Iraq (Coninued)

Paul Bremer apparently arrived in Iraq caught between "the rock and the hard place." As a professional diplomat, in all probability, he had a far better comprehension of the challenges he and the United States faced in post-invasion Iraq than did the policy makers in Washington who had sent him there.

The emerging picture of what our policy makers "thought they knew" about Iraq and how things would go following liberation is now reasonably clear. In a great sense, Iraq, as Afghanistan, as the U.S. post 9/11 economic recovery, etc., etc. would be "business as usual" and a cake walk. Based on information being fed policy makers in the Vice President's Office and DoD from Iraqi exiles (namely Ahmad Chalabi and the ex-patriot INC), Iraq was a reasonably prosperous middle class country (relatively speaking) waiting to be freed. This conception "fit" what the Administration wanted to hear, although it contradicted much of what the State Department, the CIA and the professional military believed.

Much of this willingness of the key policy makers to accept this misconception uncritically went to the neo-conservatives in the Vice President's Office and among DoD civilians. However, I would suggest that of almost equal weight in this fundamental error was the Bush decision-making process itself. Unlike democratic political processes, business hierarchies are not in essence "consensual." Politics is the art of the possible and with the exception of periodic elections not a "zero-sum game." As a result, in politics, there is a constant and on-going adjustment of strategy based on tactical capability. In business, it is much the reverse. The "Chief Decider" (CEO or President) approves the strategy and appoints subordinates to implement and carry out the tactics necessary to achieve the strategic goals. In politics, tactics are almost always "second guessed." In business, tactics are delegated and seldom second guessed in the absence of catastrophic failure.

"Loyality" in politics, is often talked about and seldom practiced. In business, it is seldom talked about, but always expected. If the American people come to understand this difference, Bush will be our first and last Harvard MBA President.

Having bought into a post 9/11 foreign policy strategy that required a forceful U.S. message to the world based on the proposition that a strong offense is better than a weak defense and to the "idea" of an "axis of evil" which included Iraq, the Chief Decider left the tactics to subordinates, namely the Secretary of Defense and the Vice President. And, most of the others (Powell, Tenant, Rice et al) jumped in line. When that occured, the decision making process bowed to "group think" along hierachical lines.

Bush's failure to seriously question tactical decisions made by subordinates, in the name of loyalty and delegation of authority led to an atmosphere wherein conflicting intelligence was not questioned. The plan then formed to take Baghdad as quickly as possible, with as few forces as possible and turn the government over to the Iraqi exiles, again, namely Chalabi. Forces needed to protect long communication lines weren't necessary because of the smooth transition anticipated. Troops to protect Iraqi borders weren't necessary, because it was originally intended to simply replace the Iraqi military top leadership and to continue with an Iraqi Army in place.

Small tactical changes, such as the Turks refusal to allow U.S. forces entry through Turkey, or the failure to achieve a "coalition of the willing" of any sizable scale, did not provide a reconsideration of the overall strategic objective. Nor did the initial opening of the invasion provide for a reassessment. Baghdad was taken; regime change occurred. And, then, around the time of Bremer's arrival, things began to fall apart.

"Falling apart" was incremental, thus adding to the fog of war. General Franks, who had achieved his portion of the plan (getting to Baghdad), was basically waiting for retirement. The State Department, which perhaps logically should have taken the lead at this point, was less than inspired, partially due to substantial opposition within the Department to preemptive war and partially due to the decision to have DoD lead the occupation. In sum, Plan A failed and there was no Plan B.

With the U.S. government now in an essentially "reactive mode" and reluctant to admit Plan A failure, Bremer's opening days as head of the CPA were spent picking up the pieces of a failed policy.

[continued in next post]