"The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy"

I am about half-way through this controversial book and, so far, the question that comes to mind is: What's the controversy?

The basic theme of the authors is that collectively the various pro-Israel lobbying groups constitute the single most powerful political lobby in the United States and that as a result U.S. foreign policy in the middle east is essentially a "rubber stamp" approval of whatever policy the Israeli government is following at the moment.

The book bends over backwards NOT to come across as anti-Semitic. It seems as if one sentence in every paragraph is devoted to the anticipated charge of anti-Semitism. They take pains to point out that the Lobby is entirely legal and in the tradition of the American politics and special interest groups. Their complaint is that the Lobby's effectiveness (in terms of organization, influence and money) occasionally distorts U.S. policy positions that are not in the "objective" interests of U.S. national security.

As a "read," the book is a bit tedious and reads more like a dissertation than a best seller. Also, the central theme is something akin to "The Emperor's New Clothes." Someone has finally written and documented what has been a fact of life for the political system for at least a half century. Despite that, it's a worthwhile read concerning "the elephant in the room."

However, to agree with the authors one has to accept their basic perspective regarding the formation of American foreign policy, i.e. the "realist" school of thought. While I personally agree with this perspective, I understand there are others, so while agreeing with the book, I'll play devil's advocate for a moment.

The counter perspective to the author's is that the formation of American foreign policy is no different than the process that is used for the formation of any other area of government policy and that special interest groups are vital for this process. Secondly, special interest groups are seldom, if ever, "objective." Be it the "oil lobby" or the "environmental lobby," NO lobby may be expected to pursue activities contrary to their essential purpose.

While the author's certainly seem to understand this, they do seem biased to the old school of thought that American foreign policy is best left to the "wise old men" who understand what American interests REALLY are and who may take a longer and more "reasoned" approach regarding those interests - i.e. American foreign policy issues are too important to be left to the normal democratic process. My personal belief is that the best approach lies somewhere in between the two extremes and I also believe that looking back on the historical record of American foreign policy, a case could be made for a middle ground. For example, one could argue that the "wise old men" approach took us into Vietnam and kept us there far too long. Or, conversely, had FDR listened more to the "wise old men," and been less worried about American public opinion, we would have entered WWII in 1939 instead of 1941, saving millions of European lives and, perhaps, avoiding war with Japan.

So, while I believe the author's have written something worthwhile for the literature of American political science, I am not sure I completely agree with the conclusions they reach.

What does interest me is a question the book poses, but has (thus far at least...I'm only half way through it) not addressed. Due to the enormous power of this lobby and the strategic importance of the United States to Israel, is it possible that the "tail is wagging the dog?" Rather than the lobby taking orders from Israel, is it possible that Israel takes its cues from the lobby?

Following that possibility, it is also reasonable to ask how the lobby arrives at it's stands on issues? Is there democratic debate and thought within the lobby or has it been "caputured" by neo-conservative thought, which I believe in itself may contain the seeds of racism.

The chief criticism of Israel by the authors lies in Israeli policies in the "Occupied Territories," Gaza and the West Bank. This is a complicated issue and there is, within Israel, no absolute consensus on what those policies should be. Aside from the problem of Jerusalem, the basic difficulty would seem to lie with the proposition: How do you reconcile Israeli security with indefensible borders? And, further, does the lack of Israeli security on the ground enhance the probability of nuclear warfare in the region?

It would seem to me that even the Likud government in Israel is wrestling with this problem. Without Israeli dominance and essential control of Gaza and the West Bank (and in the Golan Heights), the "buffer zones" seized by Israel disappear, thus leaving it more susceptible to physical invasion. This, in turn, makes the use of Israeli nuclear weapons, in the event of war, more likely, not less likely.

The solution lies in a viable Palestinian state that recognizes Israel's right to exist and, which is capable of ensuring Israeli security. The democratic election of Hamas in Palestine is an indication (without substantial changes in Hamas goals) that the region is moving further away from these two conditions than closer. [The other option is to redraw Israel's borders, but this seems less likely.]

Were it not for the U.S. situation in Iraq and current U.S.-Iranian relations, we would certainly be in a better position to act as arbitrators in the Israeli-Palestianan dilemma. Indeed, the "democratization" policies of the Bush Administration appear to have led to Hezbollah's election victory in Palestine and may well lead to pro-Iranian Shia election victories in Iran. "Wise old men" might have avoided both.

There is one part of the book that the author's and their critics seem to disagree on and the suggestion above of the "tail wagging the dog" might explain. The authors point to the Israeli influence in the decision to invade Iraq. Their critics point to Israeli advice to the U.S. government NOT to invade Iraq. On this apparent difference one must look to a) the timing of events and b) Israeli national security interests.

Let's take the latter first. The invasion of Iraq did nothing to help Israeli security. One supposes that the Mossad (Israeli intelligence) understood the Iraqi WMD issue better than we. Further, the sanctions imposed on Iraq were having a serious impact on the infrastructure and stability of the country. Saddam Hussein was a dictator with dwindling support, being squeezed slowly into a corner. He was a "threat" to no one outside of his own people in terms of resources, if not personal ambitions that amounted to little more than fantasy. Yes, he may have "sponsered" some terrorism directed toward Israel, but Israel has lived and controlled terrorist attacks for years. The threat he posed directly to Israel may well have been in the "continuing nusance" category, but it was not in the "strategic" category. The regional instability our invasion was likely to produce was a far greater threat to Israel than the regime of Saddam Hussein. This, then explains why Israel would advise the U.S. NOT to invade Iraq.

But the authors have missed a critical point. If we support Israel in actions not to the benefit of U.S. national security, Israel does the same toward American foreign policy. This brings me to the second point; Israeli policy on the U.S. invasion appears to have shifted only AFTER they came to the conclusion that the U.S. was going to invade regardless of their advice...i.e. after they consulted the Israel Lobby.

My suggestion that the tail may be wagging the dog would explain the Israeli shift, i.e. it was the Israel Lobby, dominated by neo-conservatives, that influenced the invasion decision, not Israel itself.