Iran

The general American media response to the Ahmadinejad visit to NYC and the United Nations illustrates why it is best to leave diplomacy to professionals.

For months the majority of this same media group has been decrying Bush's hard line approach to Iran and clamoring for more dialogue. Now, that the opportunity presents itself, that same media apparently wants to use it to insult Ahmadinejad, pin him down on the principle areas of contention and accuse him of being a crazy, petty dictator.

While the media may have valid, substantive points, it strikes me that the relationship between the two countries is far from a point wherein it is possible to make significant improvements on these points. Ahmadinejad is not going to make what he would consider to be major concessions for the sake of CBS or CNN ratings.

Certainly, in the interest of good journalism, the issues the media has raised with him should be raised, but not dwelt upon. Yet, the media interviews do not seem to be able to get beyond the most contentious issues between our countries: Israel, Iraq and nuclear proliferation. A word on each.

Although I completely support Israel's right to exist (to the point where I would prefer a formalized security pact with them guaranteeing them that right, even to providing a U.S. nuclear umbrella), I understand how and why we are losing the PR war in the Arab world on this point.

From the Arab viewpoint, Israel possesses nuclear weapons, why shouldn't they? Iran has, thus far, cooperated far more with the IAEA than Israel and its development of nuclear technology, thus far, has not gone beyond what the IAEA allows for the peaceful use of nuclear power. I hasten to also state that I suspect it is Iran's "intention" to utilize this development for nuclear weapons, but at this stage it's a "bargaining chip" with the West, not an imminent threat; that point is perhaps 2-3 years away.

In political philosophy, Israel might be described as a democratic-theocracy, while Iran might be described as a theocracy, with limited democratic ambitions. Some of our closest mid-east Arab allies fall into the same category: the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, although they are Sunni Arab, rather than Persian Shia.

The Israel-Palestinian conflict has, over the last fifty plus years acquired its own constituency. Roughly a quarter of Israel's GNP comes through foreign aid, most of which is based on the threat posed by the Arab world. And, there is still a minority expansionist element in Israeli politics. On the other side, one of the few things the Arab world has in common is hatred of Israel. It helps keep tyrants or benevolent monarchies in power. U.S. condemnation of Iran as a supporter of terrorism is chiefly based on Iranian support for anti-Israeli terror groups (certainly not Al Qaeda). I suspect that this support is more in line with Iran's ambitions to become the leading regional power and the intra-Islamic battle between Sunni and Shia for the hearts and minds of the middle eastern peoples than any genuine hatred of the Israeli people. I detect some "wiggle room" in the Iranian stance on these issues - i.e. support for the anti-Israeli terror groups, the situation in Syria, general relations with Israel and Ahmadinejad's weird and crazy views in regard to the Holocaust. Rather than reflexively respond to their current positions (which I agree are over the long run unacceptable), we should explore these areas with the Iranians.

Concerning Iraq, one needs to take a step backward. Remember that the CIA backed the overthrow of Iran's democratic government in the early fifties, when it believed it was leaning toward communism. We installed the Shah. While the Shah was a strong U.S. ally in the region and helpful toward the prosperity of Iran's upper and middle classes, over time he tended to adopt increasingly dictatorial methods in crushing popular movements (religious and democratic) among the Iranian people. The Iranian hostage taking of U.S. embassy personnel following the Shah's overthrow did not help U.S.-Iranian relations, but was subsequently resolved by President Reagan, followed by Reagan's Iran-Contra policy, which sold the Iranians weapons in their war against Iraq (whom we had earlier supported).

Following 9/11, the Iranians provided the United States with limited support in our defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, with assistance for downed U.S. aircraft, targeting and intelligence information. The Iranians, who were among the first to offer condolences for 9/11, followed this up by an apparent attempt to further an improvement of U.S.-Iranian relations with a secret diplomatic initiative, rejected hand-down by neo-conservative policy makers in Washington.
Bush's Axis of Evil speech ended that initiative and, I suspect, prompted acceleration of Iran's nuclear development program.

Today's Iranian support for Iraqi insurgents is another area upon which I detect wiggle room. For one, support to date (and based on what our government has released) is relatively minor compared to what it might be. On one hand, I am sure Iranian weapons are indeed showing up in Iraq, just as American weapons are showing up in Kurdish guerrilla attacks within Turkey. Some of their "support" may be unsanctioned. Yet, having said that, I also believe some percentage is sanctioned. The Iranians are undoubtedly supporting pro-Iranian, Shia militia groups within Iraq, just as we supported Contra guerrillas in Nicaragua; a country we felt was within our sphere of influence.

The pull-out of British forces from Basra pretty much ensures continued and increased Iranian support for a pro-Iranian, Shia regional government in southern Iraq. Having essentially accomplished their goal, the Iranians may now be in a position to negotiate a shut down in the flow of weapons to other areas of Iraq, with the agreement of their Shia allies in the south.

The nuclear issue. This issue is complex. From the Iranian perspective, there may be two motivations. The first is that they may have a genuine desire to develop peaceful nuclear power. Oil is not a renewable resource. As we use up what we have, the laws of supply and demand will become increasingly important. As world prices rise, it may be economically more profitable for Iran to export its oil resources than to utilize it for domestic consumption.

Weaponizing this capability is important within their greater goal for regional hegemony. The whole issue of nuclear proliferation in the mid-east began with Israel. I completely understand the pressures which led Israel to their own nuclear weapon capability. One of the most important factors in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute (and in the Golan Heights) is that Israel does not possess, within its original 1947-48 borders, militarily defensible borders. Developing nuclear weapons was the logical solution for a tiny country surrounded by hostile neighbors, who in turn would remain hostile as long has that attitude was essential to the continuance of regional dictatorships and monarchs. And, for us, it was/is easier to control the world market for oil by supporting these people than coping with the unpredictability of Islamic fundamentalist governments (aside from the issue of whether or not they support terrorism). The problem becomes circular.

So, what's the solution?

A first step is in ensuring Israel with permanent, defensible borders and a guarantee of its sovereignty. On the other hand, Israel cannot expect to achieve these goals without giving something up of their own. A possible "trade" is an Israeli move toward more secularization of its own society, acceptance of an internationalization of Jerusalem, a renunciation of "nuclear first strike," and a far reaching goal of eliminating its own nuclear weapon capability. Given the history of the Holocaust and the fact that the very establishment of Israel is based on religious premises, acceptance of these "goals" will not be easy, but with the nuclear proliferation issue, their survival may depend upon it. And, key toward even establishing these goals must be both a U.N. and Western guarantee (particularly by the United States) of Israeli security.

A second step is to begin preparing for civilization beyond oil, globally. On one level, Dubai appears to be a very small state now in this process. On a different level, Iran may be another.
What Iran requires is an end to sanctions and inclusion in the global community. To achieve this we cannot expect them to suddenly evolve into a western style democracy. Western market capitalism and democracy tends to play to the lowest common denominator of human nature. Many of the "improvements" in civilization accomplished by the West, frankly, have their down-side as well. If the Iranians wish to avoid these downsides by striking some type of balance between their religious beliefs and total western secularism, so be it. That's their business. But these differences should not stop their inclusion into the broader world community, to which they have much to contribute. At the moment, the cards they have to play are the restatement of their policy toward Israel, acceptance of nuclear non-proliferation, assistance in resolving the problem of Iraq and their oil.

More later.