for the reason noted above. Neither Rumsfeld or Cheney ever impressed me as "ideolouges," but as essentially pragmatic administrators. Did they want to get rid of Hussein prior to 9/11? Definitely. Did they believe the Clinton years had had a negative effect on American foreign policy and our military posture? Of course. Did 9/11 offer an "opportunity" to bring about regime change in Iraq and a major shift in U.S. policies with which they'd long disagreed? Absolutely.
But does all of that equate to taking part in a conspriacy to take us into an illegal war? No.
Two significant statements made by Rumsfeld give some evidence that he was not necessarily as enthusiastic about going to war as virtually everyone now believes he was. The first was his instinctive response to a soldier regarding lack of armor during one of his visits to Iraq, when he replied: "You don't always go to war with what you'd like to have." Interpretation of that remark depends on your perspective. For much of the media it illustrated a calloused disregard for our troops in the field. For much of the senior military opposed to the "leaner, meaner force structure" Rumsfeld was trying to implement, it may have been an admission of failure and vindication of the "Powell Doctrine." But, within the context of the Administration's arguments and thinking it may be seen as "opposition" to the invasion itself.
Did Rumsfeld actively argue for war? It's not clear. Tenent's book clearly shows that there was no love lost between the CIA and DoD. Rumsfeld certainly brought people into DoD who did (Wolfwitz, Feith, Pearle. et al). And, Tenent points out that Rumsfeld seemed to imply he'd rather invade Iraq than Afghanistan because Iraq contained "more targets." But did he actually recommend war? He says "no." When asked by Woodward, he replied: "I agreed with the decision, but no one asked me."
I would suggest that Rumsfeld had not been brought into the Administration with the anticipation that he might end up as a wartime Secretary of Defense. He was essentially a "functionary" brought in to revamp the military, to reorganize and modernize. Not to fight a war. And, as Cheney's former boss, he was in a bad situation. In that, Mr. Harvard MBA, our President, erred in basic management - never put a former boss in as a subordinate. Rumsfeld did what he could, given his talents and restraints and played as one of the "team." I suspect he had far more doubts than were expressed. I would hope that following the departure of the Bush Administration that he will write his own account, or leave something to be published following his own passing.
Indeed, it would appear that other than the neo-cons, who were generally found a tier down in the hierarchy, most had unexpressed doubts. Perhaps it was the macho orientation? The age difference between GW and his key advisors? A desire by older and wiser men to show that despite their age they could get the job done. That they wouldn't let the President down or perhaps even more so, they wouldn't fail George Senior. They'd take care of his boy.
The Cheney conversion has been wondered about both in the media and among those who served with him in earlier years (e.g. Powell, Scrowcroft, et al). I suspect his out-of-government experience at Halliburton and with the Texas crowd moved him a bit to the right, as did his spouse Lynne Cheney, whom I had always believed was further to the right than himself. Also, Cheney perhaps took 9/11 harder than anyone, because he was Mr. National Defense as Vice President. Like him or hate him, Cheney is a guy who doesn't make excuses for himself.
It is safe to say that whatever mistakes may have been made and in wake of the "I told you so" dissenters following 9/11 it was an event that made an organizational shamble of the Bush Administration. Powell, the General, at State; Rumsfeld, Mr. Wizard, at the Pentagon; the point man Cheney as VP. Excellent choices for peacetime; a disaster in war.
In the end, I blame Bush. It was a time to shift management styles. Not necessarily to replace people, but to become more involved and insist on putting the country on a war footing and that the focus remain on Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden and not be diverted until that task was accomplished. It was time for him to step up and help them instead of vice versa. Instead, it was "business as usual" and a continuing reliance on staffers with basically several lifetimes of staff experience. And, they reverted to what staffs do...worry about their respective standings with the boss. Remain silent or be evasive when in the same room with him and others...holding their counsel for one-on-one. And, so genuine policy came from the "wonks" beneath the administrators...the neo-cons, who had all the answers...ready and waiting. And they were wrong.
Tenent's book notes one fact, which if not new, I had not heard before. In discussing his opposition to Bush's famous State of the Union statement concerning supposed Iraqi pursuit of Niger yellow cake uranium, he tells us that in addition to the questionable sources of the intelligence, it made no sense to him since the CIA (and presumably Bush, Cheney, et al) already knew that Iraqi possessed 550 metric tons of the stuff. No one...not Bush, not Cheney, nor any of the Administration's dwindling supporters has heretofore pointed this out. Why? Why rely on questionable intelligence, now pretty much discredited as being based on forged documents, when other intelligence existed that confirmed Iraq's possession of bomb grade uranium? [Note: At the time of the Address, I thought something was wrong. The intelligence had already been questioned in the press and Bush's emphasis on "According to BRITISH intelligence...." struck me as strange. Why, I thought would he take British intelligence and clearly emphasize BRITISH. I thought it a slap in the face to the CIA; now I think it was because he anticipated Tenent's disagreement and was well aware of the CIA's earlier objection. In his book, Tenent claims he'd only looked at the Address casually the night before and did not watch the Address.]
There are possibily two explanations: 1) the other intelligence could not be used without endangering its source or 2) revealing that intelligence would have also in some way have discredited the argument of imminent nuclear threat (e.g. "they've had this stuff for ten years and haven't done anything with it").
Given what everyone believed and has not been disproven regarding Hussein's nature and long term intent, I would tend to side with the former explanation rather than the latter. The mere possession of bomb grade uranium by Hussein would have constituted a serious - if not imminent - threat and gained public support for invasion; in any regard, it would have been seen as more threatening than "British intelligence" suggesting Iraq was merely in the market for such material.
So...pretend to be Dick Cheney for the moment or maybe, at least Scooter Libby. You are aware, presumably based on "good" intelligence, that Hussein possesses 550 metric tons of yellow cake uranium, but can't reveal this due to compromising the sources. Are you justified in going with less creditable intelligence - even fabricated intelligence - to make the same point to the American people? I would argue no, but I can understand, if not agree with, the opposite argument. Did the policy makers, at one level or another, present false and questionable intelligence as the reasons for war in what they believed to be the best interests of the country and to protect other more solid intelligence that could not be revealed? Maybe. But of course the burden of proof for this possibility now rests with those who provided either false or cherry-picked intelligence.
Despite all of my readings, despite being against the Bush Doctrine and the decision to invade, despite all of the rather obvious incompetence, I have not yet come to the point wherein I believe that either Rumsfeld or Cheney lied directly to us, although those who surrounded them in all likelihood did for the reason noted above. Neither Rumsfeld or Cheney ever impressed me as "ideolouges," but as essentially pragmatic administrators. Did they want to get rid of Hussein prior to 9/11? Definitely. Did they believe the Clinton years had had a negative effect on American foreign policy and our military posture? Of course. Did 9/11 offer an "opportunity" to bring about regime change in Iraq and a major shift in U.S. policies with which they'd long disagreed? Absolutely.
But does all of that equate to taking part in a conspriacy to take us into an illegal war? No.
Two significant statements made by Rumsfeld give some evidence that he was not necessarily as enthusiastic about going to war as virtually everyone now believes he was. The first was his instinctive response to a soldier regarding lack of armor during one of his visits to Iraq, when he replied: "You don't always go to war with what you'd like to have." Interpretation of that remark depends on your perspective. For much of the media it illustrated a calloused disregard for our troops in the field. For much of the senior military opposed to the "leaner, meaner force structure" Rumsfeld was trying to implement, it may have been an admission of failure and vindication of the "Powell Doctrine." But, within the context of the Administration's arguments and thinking it may be seen as "opposition" to the invasion itself.
Did Rumsfeld actively argue for war? It's not clear. Tenent's book clearly shows that there was no love lost between the CIA and DoD. Rumsfeld certainly brought people into DoD who did (Wolfwitz, Feith, Pearle. et al). And, Tenent points out that Rumsfeld seemed to imply he'd rather invade Iraq than Afghanistan because Iraq contained "more targets." But did he actually recommend war? He says "no." When asked by Woodward, he replied: "I agreed with the decision, but no one asked me."
I would suggest that Rumsfeld had not been brought into the Administration with the anticipation that he might end up as a wartime Secretary of Defense. He was essentially a "functionary" brought in to revamp the military, to reorganize and modernize. Not to fight a war. And, as Cheney's former boss, he was in a bad situation. In that, Mr. Harvard MBA, our President, erred in basic management - never put a former boss in as a subordinate. Rumsfeld did what he could, given his talents and restraints and played as one of the "team." I suspect he had far more doubts than were expressed. I would hope that following the departure of the Bush Administration that he will write his own account, or leave something to be published following his own passing.
Indeed, it would appear that other than the neo-cons, who were generally found a tier down in the hierarchy, most had unexpressed doubts. Perhaps it was the macho orientation? The age difference between GW and his key advisors? A desire by older and wiser men to show that despite their age they could get the job done. That they wouldn't let the President down or perhaps even more so, they wouldn't fail George Senior. They'd take care of his boy.
The Cheney conversion has been wondered about both in the media and among those who served with him in earlier years (e.g. Powell, Scrowcroft, et al). I suspect his out-of-government experience at Halliburton and with the Texas crowd moved him a bit to the right, as did his spouse Lynne Cheney, whom I had always believed was further to the right than himself. Also, Cheney perhaps took 9/11 harder than anyone, because he was Mr. National Defense as Vice President. Like him or hate him, Cheney is a guy who doesn't make excuses for himself.
It is safe to say that whatever mistakes may have been made and in wake of the "I told you so" dissenters following 9/11 it was an event that made an organizational shamble of the Bush Administration. Powell, the General, at State; Rumsfeld, Mr. Wizard, at the Pentagon; the point man Cheney as VP. Excellent choices for peacetime; a disaster in war.
In the end, I blame Bush. It was a time to shift management styles. Not necessarily to replace people, but to become more involved and insist on putting the country on a war footing and that the focus remain on Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden and not be diverted until that task was accomplished. It was time for him to step up and help them instead of vice versa. Instead, it was "business as usual" and a continuing reliance on staffers with basically several lifetimes of staff experience. And, they reverted to what staffs do...worry about their respective standings with the boss. Remain silent or be evasive when in the same room with him and others...holding their counsel for one-on-one. And, so genuine policy came from the "wonks" beneath the administrators...the neo-cons, who had all the answers...ready and waiting. And they were wrong.
Spring & Summer Reading
I've just finished reading George Tenent's book, "At the Center of the Storm." The gist of it is that Tenent probably deserved the "Medal of Freedom," for putting up with the Administration's neo-cons, if for nothing else. Paranoia and arrogance is a bad mix, but DoD under Rumsfeld and the White House under Cheney seem to have had an abundance of both.
Perhaps history will judge them more kindly, but it seems apparent that in their terror over terror and fear of being blamed for incompetence leading up to 9/11, a small group of ideologues, who were driving our post 9/11 responses, basically completely lost faith in our established institutions - i.e. the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, et al and established their own networks to circumvent these institutions. That's the charitible case. Worse would be that this same small group of ideologues successfully seized, through lies and deceit, control of American foreign policy and, by Cheney proxy, the Presidency.
According to Tenent, he wrote the book because he came to believe that certain elements within the White House (he never blames the President directly) took his "Slam Dunk" remark out of context, fed it to Bob Woodward, in an attempt to shift all of the pre-Iraq invasion intelligence errors onto him and the CIA. Fair enough and in that he makes a case that perhaps did not need making. If one simply followed the day-to-day news during the lead-up to war, it was clear long before the "Slam Dunk" remark that this was an Administration that wanted War. [Note: it is often conveniently forgotten today in the Administration's claim that "we all had the same intelligence," that almost one-third of Congress voted against the resolution granting the President the authority for the Iraqi invasion and that this group was composed of some very knowledgeable and sober people - i.e. former senator Bob Graham of Florida, who served on the Senate Intelligence Committee].
More importantly, Tenent's book is an interesting account of the paranoia within the Administration. Tenent would have been wiser had he taken the advice of his former mentor and resigned after the first six months of the Bush Presidency. On the other hand, the country itself may have been worse off. Were it not for people like Tenent and Powell, we might be facing worse today.
Tenent was clearly an "outsider" within the Administration. Orginially appointed by Clinton, he was held over based on the recommendation, apparently, of Bush Senior. As far as I can remember, he was the sole senior appointee to have transitioned between the two Administrations. And, his "access" to policy making was downgraded, when Bush Junior decided that the Director of the CIA would no longer be given "cabinet status."
Tenent critics (in and outside of the CIA) have accussed him of being "too political." Clearly from his book, he is a "people person"; he ran the CIA as such and a major personal goal was to revive the human intelligence side of the agency. Further, unlike Powell, he had little if any independent support base outside of government. Anyone in a position of authority in any organization must be wary of "speaking truth to power." There is a fine line between going against the boss and being a team player. So, I don't really hold that particular criticism against him. Due to the nature of his job, had he resigned "on principle," very little of detail could have been discussed in the open press. Further, the Administration would have simply spun his departure as the completion of a changing of the guard and replaced him with a neo-con. [Powell was in a similar situation, but not to the same degree; Powell had more of an independant support base outside of the Administration. I am an admirer of Powell and believe that he has served his country well, but he still owes the American people a book similar to Tenent's, as well as post-Administration books from Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, et al.]
There are interesting tidbits in the book. One is that following our arrival in Baghdad, the military found countless documents scattered about the various Hussein ministries confirming the linkage of Hussein to Al Qaeda and 9/11. Not too surprisingly, all of these documents turned out to be forgeries. Forgeries seem to play an important role in events surrounding the Bush Administration: yellow-cake uranium in Niger, Dan Rather's demise, etc. There has been some circumstantial evidence that traces the yellow-cake forgeries to an American neo-con (Michael Ledeen), but more on that in a future post.
So...research into Iraq continues. I am now reading three books on the subject: Paul Bremer's ""My Year In Iraq," Frances Fukuyama's "America At the Crossroads," and Micahel Oren's "Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present." [And, as a note to birthday/father's day givers, have completed all of Buchanan's books, all of Woodward's books, "Cobra II," "Fiasco," "Hubris," and numerous others...so certificates might be more appropriate.]
To date, Iraq seems to have been "the Perfect Storm." I've written that the only strategic interests the United States has in the region are Oil and Israel. Both begged for regime change in Iraq. Hussein was neither a friend of the Israelis or the Saudis and a threat to both. Cheney understood the Saudis and oil aspect as many, if not all, of the neo-cons understood the Israeli aspect. 9/11 presented the opportunity.
I am not a conspiracy buff. Well, at least not big, all comprehensive conspiracies. Rather, I suspect much of human behavior consists of thousands upon thousands of little conspiracies, with sort of ad hoc motivations. They form and they go, based on specific purposes. Today's conspirators may be tomorrow's enemies. In the case of Iraq, I suspect, there was simply a confluence of interests. Various people, in positions of influence, for different reasons, were pursuing the same goal. I do not believe "cherry-picking" intelligence to be an impeachable offense. It may be a sign of incompetence and reason enough not to vote for Dick Cheney or George Bush ever again, and may damn them in the eyes of history, but it is not sufficient an offense to call for impeachment. If, however, intelligence was not only cherry picked, but fabricated to be cherry picked and this was known by the policy makers that IS, in my opinion, impeachable and tantamount to treason within a democratic state.
To my knowledge there is, at present, no hard evidence linking the cherry picking of intelligence to fabrication of this same intelligence, although there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to warrant further investigation. And, needless to say, that in itself will not resolve the present Iraqi situation.
More within the next few days.
Perhaps history will judge them more kindly, but it seems apparent that in their terror over terror and fear of being blamed for incompetence leading up to 9/11, a small group of ideologues, who were driving our post 9/11 responses, basically completely lost faith in our established institutions - i.e. the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, et al and established their own networks to circumvent these institutions. That's the charitible case. Worse would be that this same small group of ideologues successfully seized, through lies and deceit, control of American foreign policy and, by Cheney proxy, the Presidency.
According to Tenent, he wrote the book because he came to believe that certain elements within the White House (he never blames the President directly) took his "Slam Dunk" remark out of context, fed it to Bob Woodward, in an attempt to shift all of the pre-Iraq invasion intelligence errors onto him and the CIA. Fair enough and in that he makes a case that perhaps did not need making. If one simply followed the day-to-day news during the lead-up to war, it was clear long before the "Slam Dunk" remark that this was an Administration that wanted War. [Note: it is often conveniently forgotten today in the Administration's claim that "we all had the same intelligence," that almost one-third of Congress voted against the resolution granting the President the authority for the Iraqi invasion and that this group was composed of some very knowledgeable and sober people - i.e. former senator Bob Graham of Florida, who served on the Senate Intelligence Committee].
More importantly, Tenent's book is an interesting account of the paranoia within the Administration. Tenent would have been wiser had he taken the advice of his former mentor and resigned after the first six months of the Bush Presidency. On the other hand, the country itself may have been worse off. Were it not for people like Tenent and Powell, we might be facing worse today.
Tenent was clearly an "outsider" within the Administration. Orginially appointed by Clinton, he was held over based on the recommendation, apparently, of Bush Senior. As far as I can remember, he was the sole senior appointee to have transitioned between the two Administrations. And, his "access" to policy making was downgraded, when Bush Junior decided that the Director of the CIA would no longer be given "cabinet status."
Tenent critics (in and outside of the CIA) have accussed him of being "too political." Clearly from his book, he is a "people person"; he ran the CIA as such and a major personal goal was to revive the human intelligence side of the agency. Further, unlike Powell, he had little if any independent support base outside of government. Anyone in a position of authority in any organization must be wary of "speaking truth to power." There is a fine line between going against the boss and being a team player. So, I don't really hold that particular criticism against him. Due to the nature of his job, had he resigned "on principle," very little of detail could have been discussed in the open press. Further, the Administration would have simply spun his departure as the completion of a changing of the guard and replaced him with a neo-con. [Powell was in a similar situation, but not to the same degree; Powell had more of an independant support base outside of the Administration. I am an admirer of Powell and believe that he has served his country well, but he still owes the American people a book similar to Tenent's, as well as post-Administration books from Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, et al.]
There are interesting tidbits in the book. One is that following our arrival in Baghdad, the military found countless documents scattered about the various Hussein ministries confirming the linkage of Hussein to Al Qaeda and 9/11. Not too surprisingly, all of these documents turned out to be forgeries. Forgeries seem to play an important role in events surrounding the Bush Administration: yellow-cake uranium in Niger, Dan Rather's demise, etc. There has been some circumstantial evidence that traces the yellow-cake forgeries to an American neo-con (Michael Ledeen), but more on that in a future post.
So...research into Iraq continues. I am now reading three books on the subject: Paul Bremer's ""My Year In Iraq," Frances Fukuyama's "America At the Crossroads," and Micahel Oren's "Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present." [And, as a note to birthday/father's day givers, have completed all of Buchanan's books, all of Woodward's books, "Cobra II," "Fiasco," "Hubris," and numerous others...so certificates might be more appropriate.]
To date, Iraq seems to have been "the Perfect Storm." I've written that the only strategic interests the United States has in the region are Oil and Israel. Both begged for regime change in Iraq. Hussein was neither a friend of the Israelis or the Saudis and a threat to both. Cheney understood the Saudis and oil aspect as many, if not all, of the neo-cons understood the Israeli aspect. 9/11 presented the opportunity.
I am not a conspiracy buff. Well, at least not big, all comprehensive conspiracies. Rather, I suspect much of human behavior consists of thousands upon thousands of little conspiracies, with sort of ad hoc motivations. They form and they go, based on specific purposes. Today's conspirators may be tomorrow's enemies. In the case of Iraq, I suspect, there was simply a confluence of interests. Various people, in positions of influence, for different reasons, were pursuing the same goal. I do not believe "cherry-picking" intelligence to be an impeachable offense. It may be a sign of incompetence and reason enough not to vote for Dick Cheney or George Bush ever again, and may damn them in the eyes of history, but it is not sufficient an offense to call for impeachment. If, however, intelligence was not only cherry picked, but fabricated to be cherry picked and this was known by the policy makers that IS, in my opinion, impeachable and tantamount to treason within a democratic state.
To my knowledge there is, at present, no hard evidence linking the cherry picking of intelligence to fabrication of this same intelligence, although there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to warrant further investigation. And, needless to say, that in itself will not resolve the present Iraqi situation.
More within the next few days.
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