On Blackwater: Since yesterday, Associated Press has been reporting on the Iraqi government's report regarding the September Blackwater incident regarding the death of Iraqi citizens caught up in a Blackwater convoy operation. Blackwater claims its people were responding to an attack. The Iraqi report, based on their own investigation, says this isn't so and is recommending that the U.S. turn over the Blackwater employees involved for possible trial in Iraqi courts; that the families of the 17 Iraqis killed be compensated with a total of $136M, and that Blackwater be out of Iraq in six months. The State Department, which was conducting its own investigation, has turned their investigation over to the FBI. Presumably, there is a third investigation being completed by the U.S. military.
The U.S. investigations have yet to be completed, however, a leak regarding the U.S. military effort pretty much confirms (thus far) the Iraqi government's story.
The curious thing is that although MSNBC, Fox News, AP, NPR, et al have reported the above, both the New York Times and the Washington Post have remained silent and have not reported the story, which is now more than 36 hours old. Why?
Meanwhile, the situation in Iraq apparently continues to deteriorate. The British have announced half of their remaining force will leave by year end, with the probability of a complete pull-out of their remaining 2,500 troops by the end of 2008. I would guess that these remaining 2,500 will basically be a "covering withdrawal force," and be unable to conduct large scale offensive operations from January 2008 on. The British Prime Minister, while not quite claiming "victory," stated "things are calmer." We may expect to see Iranian influence increase in the region.
To the north, the Turkish government has approved across-the-border "reconnaissance-in-force" by Turkish forces in pursuit of PPK Kurdish terrorists, who killed some 14 people in a Turkish village over the weekend. A projection of future events is pretty simple. If the Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq cannot control the PPK, Turkey will move into northern Iraq to do so, while making an "arrangement" with the Iranians to divide the oil resources.
In Baghdad, a number of prominent Iraq politicians announced that they've given up on "reconciliation" between Sunnis and Shites. This basically blows the argument of a surge for stability, needed in turn, for political progress.
Things in the third major area of Iraq (Anbar Province) seem to be remaining relatively calm. The U.S. decision to make peace with Sunni tribal interests in the region appears to be working for the moment. In fact, this shift of position in Anbar, which has NOT been greeted with approval in the central Baghdad government, may be an indication that the best we can hope for is a relatively stable and semi-independent Anbar, with ties to the Saudis. Anbar borders Saudi Arabia and Syria. It is mostly desert and relatively untapped regarding potential oil resources. And, it is predominately Sunni.
"Truth" in this region appears to be a matter of perspective. The Iraqis-in-the-Street appear to be convinced of Blackwater's guilt (right or wrong). Best course for the U.S. is to pay the $136M, get the Blackwater people out, with the promise of a trial in the U.S., and get rid of Blackwater in Iraq (replacing them with U.S. Marines) ASAP. The alternative may be a complete breakdown of the Maliki-U.S. relationship and/or an end to the Maliki government.
What is becoming abundantly clear is that Iraq per se is no more. It was largely a "phony country" created by the British and oil interests following WWI and held together largely by the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein.
Bush's options are running out. It's difficult to see how he can maintain his quest for "victory" through the end of his term in office. Events on the ground are beginning to move too fast.
An air attack on Iran would not change the situation in Iraq, but in all probability lead to increased Iranian infiltration (if not a stronger response), leading in turn to increased U.S. casualties. Further, the Administration has semi-committed to a withdrawal of 5,000+ U.S. troops by year end, thus they will not be available to fill-in for the British withdrawal.
If the U.S. withdraws an additional 50,000 next year, this leaves us with approximately 100,000 troops in-country by the end of 2008, most of whom will be needed in Anbar and the northern Kurish regions, if not simply to protect our new $160M embassy in an increasingly hostile Baghdad.
Tuesday, October 09, 2007
Sunday, October 07, 2007
"The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy"
I am about half-way through this controversial book and, so far, the question that comes to mind is: What's the controversy?
The basic theme of the authors is that collectively the various pro-Israel lobbying groups constitute the single most powerful political lobby in the United States and that as a result U.S. foreign policy in the middle east is essentially a "rubber stamp" approval of whatever policy the Israeli government is following at the moment.
The book bends over backwards NOT to come across as anti-Semitic. It seems as if one sentence in every paragraph is devoted to the anticipated charge of anti-Semitism. They take pains to point out that the Lobby is entirely legal and in the tradition of the American politics and special interest groups. Their complaint is that the Lobby's effectiveness (in terms of organization, influence and money) occasionally distorts U.S. policy positions that are not in the "objective" interests of U.S. national security.
As a "read," the book is a bit tedious and reads more like a dissertation than a best seller. Also, the central theme is something akin to "The Emperor's New Clothes." Someone has finally written and documented what has been a fact of life for the political system for at least a half century. Despite that, it's a worthwhile read concerning "the elephant in the room."
However, to agree with the authors one has to accept their basic perspective regarding the formation of American foreign policy, i.e. the "realist" school of thought. While I personally agree with this perspective, I understand there are others, so while agreeing with the book, I'll play devil's advocate for a moment.
The counter perspective to the author's is that the formation of American foreign policy is no different than the process that is used for the formation of any other area of government policy and that special interest groups are vital for this process. Secondly, special interest groups are seldom, if ever, "objective." Be it the "oil lobby" or the "environmental lobby," NO lobby may be expected to pursue activities contrary to their essential purpose.
While the author's certainly seem to understand this, they do seem biased to the old school of thought that American foreign policy is best left to the "wise old men" who understand what American interests REALLY are and who may take a longer and more "reasoned" approach regarding those interests - i.e. American foreign policy issues are too important to be left to the normal democratic process. My personal belief is that the best approach lies somewhere in between the two extremes and I also believe that looking back on the historical record of American foreign policy, a case could be made for a middle ground. For example, one could argue that the "wise old men" approach took us into Vietnam and kept us there far too long. Or, conversely, had FDR listened more to the "wise old men," and been less worried about American public opinion, we would have entered WWII in 1939 instead of 1941, saving millions of European lives and, perhaps, avoiding war with Japan.
So, while I believe the author's have written something worthwhile for the literature of American political science, I am not sure I completely agree with the conclusions they reach.
What does interest me is a question the book poses, but has (thus far at least...I'm only half way through it) not addressed. Due to the enormous power of this lobby and the strategic importance of the United States to Israel, is it possible that the "tail is wagging the dog?" Rather than the lobby taking orders from Israel, is it possible that Israel takes its cues from the lobby?
Following that possibility, it is also reasonable to ask how the lobby arrives at it's stands on issues? Is there democratic debate and thought within the lobby or has it been "caputured" by neo-conservative thought, which I believe in itself may contain the seeds of racism.
The chief criticism of Israel by the authors lies in Israeli policies in the "Occupied Territories," Gaza and the West Bank. This is a complicated issue and there is, within Israel, no absolute consensus on what those policies should be. Aside from the problem of Jerusalem, the basic difficulty would seem to lie with the proposition: How do you reconcile Israeli security with indefensible borders? And, further, does the lack of Israeli security on the ground enhance the probability of nuclear warfare in the region?
It would seem to me that even the Likud government in Israel is wrestling with this problem. Without Israeli dominance and essential control of Gaza and the West Bank (and in the Golan Heights), the "buffer zones" seized by Israel disappear, thus leaving it more susceptible to physical invasion. This, in turn, makes the use of Israeli nuclear weapons, in the event of war, more likely, not less likely.
The solution lies in a viable Palestinian state that recognizes Israel's right to exist and, which is capable of ensuring Israeli security. The democratic election of Hamas in Palestine is an indication (without substantial changes in Hamas goals) that the region is moving further away from these two conditions than closer. [The other option is to redraw Israel's borders, but this seems less likely.]
Were it not for the U.S. situation in Iraq and current U.S.-Iranian relations, we would certainly be in a better position to act as arbitrators in the Israeli-Palestianan dilemma. Indeed, the "democratization" policies of the Bush Administration appear to have led to Hezbollah's election victory in Palestine and may well lead to pro-Iranian Shia election victories in Iran. "Wise old men" might have avoided both.
There is one part of the book that the author's and their critics seem to disagree on and the suggestion above of the "tail wagging the dog" might explain. The authors point to the Israeli influence in the decision to invade Iraq. Their critics point to Israeli advice to the U.S. government NOT to invade Iraq. On this apparent difference one must look to a) the timing of events and b) Israeli national security interests.
Let's take the latter first. The invasion of Iraq did nothing to help Israeli security. One supposes that the Mossad (Israeli intelligence) understood the Iraqi WMD issue better than we. Further, the sanctions imposed on Iraq were having a serious impact on the infrastructure and stability of the country. Saddam Hussein was a dictator with dwindling support, being squeezed slowly into a corner. He was a "threat" to no one outside of his own people in terms of resources, if not personal ambitions that amounted to little more than fantasy. Yes, he may have "sponsered" some terrorism directed toward Israel, but Israel has lived and controlled terrorist attacks for years. The threat he posed directly to Israel may well have been in the "continuing nusance" category, but it was not in the "strategic" category. The regional instability our invasion was likely to produce was a far greater threat to Israel than the regime of Saddam Hussein. This, then explains why Israel would advise the U.S. NOT to invade Iraq.
But the authors have missed a critical point. If we support Israel in actions not to the benefit of U.S. national security, Israel does the same toward American foreign policy. This brings me to the second point; Israeli policy on the U.S. invasion appears to have shifted only AFTER they came to the conclusion that the U.S. was going to invade regardless of their advice...i.e. after they consulted the Israel Lobby.
My suggestion that the tail may be wagging the dog would explain the Israeli shift, i.e. it was the Israel Lobby, dominated by neo-conservatives, that influenced the invasion decision, not Israel itself.
The basic theme of the authors is that collectively the various pro-Israel lobbying groups constitute the single most powerful political lobby in the United States and that as a result U.S. foreign policy in the middle east is essentially a "rubber stamp" approval of whatever policy the Israeli government is following at the moment.
The book bends over backwards NOT to come across as anti-Semitic. It seems as if one sentence in every paragraph is devoted to the anticipated charge of anti-Semitism. They take pains to point out that the Lobby is entirely legal and in the tradition of the American politics and special interest groups. Their complaint is that the Lobby's effectiveness (in terms of organization, influence and money) occasionally distorts U.S. policy positions that are not in the "objective" interests of U.S. national security.
As a "read," the book is a bit tedious and reads more like a dissertation than a best seller. Also, the central theme is something akin to "The Emperor's New Clothes." Someone has finally written and documented what has been a fact of life for the political system for at least a half century. Despite that, it's a worthwhile read concerning "the elephant in the room."
However, to agree with the authors one has to accept their basic perspective regarding the formation of American foreign policy, i.e. the "realist" school of thought. While I personally agree with this perspective, I understand there are others, so while agreeing with the book, I'll play devil's advocate for a moment.
The counter perspective to the author's is that the formation of American foreign policy is no different than the process that is used for the formation of any other area of government policy and that special interest groups are vital for this process. Secondly, special interest groups are seldom, if ever, "objective." Be it the "oil lobby" or the "environmental lobby," NO lobby may be expected to pursue activities contrary to their essential purpose.
While the author's certainly seem to understand this, they do seem biased to the old school of thought that American foreign policy is best left to the "wise old men" who understand what American interests REALLY are and who may take a longer and more "reasoned" approach regarding those interests - i.e. American foreign policy issues are too important to be left to the normal democratic process. My personal belief is that the best approach lies somewhere in between the two extremes and I also believe that looking back on the historical record of American foreign policy, a case could be made for a middle ground. For example, one could argue that the "wise old men" approach took us into Vietnam and kept us there far too long. Or, conversely, had FDR listened more to the "wise old men," and been less worried about American public opinion, we would have entered WWII in 1939 instead of 1941, saving millions of European lives and, perhaps, avoiding war with Japan.
So, while I believe the author's have written something worthwhile for the literature of American political science, I am not sure I completely agree with the conclusions they reach.
What does interest me is a question the book poses, but has (thus far at least...I'm only half way through it) not addressed. Due to the enormous power of this lobby and the strategic importance of the United States to Israel, is it possible that the "tail is wagging the dog?" Rather than the lobby taking orders from Israel, is it possible that Israel takes its cues from the lobby?
Following that possibility, it is also reasonable to ask how the lobby arrives at it's stands on issues? Is there democratic debate and thought within the lobby or has it been "caputured" by neo-conservative thought, which I believe in itself may contain the seeds of racism.
The chief criticism of Israel by the authors lies in Israeli policies in the "Occupied Territories," Gaza and the West Bank. This is a complicated issue and there is, within Israel, no absolute consensus on what those policies should be. Aside from the problem of Jerusalem, the basic difficulty would seem to lie with the proposition: How do you reconcile Israeli security with indefensible borders? And, further, does the lack of Israeli security on the ground enhance the probability of nuclear warfare in the region?
It would seem to me that even the Likud government in Israel is wrestling with this problem. Without Israeli dominance and essential control of Gaza and the West Bank (and in the Golan Heights), the "buffer zones" seized by Israel disappear, thus leaving it more susceptible to physical invasion. This, in turn, makes the use of Israeli nuclear weapons, in the event of war, more likely, not less likely.
The solution lies in a viable Palestinian state that recognizes Israel's right to exist and, which is capable of ensuring Israeli security. The democratic election of Hamas in Palestine is an indication (without substantial changes in Hamas goals) that the region is moving further away from these two conditions than closer. [The other option is to redraw Israel's borders, but this seems less likely.]
Were it not for the U.S. situation in Iraq and current U.S.-Iranian relations, we would certainly be in a better position to act as arbitrators in the Israeli-Palestianan dilemma. Indeed, the "democratization" policies of the Bush Administration appear to have led to Hezbollah's election victory in Palestine and may well lead to pro-Iranian Shia election victories in Iran. "Wise old men" might have avoided both.
There is one part of the book that the author's and their critics seem to disagree on and the suggestion above of the "tail wagging the dog" might explain. The authors point to the Israeli influence in the decision to invade Iraq. Their critics point to Israeli advice to the U.S. government NOT to invade Iraq. On this apparent difference one must look to a) the timing of events and b) Israeli national security interests.
Let's take the latter first. The invasion of Iraq did nothing to help Israeli security. One supposes that the Mossad (Israeli intelligence) understood the Iraqi WMD issue better than we. Further, the sanctions imposed on Iraq were having a serious impact on the infrastructure and stability of the country. Saddam Hussein was a dictator with dwindling support, being squeezed slowly into a corner. He was a "threat" to no one outside of his own people in terms of resources, if not personal ambitions that amounted to little more than fantasy. Yes, he may have "sponsered" some terrorism directed toward Israel, but Israel has lived and controlled terrorist attacks for years. The threat he posed directly to Israel may well have been in the "continuing nusance" category, but it was not in the "strategic" category. The regional instability our invasion was likely to produce was a far greater threat to Israel than the regime of Saddam Hussein. This, then explains why Israel would advise the U.S. NOT to invade Iraq.
But the authors have missed a critical point. If we support Israel in actions not to the benefit of U.S. national security, Israel does the same toward American foreign policy. This brings me to the second point; Israeli policy on the U.S. invasion appears to have shifted only AFTER they came to the conclusion that the U.S. was going to invade regardless of their advice...i.e. after they consulted the Israel Lobby.
My suggestion that the tail may be wagging the dog would explain the Israeli shift, i.e. it was the Israel Lobby, dominated by neo-conservatives, that influenced the invasion decision, not Israel itself.
Friday, October 05, 2007
Iraqi Corruption
Yesterday, I spent some 4 hours watching the CSPAN televised House Appropriations Committee hearing on corruption in Iraq (Rep Waxman, Dem, CA presiding as Chairman). There were various panels, but one of particular note was the one composed of the Comptroller General of the GAO, the Special IG for Iraq Reconstruction, and the former Iraqi Judge for Investigations into Corrupt Practices (who, in fear of his life, has recently requested political asylum for himself and family in the United States). This panel was followed by U.S. State Department testimony and a Republican requested witness representing some policy think tank "in defense of democratic governments," which I gathered was a neo-con leaning organization.
The hearing, which the State Department requested NOT be held, was informative. Waxman is doing useful oversight work and despite the obvious Democratic political overtones, should be of interest to both Republicans and Democrats.
I believe, however, there were two significant points or perspectives not touched upon. The purpose of this blog is to address both here, but first a general observation regarding the former Iraqi Judge of the Public Integrity Commission, Radhi al-Radhi.
Radhi testified that he estimated $18B lost to public corruption. He was also critical of the existing government and Prime Minister Maliki, whom he felt had squelched corruption investigations regarding several relatives. As is all too typical of Republican politics these days, Radhi was attacked by several of the Committee's Republicans (notably Dan Burton) on personal grounds, rather than challenging Radhi's actual testimony. Burton asked him what he position he had held under the Saddam Hussein regime ("Isn't it true you were a Public Prosecutor appointed by Saddam Hussein?"). The implication was, of course, that the Judge was a former regime member and therefore could not be trusted. This went on throughout Burton's question time; he would ask the "damning question" and then sit back, smiling smugly. Pure Joe McCarthyism. Unfortunate to his implication, Burton hadn't done his homework. The Judge replied that yes, he was for a period a Prosecutor in a Misdemeanor Court, and had been trained as a jurist in the University system. He had also been arrested and tortured twice and was Shia, not Sunni. There was no apology for Burton's attack; he simply got up and left the hearing.
Although Burton probably doesn't get it, he's one of Waxman's most supportive committee members; Waxman just let him hang himself.
Turning to what I believe were omissions, none touched on the legal status of the United States in Iraq or the possible cultural definition of "corruption" itself.
The U.S. panel members, head of GAO and the Special IG, went to pains to explain that the hearing was focusing not on corruption involving U.S. taxpayer funds, but on Iraq money. All agreed it was a somewhat vague distinction, but the GAO Comptroller General and Special IG both agreed that while we might have an overall interest in Iraqi corruption, we did not have a right to question (through audit) how efficiently or "cleanly" they spent their own money. And, there seemed to be a bipartisan consensus on the Committee on this point.
However, what I missed in this discussion was the question of whether or not we, in fact and international law, do have some fiscal oversight responsibility as the recognized "Occupying Power." While, I understand that we are transitioning from one Iraqi regime to another, I believe that we are still classified as an Occupying Power, with specific responsibilities. Whether or not those responsibilities include oversight of Iraqi internal financial affairs is a question in my mind and was not addressed.
The second issue that I believe the Committee omitted and that I would have liked to have seen was to attempt to define "corruption" in broader, cultural terms (although granted Waxman isn't the "philosopher type," more the "accountant.).
While there was a clear bi-partisan consensus that similar corruption had become almost the norm under the Saddam Hussein regime, it ended there. No one suggested that what we in the West might consider "corruption" was, in part, tied to a longer regional tradition extending much farther back than Hussein and possibly intertwined with Islam itself.
While I am not expert enough to draw conclusions, I would have enjoyed more discussion on this topic. For instance, what might well be considered "bribery" in Western culture, may simply be a means of "doing business" in the Middle East. This isn't so clearly right or wrong, but has to be understood within the context of the region's historical development and religion.
I would suggest that the historical development is essentially based on tribal perogitives. The money accepted in a "bribe" often goes not to merely enrich an individual, but to the older tradition of tribal organization. And, Islam, would seem to me, to deal with this in a unique way. First, there is no "clear" distinction between the state and the religion. Religious authority and principles regarding individual behavior are supreme and protected by a sort of "Supreme Court" of the religious hierarchy. But part of their authority (and success over the centuries) lies with this authority's reluctance to intrude on the day-to-day workings of the state. Bribery then is viewed much as part of the tribal system itself and, by extension, to the politics of the state. In other words, there is a subtle difference between how Western cultures and Middle Eastern cultures view and define "corruption." And, to, this provides for a curious form of democracy. The ultimate religious authorities do not draw their power from the state, but ultimately from the will of the people themselves, who have passed "power" to those recognized as their religious leaders. The result is that this produces, rightly or wrongly, a more "uniform" value system for the society, which the state then enforces, not in a dictatorial sense, but rather as religious principle.
Of course, as the Iraqi Judge pointed out, "corruption is corruption." In both cultures there is bribery amounting to "theft." A case in point is the former Iraqi Minister of Electricity who was convicted under Iraqi law of essentially stealing some $2B. This person, according to the testimony before the Committee, had been convicted in an Iraqi court of law and was being held in the Green Zone in Baghdad pending sentencing. Somehow, an American private security firm (not Blackwater), managed to get him out of confinement and he is now alive and well and living in Chicago.
The significance of the above lies in the difficulties (if not impossibility) of creating a westernized democracy in Iraq or elsewhere within the Islamic world. Just as with our own Christian fundamentalists and the American Israeli lobby, I do not expect we have much hope of totally "secularizing" Islam and that many of our efforts (and judgements pertaining to the Iraqi people) are perceived by the majority of the Iraqi people as attempts to do so.
The hearing, which the State Department requested NOT be held, was informative. Waxman is doing useful oversight work and despite the obvious Democratic political overtones, should be of interest to both Republicans and Democrats.
I believe, however, there were two significant points or perspectives not touched upon. The purpose of this blog is to address both here, but first a general observation regarding the former Iraqi Judge of the Public Integrity Commission, Radhi al-Radhi.
Radhi testified that he estimated $18B lost to public corruption. He was also critical of the existing government and Prime Minister Maliki, whom he felt had squelched corruption investigations regarding several relatives. As is all too typical of Republican politics these days, Radhi was attacked by several of the Committee's Republicans (notably Dan Burton) on personal grounds, rather than challenging Radhi's actual testimony. Burton asked him what he position he had held under the Saddam Hussein regime ("Isn't it true you were a Public Prosecutor appointed by Saddam Hussein?"). The implication was, of course, that the Judge was a former regime member and therefore could not be trusted. This went on throughout Burton's question time; he would ask the "damning question" and then sit back, smiling smugly. Pure Joe McCarthyism. Unfortunate to his implication, Burton hadn't done his homework. The Judge replied that yes, he was for a period a Prosecutor in a Misdemeanor Court, and had been trained as a jurist in the University system. He had also been arrested and tortured twice and was Shia, not Sunni. There was no apology for Burton's attack; he simply got up and left the hearing.
Although Burton probably doesn't get it, he's one of Waxman's most supportive committee members; Waxman just let him hang himself.
Turning to what I believe were omissions, none touched on the legal status of the United States in Iraq or the possible cultural definition of "corruption" itself.
The U.S. panel members, head of GAO and the Special IG, went to pains to explain that the hearing was focusing not on corruption involving U.S. taxpayer funds, but on Iraq money. All agreed it was a somewhat vague distinction, but the GAO Comptroller General and Special IG both agreed that while we might have an overall interest in Iraqi corruption, we did not have a right to question (through audit) how efficiently or "cleanly" they spent their own money. And, there seemed to be a bipartisan consensus on the Committee on this point.
However, what I missed in this discussion was the question of whether or not we, in fact and international law, do have some fiscal oversight responsibility as the recognized "Occupying Power." While, I understand that we are transitioning from one Iraqi regime to another, I believe that we are still classified as an Occupying Power, with specific responsibilities. Whether or not those responsibilities include oversight of Iraqi internal financial affairs is a question in my mind and was not addressed.
The second issue that I believe the Committee omitted and that I would have liked to have seen was to attempt to define "corruption" in broader, cultural terms (although granted Waxman isn't the "philosopher type," more the "accountant.).
While there was a clear bi-partisan consensus that similar corruption had become almost the norm under the Saddam Hussein regime, it ended there. No one suggested that what we in the West might consider "corruption" was, in part, tied to a longer regional tradition extending much farther back than Hussein and possibly intertwined with Islam itself.
While I am not expert enough to draw conclusions, I would have enjoyed more discussion on this topic. For instance, what might well be considered "bribery" in Western culture, may simply be a means of "doing business" in the Middle East. This isn't so clearly right or wrong, but has to be understood within the context of the region's historical development and religion.
I would suggest that the historical development is essentially based on tribal perogitives. The money accepted in a "bribe" often goes not to merely enrich an individual, but to the older tradition of tribal organization. And, Islam, would seem to me, to deal with this in a unique way. First, there is no "clear" distinction between the state and the religion. Religious authority and principles regarding individual behavior are supreme and protected by a sort of "Supreme Court" of the religious hierarchy. But part of their authority (and success over the centuries) lies with this authority's reluctance to intrude on the day-to-day workings of the state. Bribery then is viewed much as part of the tribal system itself and, by extension, to the politics of the state. In other words, there is a subtle difference between how Western cultures and Middle Eastern cultures view and define "corruption." And, to, this provides for a curious form of democracy. The ultimate religious authorities do not draw their power from the state, but ultimately from the will of the people themselves, who have passed "power" to those recognized as their religious leaders. The result is that this produces, rightly or wrongly, a more "uniform" value system for the society, which the state then enforces, not in a dictatorial sense, but rather as religious principle.
Of course, as the Iraqi Judge pointed out, "corruption is corruption." In both cultures there is bribery amounting to "theft." A case in point is the former Iraqi Minister of Electricity who was convicted under Iraqi law of essentially stealing some $2B. This person, according to the testimony before the Committee, had been convicted in an Iraqi court of law and was being held in the Green Zone in Baghdad pending sentencing. Somehow, an American private security firm (not Blackwater), managed to get him out of confinement and he is now alive and well and living in Chicago.
The significance of the above lies in the difficulties (if not impossibility) of creating a westernized democracy in Iraq or elsewhere within the Islamic world. Just as with our own Christian fundamentalists and the American Israeli lobby, I do not expect we have much hope of totally "secularizing" Islam and that many of our efforts (and judgements pertaining to the Iraqi people) are perceived by the majority of the Iraqi people as attempts to do so.
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