Iraq (Continued)

Bremer found the vast majority of pre-invasion assumptions regarding Iraq to be incorrect. People were not greeting us in the streets with flowers. The years of sanctions against the Hussein regime had virtually destroyed the country's vital infrastructure, ranging from electricity, to water, to oil. What middle class was left was fleeing, basically leaving middle (and upper) class Iraqi ex-patriots quarreling with Kurds who were playing for independence, Sunnis, divided between secularism and Baathists and a fractured Shia community, at least half of whom were motivated by little more than revenge.

Post World War II Germany and Japan, Korea, Vietnam, etc. all paled in comparison to the complexity of post invasion Iraq. Kurds who advocated a unified, but federalized Iraq, fought Kurds who favored independence. Secular Sunnis fought Baathists and Sunnis Al Qaeda. Iranian leaning Shias fought Iraq Shias. And, on and on. On top of all of this, key policy makers in Washington still fought for Plan A and the transfer of Iraqi sovereignty as quickly as possible to the now present former Iraqi exiles. The military seemed undecided in what its next role would be. In Plan A they were to be gone in a few months. The "coalition of the willing," aside from the Brits, in the south, was virtually worthless in the new situation, although through no particular fault of their own. Most had entered the coalition with only token forces and expected to be little more than a symbolic presence. Separate Rules of Engagement meant very little integration into the overall coalition structure and American military leadership found themselves dealing with political issues they were unprepared for and far fewer resources than they needed to deal with the military ones. And, the Iraqi Army had simply dissolved, complicated by a Plan A de-Baathification policy.

Perhaps, no other American diplomat in history faced as complex a situation as Bremer. That he physically survived was no mean feat. That he accomplished what he had been sent to do was nothing short of a miracle.

He did not do it alone. His first "Ally" came from a curious source, the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Sistani.

Sistani was the chief Shia cleric in Iraq and his religious authority in the country was un-questioned among Iraqis Shias. Bremer, a Catholic, compared him to the Pope, but that would be (as I am sure Bremer would admit) an oversimplification that failed to describe the complex relationship of state to religion within the Muslim world. I have tried to explain this relationship in earlier posts and won't dwell on it here. Suffice to say that as Sistani went, so would go Iraq and Sistani grasped the fundamental tenant of democracy...majority rule...and, of course, as the senior religious leader of Iraqis Shias, he spoke for that majority.

Although he and Bremer never met (Sistani refused to meet with any of the coalition), together and subtly through back channels, they prevented the Plan A transfer of power from occupation forces to the former Iraqi exiles, by simply and effectively demanding a democratic Iraq. Sistani accomplished this by insisting that the new democratic Iraqi Constitution could only be written by freely elected Iraqis, not by any coalition appointed Iraqis. The effect was that in an Iraq composed of 60% Shia, the Shia would rule. Minority rights, the extent of religious influence, women's rights, Kurdish autonomy, de-Baathification, etc. were all important issues to be debated and decided, but Sistani never waivered from the basic democratic principle of majority rule. He had caught and stimied the Bush neo-cons and Iraqis ex-patriots with their own words.

Bremer, in his book and in practice, never waivered from his own loyalty to President Bush and Bush's stated intentions in Iraq. But, he effectively destroyed Plan A (which was in reality dead on arrival) and in many ways came closer to Sistani's position than the positions being proposed by Washington.

To deal with Washington, Bremer turned to Rice and by highlighting the failures of the American military in the post-invasion milieu, finally managed to essentially transfer Washington decision-making from DoD to Rice and the NSC and away from Rumsfeld and the generals, who were sort of bumbling around without a Plan B.

There were unfortunate casualties along the way, both among the Iraqi ex-patriots and the American military. Among the latter was General Paul Abizaid, who was damned if he did and damned if he didn't. Abizaid, who had been Frank's second in command and promoted with Frank's retirement, was exceptionally well qualified but like Bremer, caught between the rock and the hard place. With a Plan A force structure and an American presidential election in the offing (2004) he was effectively prevented from any increase in that structure. Caught between a seriously changed situation on the ground and a Pentagon reluctant to pull the plug on Plan A, he was virtually doomed to failure. But, as a scapegoat, he played a part in Bremer's success in transferring decision-making from the Pentagon to Rice.

The United States military remains mired in Iraq. Perhaps, with a bit of luck, Petraeus, like Bremer, can pull it off. Increased U.S. forces (but not by much) coupled with the apparent growing exhaustion of the various insurgents may lead to some temporary stability, sufficient for us to declare "victory" and get out. However, similar to our backing elections and democracy in Palestian, the long term result in Iraq may be a quasi-democratic/religious state, allied more closely to Iran than the United States. A free and democratic Iraq may be in the interests of the Iraqi people, but not in the "real" interests of American national security. And, if as the President insists, we stay until victory...whose victory? Our victory may not be the same as that perceived by the democratically elected majority of Iraqis. If we stay longer than the Iraqis want, the policy of the neo-conservativism evolves into a policy of neo-colonialism.

In my next and last post on this subject, I'll try and tie things together with a bit of repetition regarding what I've said in earlier posts on why our intervention in Iraq was wrong and the changes I believe necessary in American foreign policy to bring about global stability and U.S. security.