More on Tenent and Pre-Invasion Intelligence

In my last blog I suggested that in regard to the decision to invade Iraq there may have been a "confluence of interests," rather than a conspiracy. There is an old saying that "there is no one more fanatical than a convert." A history of neo-conservatives traces their origins back to people who were, in the beginning, disaffected Trotskyites. With converts and ideologues the "end" often justifies the "means." If the "truth" is at the end of the road, it matters little how you get there and this may be particularly true of those who have used different paths. Thus, while the specific "interest" may have differed (Israel, Oil, Fundamental Christianity, business interests, etc.) I have little doubt that all of those who influenced the invasion decision thought they were acting in the best interests of the United States. Not questioning the patriotism of Bush, Cheney, et al may be some indication of how significantly the war issue has evolved over the last two-three years.

Tenent's book notes one fact, which if not new, I had not heard before. In discussing his opposition to Bush's famous State of the Union statement concerning supposed Iraqi pursuit of Niger yellow cake uranium, he tells us that in addition to the questionable sources of the intelligence, it made no sense to him since the CIA (and presumably Bush, Cheney, et al) already knew that Iraqi possessed 550 metric tons of the stuff. No one...not Bush, not Cheney, nor any of the Administration's dwindling supporters has heretofore pointed this out. Why? Why rely on questionable intelligence, now pretty much discredited as being based on forged documents, when other intelligence existed that confirmed Iraq's possession of bomb grade uranium? [Note: At the time of the Address, I thought something was wrong. The intelligence had already been questioned in the press and Bush's emphasis on "According to BRITISH intelligence...." struck me as strange. Why, I thought would he take British intelligence and clearly emphasize BRITISH. I thought it a slap in the face to the CIA; now I think it was because he anticipated Tenent's disagreement and was well aware of the CIA's earlier objection. In his book, Tenent claims he'd only looked at the Address casually the night before and did not watch the Address.]

There are possibily two explanations: 1) the other intelligence could not be used without endangering its source or 2) revealing that intelligence would have also in some way have discredited the argument of imminent nuclear threat (e.g. "they've had this stuff for ten years and haven't done anything with it").

Given what everyone believed and has not been disproven regarding Hussein's nature and long term intent, I would tend to side with the former explanation rather than the latter. The mere possession of bomb grade uranium by Hussein would have constituted a serious - if not imminent - threat and gained public support for invasion; in any regard, it would have been seen as more threatening than "British intelligence" suggesting Iraq was merely in the market for such material.

So...pretend to be Dick Cheney for the moment or maybe, at least Scooter Libby. You are aware, presumably based on "good" intelligence, that Hussein possesses 550 metric tons of yellow cake uranium, but can't reveal this due to compromising the sources. Are you justified in going with less creditable intelligence - even fabricated intelligence - to make the same point to the American people? I would argue no, but I can understand, if not agree with, the opposite argument. Did the policy makers, at one level or another, present false and questionable intelligence as the reasons for war in what they believed to be the best interests of the country and to protect other more solid intelligence that could not be revealed? Maybe. But of course the burden of proof for this possibility now rests with those who provided either false or cherry-picked intelligence.

Despite all of my readings, despite being against the Bush Doctrine and the decision to invade, despite all of the rather obvious incompetence, I have not yet come to the point wherein I believe that either Rumsfeld or Cheney lied directly to us, although those who surrounded them in all likelihood did for the reason noted above. Neither Rumsfeld or Cheney ever impressed me as "ideolouges," but as essentially pragmatic administrators. Did they want to get rid of Hussein prior to 9/11? Definitely. Did they believe the Clinton years had had a negative effect on American foreign policy and our military posture? Of course. Did 9/11 offer an "opportunity" to bring about regime change in Iraq and a major shift in U.S. policies with which they'd long disagreed? Absolutely.

But does all of that equate to taking part in a conspriacy to take us into an illegal war? No.

Two significant statements made by Rumsfeld give some evidence that he was not necessarily as enthusiastic about going to war as virtually everyone now believes he was. The first was his instinctive response to a soldier regarding lack of armor during one of his visits to Iraq, when he replied: "You don't always go to war with what you'd like to have." Interpretation of that remark depends on your perspective. For much of the media it illustrated a calloused disregard for our troops in the field. For much of the senior military opposed to the "leaner, meaner force structure" Rumsfeld was trying to implement, it may have been an admission of failure and vindication of the "Powell Doctrine." But, within the context of the Administration's arguments and thinking it may be seen as "opposition" to the invasion itself.

Did Rumsfeld actively argue for war? It's not clear. Tenent's book clearly shows that there was no love lost between the CIA and DoD. Rumsfeld certainly brought people into DoD who did (Wolfwitz, Feith, Pearle. et al). And, Tenent points out that Rumsfeld seemed to imply he'd rather invade Iraq than Afghanistan because Iraq contained "more targets." But did he actually recommend war? He says "no." When asked by Woodward, he replied: "I agreed with the decision, but no one asked me."

I would suggest that Rumsfeld had not been brought into the Administration with the anticipation that he might end up as a wartime Secretary of Defense. He was essentially a "functionary" brought in to revamp the military, to reorganize and modernize. Not to fight a war. And, as Cheney's former boss, he was in a bad situation. In that, Mr. Harvard MBA, our President, erred in basic management - never put a former boss in as a subordinate. Rumsfeld did what he could, given his talents and restraints and played as one of the "team." I suspect he had far more doubts than were expressed. I would hope that following the departure of the Bush Administration that he will write his own account, or leave something to be published following his own passing.

Indeed, it would appear that other than the neo-cons, who were generally found a tier down in the hierarchy, most had unexpressed doubts. Perhaps it was the macho orientation? The age difference between GW and his key advisors? A desire by older and wiser men to show that despite their age they could get the job done. That they wouldn't let the President down or perhaps even more so, they wouldn't fail George Senior. They'd take care of his boy.

The Cheney conversion has been wondered about both in the media and among those who served with him in earlier years (e.g. Powell, Scrowcroft, et al). I suspect his out-of-government experience at Halliburton and with the Texas crowd moved him a bit to the right, as did his spouse Lynne Cheney, whom I had always believed was further to the right than himself. Also, Cheney perhaps took 9/11 harder than anyone, because he was Mr. National Defense as Vice President. Like him or hate him, Cheney is a guy who doesn't make excuses for himself.

It is safe to say that whatever mistakes may have been made and in wake of the "I told you so" dissenters following 9/11 it was an event that made an organizational shamble of the Bush Administration. Powell, the General, at State; Rumsfeld, Mr. Wizard, at the Pentagon; the point man Cheney as VP. Excellent choices for peacetime; a disaster in war.

In the end, I blame Bush. It was a time to shift management styles. Not necessarily to replace people, but to become more involved and insist on putting the country on a war footing and that the focus remain on Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden and not be diverted until that task was accomplished. It was time for him to step up and help them instead of vice versa. Instead, it was "business as usual" and a continuing reliance on staffers with basically several lifetimes of staff experience. And, they reverted to what staffs do...worry about their respective standings with the boss. Remain silent or be evasive when in the same room with him and others...holding their counsel for one-on-one. And, so genuine policy came from the "wonks" beneath the administrators...the neo-cons, who had all the answers...ready and waiting. And they were wrong.