Positive News From Iraq

Within the last week, positive news has been emerging from Iraq. Casualties appear down significantly (both Coalition Forces and Iraqi) and Baghdad residents who had fled in fear of the insurgency are returning. It's an old clique from Vietnam, but there may be "light at the end of the tunnel."

Of course, it is a different story regarding whether or not stability in Iraq will ultimately lead to accomplishment of our professed goal...namely, the formation of a stable, democratic Arab state in the region and, in turn, whether or not the benefits of such a state really apply to American national security. Yet, for now, we should applaud the present progress if for no other reason than the safety and security of the Iraqi people themselves.

I've just completed two books: "The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War and Losing the Peace," by Ali A. Allawi and "My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope," by L. Paul Bremer. Allawi, related to the first post invasion Prime Minister, and former Minister of Defense and later Finance, is sort of the inside story of Iraq from the perspective of an Iraqi. Bremer, of course, was the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and led the Coalition's post invasion administration of Iraq from roughly April 2003 until June 2004.

The books agree to a remarkable extent. If one puts aside the argument over whether or not the invasion should have taken place at all, there seems to be common consensus that the two significant errors were: 1) insufficient Coalition troop commitment and 2) insufficient planning and/or erroneous assumptions about a post-invasion Iraq.

It is difficult to see how Bremer may now be blamed for either error. His book is both a textbook and warning for future "nation building." It was exhausting to read the book, much less to have lived it. In fact, on what I believe still to be only a slight chance, should Iraq turn out to be a "success," Paul Bremer may have two distinctions as a father of modern Iraq and as the spoiler of a misguided neo-conservative American foreign policy.

When evaluating Paul Bremer, one must keep in mind that while consistently pushing for the idealism of President Bush, he always kept one foot in the realist school of foreign policy thinking, ala Henry Kissinger. While his book is (as most biographies are) in places self-serving, it is largely the modern day story of a "founding father." The record is replete with those who backed democracy in Iraq for their own purposes, but Bremer appears to be a figure that took it all quite seriously and literally. In reading Bremer's book, I was constantly reminded of Madison's "Notes" on the Constitutional Convention.

It becomes more and more apparent that the reasons we entered Iraq understaffed and with poor planning may be attributed to those within the Vice President's office and Defense Department civilians who essentially accepted Iraqi exile's tactical interpretations of the Iraq milieu, while in pursuit of a larger, more theoretical construct for American foreign policy in the post 9/11 world, within the zeitgeist of globalization, otherwise known as the "neo-conservatives." Without trying to elaborate on neo-conservative principles, I'll contrast them with "realists" as those in pursuit of a defined ideology and who believe the United States has both a right and duty to actively shape the global political stage. Realists, on the other hand, believe that the pursuit of American national interests involves taking the world and dealing with it as it is given, without the "shaping" portion.

In large measure, the differences between the two are ones of degree and timing. Kissinger and Nixon "opened" China by dealing with the Chinese as they were and not on the basis of "as we wish they were." They sold this approach to the Republican Right with the logic that the recognition of China and improved relations would "eventually" lead China toward moderation and democratization. They sold the same approach to the Republican business interests with the promise of trade and the rest of us (loosely grouped as the American Consumer) on the basis of cheap goods at Wal Mart.

Neo-conservatism would presumably take a similar position vis a vie China, but with a somewhat more aggressive stance, insisting on faster and more significant Chinese internal reforms, coupled with the "always on the table" position of preemptive war, if necessary. No one minds the U.S. pressing for the former, but the latter scares the hell out of most of the world community. Yesterday it was Iraq; today, it's Iran; tomorrow it may be China.

Unfortunately, fear is seldom a good motivation for long-term cooperation. People or nations may temporarily acquiesce in being forced to "obey," but will simultaneously interpret their acquiescence as necessary to their survival in the face of evil (e.g. neo-colonialism, Zionism, Western dominance, etc.) - i.e. they'll wait for a time to get even.

So, I suspect much of the world views the present Bush Doctrine as little more than a means by which the United States continues its post World War II super power status and dominance within a New World Order, brought on by the end of communism and globalization, as opposed to a more desirable outcome of the increasing diffusion of power and equality among nations, large or small. Again, the differences between neo-conservatives and realists may lie not so much in end goals, as in the means to achieve them. Sort of the difference between say a Tip O'Neil and Tom DeLay...the difference between "do it this way because..." versus "do it my way or else..."

To return to Bremer, et al and post invasion Iraq, Bremer tried whenever possible to diplomatically guide the Iraqi people via a "do it this way because." In this, he had help from two significant individuals: the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Sistani and Condi Rice.

[continued in next post]