It would appear that the President's speech was not that well received. That, of course, could have been easily forecast. Public opinion polls are running 2:1 against the War, the "Surge," and Bush himself. A number of Republican congressmen and women are changing sides and joining the "let's get out" coalition. In fact, if the "Surge" does not substantially improve the situation, look for both Houses of Congress to achieve 2/3rd's anti-war majorities. At that point, the war is pretty much done, although it is difficult to see how a consensus in Congress would emerge for an alternative policy other than simple withdrawal. This is unfortunate for two reasons: 1) The "Surge," in my opinion, will not work and may well lead to a worsening of our overall position and 2) the President seems unable to come up with anything other than "stay the course." IOW, the "Surge," even if successful, seems to be designed to simply return the situation to the status quo of 2005 (before the bombing of the Mosque and the beginning of sectarian violence on a large scale.
I hasten to add, I have no "quick solution." I do think an abrupt withdrawal would not be wise and might well lead to a regional war and an expansion of global terrorism. I am inclined, as stated in the last few posts, to go along with the surge and hope for the best. If the Iraqis do not "stand up" (and I think it likely they will not) then we require a totally different approach. Also, hopefully, the Administration understands their failed policy and is using the surge to buy time, while putting together that alternative...but, given their history, that isn't likely.
Overall, I tend to agree with Pat Buchanan regarding his own fears that we may be preparing to go into Iran. His logic is that Bush and Cheney realize that the next President will not pursue an aggressive foreign policy and back off from both North Korea and Iran (whether true or not, Buchanan believes that is what THEY believe). Consequently, they feel it their mission to eliminate "the Axis of Evil," by hook or crook. Buchanan sees the recent moves of the past week as substantiating his view: the movement of an additional carrier battle group to the Persian Gulf; the deployment of Patriot Missile units to Iraq; the Surge itself; the raid on an Iranian Consulate in northern Iraq.
However, there is another perspective that may be more likely, assuming the Administration has not totally lost whatever "collective mind" they possess. All of these moves may be "defensive" in nature. The situation may actually be worse than that reported and perceived by the public. The reaction to the "surge" could be all out war against our troops in Iraq if, in a curious way, it is interpreted as "interference" in a domestic civil war (involvement in which we have stayed out of the way of to date). I suspect that if the Surge IS successful, it will bring MORE outside interference (from Syria, Iran, et al). IOW, as long as no single side is perceived as "winning," Iraq neighbors have a type of security. If the Shites begin winning, the Kurds and Sunnis external supporters will feel compelled to increase their own interventions.
So, I think regardless of the success or failure of the Surge, we could very quickly be in a "withdrawal" situation. If it's successful, withdrawal because the Iraqis have "stood up"; if not, because a forced withdrawal is necessary. The additional carrier battle group, the Patriot missiles, the raid on the Iranian consulate may all be designed to send the message to Iran that our "withdrawal" will be well protected.
I think we are close to the point wherein all that is desired by us in Iraq is sufficient stability and government progress, even if temporary, to allow for a "withdrawal with face."
Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under Biden, have begun. It would be a great failure of this committee if, after grilling the Administration on Iraq and listening to opinions from all sides on the same, they do not take the broader view and explore the future direction of American foreign policy in general.
I assume (maybe incorrectly) that the invasion of Iraq was motivated by more than "I want to do better than Daddy." While Bush has made substantial changes in many of the neo-conservatives who formulated the Iraq invasion plan, he has still NOT renounced or even modified the "Bush Doctrine." The committee hearings, thus far, in focusing on the immediate problem in Iraq, have been limite to "tactics." It should also debate the strategic policy that engendered such tactics...the Bush Doctrine itself.
It is my own position that at this point the tactical situation cannot be resolved successfully without a reappraisal of the strategy.
More on this in future posts, but I am continuing my "reading program" and am now into a book, I missed when it was originally published in 2002, Woodward's first of the three books on Bush's mid-east wars: "Bush At War." This book covers the period from 9/11 to the beginning of the military planning for the invasion of Iraq. "Plan of Attack" covers Iraq and "State of Denial" the period of Iraqi occupation. I've read the last two. No one in the Administration has seriously challenged any of Woodward's books, all of which have been based on extensive interviews with the major players in the Administration. The first two books were generally "slightly favorable" to the Administration; the last an exploration of a failed policy (and not so favorable).
So, I assume what Woodward relates is reasonably factual.
It is clear to me in reading about what happened immediately following 9/11 was at least "guided" by substantial discussion in line with the "Bush Doctrine" PRIOR to 9/11. There are repeated, but seemingly inconsequential references to Iraq (chiefly by Rumsfeld) in the discussions immediately following 9/11. In fact, Iraq seems to have been the focus of pre-9/11 discussion and 9/11 and Al Qaeda a sort of diversion. To me this explains the "War on Terror." The phrase was deliberately chosen so as NOT to limit our 9/11 response to Al Qaeda and Afghanistan. In the post 9/11 planning, Rumsfeld is constantly reminding the planners for the war in Afghanistan to state objectives broadly, so that public opinion does not become focused solely on Al Qaeda, the Taliban and Afghanistan, but leaves the door open for future action elsewhere.
This was extraordinarily deceitful to both the American people and our traditional and new allies, the support of whom was conditioned upon our war in Afghanistan to be for limited objectives related to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda in response to 9/11. Had all of these people been told (including the American people) PRIOR to their support in Afghanistan of the "broader agenda" it is highly unlikely we would have had their support in the "first round."
IMO, Congress now has the responsibility to ensure this debate over the broader direction of American foreign policy. I see three major choices. We may continue to pursue the Bush Doctrine, but gear our military forces to ensure its success. We may return to something in between Clinton and Bush, but renounce regime change and preemptive war and rely primarily, but not exclusively, on multi-lateralism (with emphasis on homeland security). Or, we may go into a semi-isolationist mode.
The neo-con hi-jacking of American foreign policy was unexpected and possible only in the wake of 9/11. Prior to 9/11 the debate in American foreign policy was between "internationalists and isolationists." No one expected the radical assumptions of the "Bush Doctrine." Now is the time for our attention.
Friday, January 12, 2007
Tuesday, January 09, 2007
A Final Thought...For Today
If my "theory" regarding placing Chalabi in power in Iraq is correct [see earlier post on "Iraq: The End of the Beginning or the Beginning of the End"], that removes the third leg of the stool from the Administration's arguments for invasion.
The three legs were: WMD, regime change and democracy. Other arguments were made...control of oil, the threat to Israel, etc., but these were the main three reasons used to "sell" the war.
The WMD argument is gone. The regime change has occured. If we failed to plan for a post-war Iraq because we intended to place Chalabi in power, that pretty well negates the "democracy" argument.
The three legs were: WMD, regime change and democracy. Other arguments were made...control of oil, the threat to Israel, etc., but these were the main three reasons used to "sell" the war.
The WMD argument is gone. The regime change has occured. If we failed to plan for a post-war Iraq because we intended to place Chalabi in power, that pretty well negates the "democracy" argument.
A Few Clarifying Remarks
In rereading my last blog, it occurred to me that I may have given the impression that, with a proper military approach, we can "win" in Iraq. Since that is definitely not my position, some clarification is required.
Ultimately, I do not think a U.S. military counter-insurgency effort will be successful. However, a counter-insurgency effort is preferable to an immediate withdrawal or a military policy that treats Iraqis as terrorists. In other words, counter-insurgency should be part of our withdrawal strategy, not an attempt to win some sort of American "victory."
I cringe whenever the President uses the term "victory" and am reasonably sure that each time he does so, he creates another thousand or so insurgents. Iraq, in the same vein of bringing democracy to them, is not ours to "win" or to "lose." Whether we realize it or not, for better or for worse, the future of Iraq is now in the hands of Iraqis and its immediate neighbors.
While there are cases in our history wherein we have successfully fought insurgents, none seem to me to be compatible with the Iraqi situation (the Phillipines, the American Western Frontier might be examples). Our successes were achieved in a different era; both involved violence on a level that would probably be unsupportable in today's world of "real time" reporting.
In an unpublished essay writen for the local paper, I recently suggested that it may well be that it is "impossible" for Bush to get from "here to there." This is a very foreign concept for most of Washington, whether Democratic or Republican. The idea persists that "we" are in control (or should be) of events in Iraq. On the Bush side (what little is left there) is the idea that our "victory" depends on the resources the American people are willing to commit...i.e. if we continue our support of the war and we are, if necessary, willing to escalate our commitment in terms of forces and money, we can achieve "victory." I doubt it.
Insurgencies almost always succeed when fought from the "outside." As an example, we have only to look to our own history and the American Revolution. There is something in the human psyche that tells us to "beware of Greeks bearing gifts" (i.e. the story of the Trojan horse). We can saturate Iraq with a half million troops, all on their best behavior, and rebuild their infrastructure, their hospitals, their schools, etc. and one relatively small incident such as an American soldier murdering an Iraq, can destroy all of our good intentions. In sum, insurgencies are best fought from within by native populations and are, almost by definition, "civil wars."
So, no matter what "we" do in Iraq, I seriously doubt that it will in the long run have much to do with its future.
I cannot forgive the President for the error of the initial invasion, nor do I agree with his "global strategy." However, I can also understand why an immediate withdrawal of our forces would be harmful to our global position, the world economy, the future of our own military, the Iraqi people who have bought into our presence, etc., etc. So, I believe I would support a phased withdrawal based on a specific timetable and one in which we do everything possible to support Iraqi democratic processes up to the moment the last soldier leaves. This would include a rationally explained temporary "surge" in forces for the sake of restoring some semblance of security. But, my support is also contingent on a broader shift in U.S. foreign policy that rejects "preemptive war" and "regime change." I would concede that under certain dire circumstances (e.g. a North Korea or Iran with a sizable nuclear arsenal) both of these "tools" may well need to be utilized, but neither should be part of public policy. In fact, I believe that, in a sense, rejection of these policies by the American voter was one reason for the results of our last election. Bush sort of lost the Presidency by proxy.
Nevertheless he is President and will be until the next election. He is also Commander-in-Chief. If he choses to continue to pursue a misguided foreign policy, contrary to the will of the people, Congress has but two choices in response: cut-off funding for these policies and/or impeachment. There is a third choice that isn't discussed much...the power of Joint Resolutions. In other words, if the situation continues to worsen, Congress may "resolve" anything it wishes. The resolutions would not be legally binding on the President, but would be a powerful political incentive to change course.
The most powerful incentive for change is, of course, the 2008 elections. Bush isn't running, but the American voter should simply make it clear now that if there is no significant improvement in Iraq within the next two years and we are not in a serious withdrawal posture, Republicans will be held accountable at the polls...both in Congress and in regard to the Presidency.
Republicans of all stripes should understand this...the political wisdom of yesterday was "Democrats Get Us Into Wars and Republicans Get Us Out." It was Eisenhower's pledge to end Korea that led to a Republican victory. Nixon campaigned on disengagement from Vietnam.
Aside from a few die-hards (perhaps Barney and Laura...and Cheney), whether you are Republican or Democrat, Iraq is today perceived by the vast majority as a "failed policy." Neither Party, nor the country at large should look forward to having to debate this policy going into the 2008 election. It may have already cost McCain the nomination of the Republican Party. By this "error" (and it really doesen't matter much politically whether it was due to false intelligence, neo-cons, or whatever) the President's "legacy" is probably already fixed as one of failure. And, to continue the pursuit of a failed policy for the sake of this legacy is a disservice to the country.
We have sent the world a post 9/11 "message." If attacked directly, we are apt to strike back by doing wild and crazy things. The 2008 elections (if not sooner) should be marked by a return to national sanity and the end of the post 9/11 era. That is not to say we should forget the lessons of 9/11. There is still much improvement to be done in homeland security and there are genuine debates ahead regarding 9/11 lessons and the right of privacy, to say nothing of the rights of the accused, but internationally it is time to stop scaring the hell out of the rest of the world and strutting around as if we control it.
Power and those who seek power will always use illegitimate methods, to one degree or another, to either retain power or to gain it. The apparent "weapon of choice" for those in power is threat and coercion. "My way or the highway." The weapon of choice for those out of power, but seeking it, is deceit and manipulation. I have come to think that this isn't "Republican" or "Democrat" as much as it is simply human nature...as sad as that may be. Both at home and abroad, the President has played the "in your face" card since 9/11. The failure in Iraq and its revealed incompetence has essentially negated this approach. Had we restrained ourselves to Afghanistan and finding Bin Laden, while slowly but surely improving our global military posture, he may have been successful in continuing to play this card. Instead, he "overreached." Typical of Texans, but I won't get into that. We now risk being seen internationally as a "Paper Tiger." Global ambitions such as the President pursues do not practically match up with the difficulty to find 20,000 extra troops for a temporary surge in Iraq.
So, in a sense, we are now in the position (despite being the sole remaining Super Power) internationally of being "out of power." Yes...we are still a force to be reckoned with...because of our shear size and economic strength, but there is a distinct difference between reckoning with the United States and listening to us seriously. I would suggest that it is increasingly obvious to the international community that we are not willing to "put our money where our mouth is." Thus, it it is time to turn to the tools of the "weak" or those out of power, but seeking it...deceit and manipulation, or in other words, international diplomacy.
Ultimately, I do not think a U.S. military counter-insurgency effort will be successful. However, a counter-insurgency effort is preferable to an immediate withdrawal or a military policy that treats Iraqis as terrorists. In other words, counter-insurgency should be part of our withdrawal strategy, not an attempt to win some sort of American "victory."
I cringe whenever the President uses the term "victory" and am reasonably sure that each time he does so, he creates another thousand or so insurgents. Iraq, in the same vein of bringing democracy to them, is not ours to "win" or to "lose." Whether we realize it or not, for better or for worse, the future of Iraq is now in the hands of Iraqis and its immediate neighbors.
While there are cases in our history wherein we have successfully fought insurgents, none seem to me to be compatible with the Iraqi situation (the Phillipines, the American Western Frontier might be examples). Our successes were achieved in a different era; both involved violence on a level that would probably be unsupportable in today's world of "real time" reporting.
In an unpublished essay writen for the local paper, I recently suggested that it may well be that it is "impossible" for Bush to get from "here to there." This is a very foreign concept for most of Washington, whether Democratic or Republican. The idea persists that "we" are in control (or should be) of events in Iraq. On the Bush side (what little is left there) is the idea that our "victory" depends on the resources the American people are willing to commit...i.e. if we continue our support of the war and we are, if necessary, willing to escalate our commitment in terms of forces and money, we can achieve "victory." I doubt it.
Insurgencies almost always succeed when fought from the "outside." As an example, we have only to look to our own history and the American Revolution. There is something in the human psyche that tells us to "beware of Greeks bearing gifts" (i.e. the story of the Trojan horse). We can saturate Iraq with a half million troops, all on their best behavior, and rebuild their infrastructure, their hospitals, their schools, etc. and one relatively small incident such as an American soldier murdering an Iraq, can destroy all of our good intentions. In sum, insurgencies are best fought from within by native populations and are, almost by definition, "civil wars."
So, no matter what "we" do in Iraq, I seriously doubt that it will in the long run have much to do with its future.
I cannot forgive the President for the error of the initial invasion, nor do I agree with his "global strategy." However, I can also understand why an immediate withdrawal of our forces would be harmful to our global position, the world economy, the future of our own military, the Iraqi people who have bought into our presence, etc., etc. So, I believe I would support a phased withdrawal based on a specific timetable and one in which we do everything possible to support Iraqi democratic processes up to the moment the last soldier leaves. This would include a rationally explained temporary "surge" in forces for the sake of restoring some semblance of security. But, my support is also contingent on a broader shift in U.S. foreign policy that rejects "preemptive war" and "regime change." I would concede that under certain dire circumstances (e.g. a North Korea or Iran with a sizable nuclear arsenal) both of these "tools" may well need to be utilized, but neither should be part of public policy. In fact, I believe that, in a sense, rejection of these policies by the American voter was one reason for the results of our last election. Bush sort of lost the Presidency by proxy.
Nevertheless he is President and will be until the next election. He is also Commander-in-Chief. If he choses to continue to pursue a misguided foreign policy, contrary to the will of the people, Congress has but two choices in response: cut-off funding for these policies and/or impeachment. There is a third choice that isn't discussed much...the power of Joint Resolutions. In other words, if the situation continues to worsen, Congress may "resolve" anything it wishes. The resolutions would not be legally binding on the President, but would be a powerful political incentive to change course.
The most powerful incentive for change is, of course, the 2008 elections. Bush isn't running, but the American voter should simply make it clear now that if there is no significant improvement in Iraq within the next two years and we are not in a serious withdrawal posture, Republicans will be held accountable at the polls...both in Congress and in regard to the Presidency.
Republicans of all stripes should understand this...the political wisdom of yesterday was "Democrats Get Us Into Wars and Republicans Get Us Out." It was Eisenhower's pledge to end Korea that led to a Republican victory. Nixon campaigned on disengagement from Vietnam.
Aside from a few die-hards (perhaps Barney and Laura...and Cheney), whether you are Republican or Democrat, Iraq is today perceived by the vast majority as a "failed policy." Neither Party, nor the country at large should look forward to having to debate this policy going into the 2008 election. It may have already cost McCain the nomination of the Republican Party. By this "error" (and it really doesen't matter much politically whether it was due to false intelligence, neo-cons, or whatever) the President's "legacy" is probably already fixed as one of failure. And, to continue the pursuit of a failed policy for the sake of this legacy is a disservice to the country.
We have sent the world a post 9/11 "message." If attacked directly, we are apt to strike back by doing wild and crazy things. The 2008 elections (if not sooner) should be marked by a return to national sanity and the end of the post 9/11 era. That is not to say we should forget the lessons of 9/11. There is still much improvement to be done in homeland security and there are genuine debates ahead regarding 9/11 lessons and the right of privacy, to say nothing of the rights of the accused, but internationally it is time to stop scaring the hell out of the rest of the world and strutting around as if we control it.
Power and those who seek power will always use illegitimate methods, to one degree or another, to either retain power or to gain it. The apparent "weapon of choice" for those in power is threat and coercion. "My way or the highway." The weapon of choice for those out of power, but seeking it, is deceit and manipulation. I have come to think that this isn't "Republican" or "Democrat" as much as it is simply human nature...as sad as that may be. Both at home and abroad, the President has played the "in your face" card since 9/11. The failure in Iraq and its revealed incompetence has essentially negated this approach. Had we restrained ourselves to Afghanistan and finding Bin Laden, while slowly but surely improving our global military posture, he may have been successful in continuing to play this card. Instead, he "overreached." Typical of Texans, but I won't get into that. We now risk being seen internationally as a "Paper Tiger." Global ambitions such as the President pursues do not practically match up with the difficulty to find 20,000 extra troops for a temporary surge in Iraq.
So, in a sense, we are now in the position (despite being the sole remaining Super Power) internationally of being "out of power." Yes...we are still a force to be reckoned with...because of our shear size and economic strength, but there is a distinct difference between reckoning with the United States and listening to us seriously. I would suggest that it is increasingly obvious to the international community that we are not willing to "put our money where our mouth is." Thus, it it is time to turn to the tools of the "weak" or those out of power, but seeking it...deceit and manipulation, or in other words, international diplomacy.
Monday, January 08, 2007
Iraq: The End of the Beginning or the Beginning of the End?
The answer to the above question may come with President Bush's "New Strategy" speech on Wednesday evening (9PM EST). If the answer is the "end of the beginning," it will be essentially more of the same...just Phase II. If it is the "beginning of the end," we may be out of Iraq by the end of his Presidency.
I have just finished "Fiasco," by Thomas Ricks, the Washington Post's senior Pentagon correspondent. He joined the Post in 2000. Prior to that he was in a similar position at the Wall Street Journal for seventeen years.
It's difficult to summarize a 482 page book in a few paragraphs, but here goes...
"Fiasco" doesn't dwell on the U.S. political side of Iraq. Instead it is a "military history" of the war from its beginning until early 2006. But it is also a story of the "ripple effect" of false assumptions and the reluctance of "committed" authority and power to admit error and change course.
Ricks' book is divided into three main parts: "Containment," "Into Iraq," and "The Long Term." The first section is the run-up to the war; the false intelligence; the military planning; and the decision for invasion. The second part deals with the invasion, the drive to Baghdad, and the immediate aftermath. The final part looks at the growing insurgency and the military attempt to deal with it. Virtually, the entire book is based on interviews with senior and key military people who took part.
The key false assumption that led to the "Fiasco," seems to have been the notion that we would be greeted as "liberators" and that there would be a quick hand-over of the reins of power to a new Iraqi government.
This assumption drove military planning - i.e. a relatively small force, essentially a "spearhead" to Baghdad. Overthrow Hussein. A fast transition and out. There was an added advantage to this type of plan insomuch as if the Iraqis did possess WMD, we'd be moving too fast for them to be effectively used against us. Secondly, with the false assumption that we'd be viewed as liberators, there wasn't much concern regarding protection for the rear echelons, guarding discovered munition dumps, etc.
There were a few tell tale signs that this was not to be in the drive to Baghdad, but they became significant only in hindsight: rear echelon attacks on supply convoys, attacks by apparent civilians, etc. Franks' (General Tommy Franks, who formed the plan and was head of CENTCOM, the command with overall responsibility) favorite saying was "Speed Kills." Unfortunately, "speed" had the disadvantage of making the plan assumptions far more important than usual, because the rapid movement made it difficult to have time to observe actual conditions on the ground and to adjust tactics accordingly.
So, we got to Baghdad ahead of schedule. At that point, no one seems to have known what to do next. There is general consensus today among the military people who took part that no one planned for the aftermath.
Here there is a "missing piece" in the story. The impression is that Franks, Rumsfeld and the Pentagon in general thought someone else would take charge...that their "job" ended when they reached Baghdad and overthrew the regime. There was a civilian U.S. authority, under retired General Jay Gardner, but no one appears to have paid a great deal of attention to them at a strategic level of importance (unlike MacArthur in post-war Japan or Clay in Germany). Instead, this group seems to have been viewed as a sort of necessary, but minor function.
There was also a virtual "war" going on between the State and Defense Departments. In some ways, Rumsfeld seems to have thought that his only post-war assignment was in ensuring WMD were found. When this did not occur, bureaucratic paralysis seems to have set in. Sort of: "What! No WMD! Then, why are we here?"
Yet, still, there was such lack of forethought on the post-war situation, that one suspects a missing historical piece. Enter Iraqi ex-patriot Ahmed Chalabi, the W.T. Barnum ("There's a sucker born every minute") of the 21st Century. Chalabi was head of an ex-patriot Iraqi group claiming Iraqi post-war political power. Chalabi (who lives in London today) was the source of much of the phony intelligence on pre-war Iraq...from the WMD threat to being greeted in the streets with flowers. He was also an "insider" with Washington neo-cons in and out of government (Wolfwitz and Pearle being two). In 2004, he would be invited to sit immediately behind Laura Bush at the State of the Union Address.
On the other hand, the professional intelligence community - world-wide - never seems to have taken him very seriously, but he had the ear of the key civilians in the White House and Pentagon, who were pushing for war...and returned their friendship by coming up with exactly the intelligence they wanted to hear.
Chalabi moved into Baghdad with our forces (and a small ex-patriot based militia of his own) and apparently began to "assume" power. At this point things get hazy. It is as if someone, in Washington, told Chalabi that he would be "The Man," but forgot to tell our generals on the ground in Iraq or Jay Gardner, heading the civilian transition team. Sooo...they and the emerging religious factions in Iraq, seem to have just ignored him. There is this sort of "pause." The military waits to either go home or be told what to do next and get neither. The religious factions begin filling the vacuum. Here, I'll guess the "missing piece" of history.
Chalabi was disliked by almost everyone except the neo-cons. The State Department distrusted him. The CIA distrusted him. The military-on-the-ground in Iraqi distrusted him. Pearle, Wolfwitz, Douglas Feith (who worked for Wolfwitz, as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), Scooter Libby (and to a lesser extent Cheney) and Judith Miller (of the New York Times) appear to have been his base of power within the United States.
But, perhaps more important than State, the CIA, et. al., Jay Gardner disliked him. And, as head of the civilian transition team, Gardner was technically the chief U.S. bureaucrat in Iraq at the time. Ricks interviewed Gardner who told him that following his appointment, but prior to his departure for Iraq, Feith told him: "You know, Jay, when you get there [Iraq], we could just make Chalabi President." Later in a joint press briefing, when Gardner was asked about Chalabi's Iraq National Congress (his political group), Gardner played down their role saying that a "lot of groups" will make inputs.
Following the press conference, Feith exploded at Gardner: "You've ruined everything, how could you say this?" The story in the book was related supposedly to illustrate how Gardner failed to get along with the Pentagon...but perhaps, Gardner DID ruin everything.
Shortly thereafter, Paul Bremer was appointed to replace Gardner.
Bremer was, by Ricks account, a career diplomat and, prior to his Iraqi service, thought to be a smart and savy guy. In Iraq, however, he was essentially a "loner" and uncommunicative. His answer on more than one occasion to real and pressing questions (i.e. de-Baathification; failure to seal the Syrian and Iranian borders, disbanding the Iraqi Army and sending them home with their guns, etc.)...was in the last resort, words to the effect: "I have my instructions."
Instructions to screw up the country? Maybe...at least until things could be rearranged to bring Chalabi back as the new "strongman of Iraq."
Ricks describes Chalabi as a "secular Shite," which seems like an oxymoron. As such, he was an "enemy" of the Sunnis and, perhaps, an opening toward Shite Iran...the guy who could form a secular government, based on a Shite majority.
For a brief period he held the Number 2 position in the first Iraqi government; then his fortunes changed and fast.
Five months after his attendance at the State of the Union Address, Iraqi police, accompanied by U.S. Navy Seals and the CIA raided his home in Baghdad. The story subsequently was circulated that he'd spied for Iran...he left government and returned to London.
So, the "missing piece" is that perhaps there was a post-war plan for Iraq...a covert one, held by a handful of civilian Pentagon neo-cons. What screwed the plan up may have been, in a curious way, Bush's naivety and steadfastness. Once the WMD and 9/11 reason for invading Iraq were proven false, the reason turned to "democracy." This had been a reason from the first (it was part of Cheney's view of a way to "stabilize" the Mid-East and Bush's mission to democratize the world), but had never been in the forefront, chiefly - I believe - because it was such a hard sell to the American people, whose reaction was/has been sort of "Yes...well...that would be nice...but do we want to have our kids dying for it?"
But, if Bush really personally believed in his mission, he probably would have insisted that if Chabali became President of Iraq, he'd have to get there primarily on his own, through a democratic process. And, with the CIA, the State Department, our generals, the Iraqi secular Sunnis and the Iraqi religious Shites all against him...it was just not in the cards; to make sure of that, the CIA either "exposed" him or spread rumors to totally discredit him.
So, Iraq began to descend into a civil war (or more properly, a religious war). And, our "forces in place" were left holding the bag.
Ricks points out that the result was a mixed bag. In certain sectors, we did very well...the sectors wherein the military commander sensed that we were caught up in an insurgency and adjusted tactics accordingly. In others, we did miserably...mass arrests, beatings, hostage taking...and generally treating all Iraqis as potential or real terrorists.
One of the "hero generals" in Ricks' book is General David Petraeus, who commanded the 101st Airborne. Petraeus sensed the insurgency early and became a counter-insurgency specialist. Although promoted to three stars, he was shuttled to Kansas to head the Army War College following his tour of duty in Iraq...prestigious, but not particularly career building (the Pentagon being where the action is). Bush has just named him to replace General Casey, who will become Army Chief of Staff (Casey also grasped counter-insurgency and, as head of all coalition forces in Iraq, began teaching its tactics to all incoming unit commanders in Iraq).
Thus, the "good news" is that our military has apparently adjusted reasonably quickly to a political vacuum and a situation they did not anticipate, nor could have expected to anticipate given what they were being told (and not told) by the political leadership. The "bad news" is that there really is little more they can do now other than what they are doing until such time as they are given new directions. This, I suspect, is the reason they have been less than enthusastic regarding adding additional forces and why they keep reminding us that the answer to the Iraq problem is not military, but political.
Finally, Ricks (who is very definitely pro-military) points out that aside from the occasional "cover-up" of a scandal by specific individuals (sometimes in high positions), today's Army, institutionally, is exceptional in allowing "out-of-the-box" thinking and dissent. He points out that some of the earliest and harshist criticism for the Iraq War actually came out of professional military journals and at the War Colleges. And, he notes that the doctrine of "preemptive war" runs contrary to what much of the profession considers to be a mainstay of our military history and traditions.
In concluding this, let me say that I share many of Ricks observations. One can be pro-military, but anti-war. Military force is organized violence on such a massive scale that it is probable that criminal activities will accompany its use - mistreatment of prisoners, the murder of civilians, etc. (as well as lethal accidents and errors). That in no way justifies those criminal activities; they should be exposed and prosecuted, but it is also precisely why such force should be deployed only in the face of immenient threat and as a last resort.
I opposed the Iraq War from the beginning. Tactically, because I believed the intelligence was not strong enough to justify it, that the Administration's overall case for war was weak and that we had not exhausted chances for a diplomatic solution. Strategically, I opposed it because I believe that "preemptive war" is such a major change in our history and values that it should be debated rationally at a national level, rather than "sold" on the basis of falsehoods and quasi-falsehoods, fear and threats. And, secondly, because the resources we were willing to commit did not seem to match the goals we sought. It was encouraging to discover in "Fiasco" that most of our professional military felt approximately the same way.
I have just finished "Fiasco," by Thomas Ricks, the Washington Post's senior Pentagon correspondent. He joined the Post in 2000. Prior to that he was in a similar position at the Wall Street Journal for seventeen years.
It's difficult to summarize a 482 page book in a few paragraphs, but here goes...
"Fiasco" doesn't dwell on the U.S. political side of Iraq. Instead it is a "military history" of the war from its beginning until early 2006. But it is also a story of the "ripple effect" of false assumptions and the reluctance of "committed" authority and power to admit error and change course.
Ricks' book is divided into three main parts: "Containment," "Into Iraq," and "The Long Term." The first section is the run-up to the war; the false intelligence; the military planning; and the decision for invasion. The second part deals with the invasion, the drive to Baghdad, and the immediate aftermath. The final part looks at the growing insurgency and the military attempt to deal with it. Virtually, the entire book is based on interviews with senior and key military people who took part.
The key false assumption that led to the "Fiasco," seems to have been the notion that we would be greeted as "liberators" and that there would be a quick hand-over of the reins of power to a new Iraqi government.
This assumption drove military planning - i.e. a relatively small force, essentially a "spearhead" to Baghdad. Overthrow Hussein. A fast transition and out. There was an added advantage to this type of plan insomuch as if the Iraqis did possess WMD, we'd be moving too fast for them to be effectively used against us. Secondly, with the false assumption that we'd be viewed as liberators, there wasn't much concern regarding protection for the rear echelons, guarding discovered munition dumps, etc.
There were a few tell tale signs that this was not to be in the drive to Baghdad, but they became significant only in hindsight: rear echelon attacks on supply convoys, attacks by apparent civilians, etc. Franks' (General Tommy Franks, who formed the plan and was head of CENTCOM, the command with overall responsibility) favorite saying was "Speed Kills." Unfortunately, "speed" had the disadvantage of making the plan assumptions far more important than usual, because the rapid movement made it difficult to have time to observe actual conditions on the ground and to adjust tactics accordingly.
So, we got to Baghdad ahead of schedule. At that point, no one seems to have known what to do next. There is general consensus today among the military people who took part that no one planned for the aftermath.
Here there is a "missing piece" in the story. The impression is that Franks, Rumsfeld and the Pentagon in general thought someone else would take charge...that their "job" ended when they reached Baghdad and overthrew the regime. There was a civilian U.S. authority, under retired General Jay Gardner, but no one appears to have paid a great deal of attention to them at a strategic level of importance (unlike MacArthur in post-war Japan or Clay in Germany). Instead, this group seems to have been viewed as a sort of necessary, but minor function.
There was also a virtual "war" going on between the State and Defense Departments. In some ways, Rumsfeld seems to have thought that his only post-war assignment was in ensuring WMD were found. When this did not occur, bureaucratic paralysis seems to have set in. Sort of: "What! No WMD! Then, why are we here?"
Yet, still, there was such lack of forethought on the post-war situation, that one suspects a missing historical piece. Enter Iraqi ex-patriot Ahmed Chalabi, the W.T. Barnum ("There's a sucker born every minute") of the 21st Century. Chalabi was head of an ex-patriot Iraqi group claiming Iraqi post-war political power. Chalabi (who lives in London today) was the source of much of the phony intelligence on pre-war Iraq...from the WMD threat to being greeted in the streets with flowers. He was also an "insider" with Washington neo-cons in and out of government (Wolfwitz and Pearle being two). In 2004, he would be invited to sit immediately behind Laura Bush at the State of the Union Address.
On the other hand, the professional intelligence community - world-wide - never seems to have taken him very seriously, but he had the ear of the key civilians in the White House and Pentagon, who were pushing for war...and returned their friendship by coming up with exactly the intelligence they wanted to hear.
Chalabi moved into Baghdad with our forces (and a small ex-patriot based militia of his own) and apparently began to "assume" power. At this point things get hazy. It is as if someone, in Washington, told Chalabi that he would be "The Man," but forgot to tell our generals on the ground in Iraq or Jay Gardner, heading the civilian transition team. Sooo...they and the emerging religious factions in Iraq, seem to have just ignored him. There is this sort of "pause." The military waits to either go home or be told what to do next and get neither. The religious factions begin filling the vacuum. Here, I'll guess the "missing piece" of history.
Chalabi was disliked by almost everyone except the neo-cons. The State Department distrusted him. The CIA distrusted him. The military-on-the-ground in Iraqi distrusted him. Pearle, Wolfwitz, Douglas Feith (who worked for Wolfwitz, as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), Scooter Libby (and to a lesser extent Cheney) and Judith Miller (of the New York Times) appear to have been his base of power within the United States.
But, perhaps more important than State, the CIA, et. al., Jay Gardner disliked him. And, as head of the civilian transition team, Gardner was technically the chief U.S. bureaucrat in Iraq at the time. Ricks interviewed Gardner who told him that following his appointment, but prior to his departure for Iraq, Feith told him: "You know, Jay, when you get there [Iraq], we could just make Chalabi President." Later in a joint press briefing, when Gardner was asked about Chalabi's Iraq National Congress (his political group), Gardner played down their role saying that a "lot of groups" will make inputs.
Following the press conference, Feith exploded at Gardner: "You've ruined everything, how could you say this?" The story in the book was related supposedly to illustrate how Gardner failed to get along with the Pentagon...but perhaps, Gardner DID ruin everything.
Shortly thereafter, Paul Bremer was appointed to replace Gardner.
Bremer was, by Ricks account, a career diplomat and, prior to his Iraqi service, thought to be a smart and savy guy. In Iraq, however, he was essentially a "loner" and uncommunicative. His answer on more than one occasion to real and pressing questions (i.e. de-Baathification; failure to seal the Syrian and Iranian borders, disbanding the Iraqi Army and sending them home with their guns, etc.)...was in the last resort, words to the effect: "I have my instructions."
Instructions to screw up the country? Maybe...at least until things could be rearranged to bring Chalabi back as the new "strongman of Iraq."
Ricks describes Chalabi as a "secular Shite," which seems like an oxymoron. As such, he was an "enemy" of the Sunnis and, perhaps, an opening toward Shite Iran...the guy who could form a secular government, based on a Shite majority.
For a brief period he held the Number 2 position in the first Iraqi government; then his fortunes changed and fast.
Five months after his attendance at the State of the Union Address, Iraqi police, accompanied by U.S. Navy Seals and the CIA raided his home in Baghdad. The story subsequently was circulated that he'd spied for Iran...he left government and returned to London.
So, the "missing piece" is that perhaps there was a post-war plan for Iraq...a covert one, held by a handful of civilian Pentagon neo-cons. What screwed the plan up may have been, in a curious way, Bush's naivety and steadfastness. Once the WMD and 9/11 reason for invading Iraq were proven false, the reason turned to "democracy." This had been a reason from the first (it was part of Cheney's view of a way to "stabilize" the Mid-East and Bush's mission to democratize the world), but had never been in the forefront, chiefly - I believe - because it was such a hard sell to the American people, whose reaction was/has been sort of "Yes...well...that would be nice...but do we want to have our kids dying for it?"
But, if Bush really personally believed in his mission, he probably would have insisted that if Chabali became President of Iraq, he'd have to get there primarily on his own, through a democratic process. And, with the CIA, the State Department, our generals, the Iraqi secular Sunnis and the Iraqi religious Shites all against him...it was just not in the cards; to make sure of that, the CIA either "exposed" him or spread rumors to totally discredit him.
So, Iraq began to descend into a civil war (or more properly, a religious war). And, our "forces in place" were left holding the bag.
Ricks points out that the result was a mixed bag. In certain sectors, we did very well...the sectors wherein the military commander sensed that we were caught up in an insurgency and adjusted tactics accordingly. In others, we did miserably...mass arrests, beatings, hostage taking...and generally treating all Iraqis as potential or real terrorists.
One of the "hero generals" in Ricks' book is General David Petraeus, who commanded the 101st Airborne. Petraeus sensed the insurgency early and became a counter-insurgency specialist. Although promoted to three stars, he was shuttled to Kansas to head the Army War College following his tour of duty in Iraq...prestigious, but not particularly career building (the Pentagon being where the action is). Bush has just named him to replace General Casey, who will become Army Chief of Staff (Casey also grasped counter-insurgency and, as head of all coalition forces in Iraq, began teaching its tactics to all incoming unit commanders in Iraq).
Thus, the "good news" is that our military has apparently adjusted reasonably quickly to a political vacuum and a situation they did not anticipate, nor could have expected to anticipate given what they were being told (and not told) by the political leadership. The "bad news" is that there really is little more they can do now other than what they are doing until such time as they are given new directions. This, I suspect, is the reason they have been less than enthusastic regarding adding additional forces and why they keep reminding us that the answer to the Iraq problem is not military, but political.
Finally, Ricks (who is very definitely pro-military) points out that aside from the occasional "cover-up" of a scandal by specific individuals (sometimes in high positions), today's Army, institutionally, is exceptional in allowing "out-of-the-box" thinking and dissent. He points out that some of the earliest and harshist criticism for the Iraq War actually came out of professional military journals and at the War Colleges. And, he notes that the doctrine of "preemptive war" runs contrary to what much of the profession considers to be a mainstay of our military history and traditions.
In concluding this, let me say that I share many of Ricks observations. One can be pro-military, but anti-war. Military force is organized violence on such a massive scale that it is probable that criminal activities will accompany its use - mistreatment of prisoners, the murder of civilians, etc. (as well as lethal accidents and errors). That in no way justifies those criminal activities; they should be exposed and prosecuted, but it is also precisely why such force should be deployed only in the face of immenient threat and as a last resort.
I opposed the Iraq War from the beginning. Tactically, because I believed the intelligence was not strong enough to justify it, that the Administration's overall case for war was weak and that we had not exhausted chances for a diplomatic solution. Strategically, I opposed it because I believe that "preemptive war" is such a major change in our history and values that it should be debated rationally at a national level, rather than "sold" on the basis of falsehoods and quasi-falsehoods, fear and threats. And, secondly, because the resources we were willing to commit did not seem to match the goals we sought. It was encouraging to discover in "Fiasco" that most of our professional military felt approximately the same way.
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