M. King Hubbert was a geologist specializing in global oil resources. He worked for Shell Oil in Houston and in the fifties began formulating a mathematical formula for the prediction of oil resources and the impact of production upon these resources. Initially, his work was met with skepticism. Hubbert's "curve" (a bell shaped curve tracking the world's oil production) was sort of a "black box." Few in the industry understood the math and formula behind it, adding to the initial skepticism. In the sixties, Hubbert elaborated and refined the curve, predicting that "peak" oil production would occur around the year 2000 and thereafter begin to decline.
While I don't pretend to understand the mathematical assumptions behind the curve, I may imagine that it is based essentially on the best historical production figures Hubbert could obtain, combined with a healthy margin of error regarding potential new discoveries, coupled to an understanding of supply and demand. Essentially, Hubbert forecast that "peak" oil production would occur at a point in time at which the world's oil resources would be generally known and its complete depletion could be reasonably forecast. At that point, in defiance of the normal law of supply and demand, wherein supply always rises to meet demand, production would instead begin to drop in anticipation of the end of the era of oil and the resultant rise in prices.
Hubbert's 2000 production peak wasn't exactly on target, but close enough to emphasis the obvious: oil is a depletable resource and the industrial age has depleted it much faster than it can be replaced. One, of his followers, Kenneth S. Deffeyes, a retired professor of geology from Princeton, in a book entitled "Beyond Oil," published in 2005 and updated in 2006, estimates that we hit peak oil production in December of 2005. Today, most geologists believe that we have either already hit peak production or will shortly (within the next ten years).
What this basically means is that the world, at some point within this century, will lose the cheap energy source that fueled the industrial revolution and most of the material conveniences we enjoy today. Worse, this is occuring at a time when political and technological changes are "promising" to bring those same material conveniences to approximately half of the world's population that had been denied to them under communism.
In theory, eventually, the price of oil will rise until a less expensive alternative energy source is found, so that, in the long run, the transition to a new renewable and inexpensive energy source will be but a blip in human progress. But, the key concern today is, as is the case in globalization, the degree of disruption occuring in the transition.
To minimize this disruption a key element of U.S. foreign policy must be to ensure the more or less uninterupted flow of oil, at more or less free market prices, from the Persian Gulf. Basically, four countries: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and the UAE hold two-thirds of the world's oil reserves. The continued participation of these countries within the global free market system, even though they may not be democratic, is essential to global economic stability for at least the next fifty years.
Although no longer the strong industrial power we once were, the U.S. remains the world's largest single user of oil. With it, we heat our homes and offices, fuel our transportation system, etc. Indeed, much of our entire "new economy" has been built around the premise of cheap energy: suburbs, shopping centers, highway systems, drive-through everythings, etc. As a result, hegemony, if not outright occupation, in the Middle East is of prime importance to U.S. economic national security, which in turn, is directly linked to our status as the world's remaining superpower. Indirectly, it is also linked to our rather tenuous relationship with the world's new and growing industrial base, the southeast asian "tigers," India and China.
The United States retains its superpower status primarily due to three factors: consumption - i.e. what we import (increasingly based on credit), a safe harbor for investment and stable currency - i.e. Wall Street and the dollar, and military force - i.e. the ability to "project" control abroad. [Agriculture exports might constitute a fourth]. All three of these factors are reaching their limits and the limits are becoming increasingly visable to the rest of the world. And, as this visibility becomes clearer, our superpower status becomes increasingly in doubt.
Throughout the Clinton years we managed to sustain the fiction by means of selling much of the world with the idea of a "new economy" and the coming of a post-industrial age, in which the United States continued to dominate through cutting edge information technology. Unfortunantely, the nature of the technology we touted undercut the rationale of a U.S. advantage. To maintain an industrial advantage, requires hardware - i.e. the physical infrastructure of factories, equipment and cheap labor. To maintain a "new economy" advantage requires a "license" - i.e. a piece of paper that promises to respect intellectual property rights.
In a sense, we leapt ahead of much of the world's political development and "bet" our economic future on the global acceptance of democratic principals, the rule of law, and universal property rights. We believed our own hype, in a post Cold War world.
Two events caused the world to "reevaluate" our worth. One was the dot.com bubble burst. Any new technological innovation that comes hard and fast tends to be over-valued in a free market economy. It has happened periodically throughout the history of capitalism and, I should think, pretty much confirms human nature and Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of free and rationale choice in the market. But this time, it happened on a global basis and the result was a reappraisal of the U.S. advantage in a "new global economy."
The second shoe dropped on 9/11. Our attackers flew airplanes (taken over with box cutters) not into the National Cathederal or Riverside Church, or the George Washington Monument but into the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon. In other words, they selected their targets as those representative of the foundations of our superpower status, instead of targets representative of our religious beliefs or our democratic values.
Our response has been consistent with our own self-image, in turn distorted by a failure to appreciate the genuine causes contributing to the end of the Cold War and the failure to come to grips with the substantial changes in the global situation wrought by that end. And, if left unevaluated and unchallenged, these false assumptions leave us on a path toward a future of on-going "oil wars" and the continuing decline of American society. In sum, unless we are now ready to institute serious political and economic reforms and face the serious errors made in our post Cold War history, things just "ain't goin to get better."
[More to come]
Saturday, November 10, 2007
Sunday, November 04, 2007
Iraq (Continued)
With approximately 4,000 dead American soldiers and approximately one trillion dollars spent, we now may be facing a revitalized, democratic Iraq aligned to Iran.
The administration's reaction to 9/11 was initially "an emotion seeking a policy." They had been caught off guard by a relatively simplistic plot that had worked with unbelievable effectiveness and one that undermined many of the assumptions of globalization. The natural response to the attack, locking down the country, cancelling the tax cuts, mobilizing the country, ran contrary to many of these assumptions. The answer to the response problem was to, rather than retreat behind our own borders, strike outwardly and the neo-conservatives were right there, in DoD and CHeney's office, to assist them in this thinking.
The foreign policy element of this thinking had a long history within the Republican Party going back to John Foster Dulles and the concept of "roll-back" following WWII (many would trace it back further to Teddy Roosevelt or even the concept of manifest destiny in the 1840s, interrupted by the Civil War and continued in the late 1880s, calling for an expansion of American power).
Basically, roll-back following WWII called for a more aggressive American posture versus communism and the Soviet Union. Roll-back advocates called for things like the invasion of Cuba, direct military support for the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, support of revolutions from the right and, where necessary the pragmatic support of anti-communist dictatorships. One of their favorite witchhunts during this period was: Who Lost China? Although roll-back never achieved its goals and the official U.S. foreign policy of the Cold War became, in face of Soviet nuclear weapons, "containment," the wishful thinking of its supporters never completely went away.
This was also the hey day of the newly formed CIA and one of its great "successes" lay in the Iranian coup that ousted a communist leaning, but more or less democratically elected government and placed the Shah in power. This was a major cause of the subsequent Iranian Revolution which deposed the Shah and led to the seizing of our Tehran embassy, for which in turn, we've never forgiven the Iranians. [Note: if one is looking for a new start in U.S.-Iranian relations, we might start by "calling ourselves even" and each acknowledging our own errors].
So, following a relatively easy victory in Afghanistan, the administration having taken the first bite of the apple of regime change and nation building turned toward the "axis of evil." As part of the axis, North Korea was sort of a "no-brainer." An oppressive state, run by a deranged person, North Korea was on every body's list of rogue states. Another, on our list, if not the rest of the world's, was Iraq.
Iraq was from the Administration's viewpoint a "win-win" situation. Hussein wasn't exactly a poster boy for good deeds and had defied us in the first Gulf War and whenever thereafter he had an opportunity. Although an on-going nuisance of the first rank few other than ourselves (and subsequently Tony Blair in Britain and the others who joined the "Coalition of the Willing") considered Hussein an imminent threat to anyone other than the Iranian Kurds in northern Iraq and southern Iranian Shias.
There are only two strategic interests of the United States in the mid-east: Israel and Oil. It would be nice if the entire region was dominated by freely elected governments, respecting minority rights, women's rights, etc. It would also be nice if the same goals were achieved throughout Africa and elsewhere...but achievement of these goals (until the Bush Doctrine) is not essential to the national security of the United States. The security of Israel is essential if for no other reason than the Israel Lobby in the United States, a legitimate and important part of our own political system. The security of the Persian Gulf region is essential to the free flow of oil and its impact on the world economy. Other than that and despite a long history of missionary work and limited trade, its pretty much a large sand box inhabited by curious and quarrelsome people, who in the annuals of human civilization have seen better days (and hopefully will see better days again, although not at our expense).
For a long time following our invasion of Iraq I assumed that the "win-win" scenario within American politics consisted of pro-Israeli liberal Democrats and oil focused right wing Republicans. However, following a read of a controversial new book, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," I have revised my opinion.
I now believe that Israel did not initially want a U.S. invasion of Iraq and considered it likely to de-stabilize a region in which stability was a major component of their own national security, barring a real threat of nuclear proliferation in the region. Indeed, Sharon's initial advice seems to have been, "oh no, don't go there." I also believe that the Mossad (Israeli intelligence) to be among the most informed services on earth and that they did not buy into Hussein's possession of WMD. Rather, I now think that prominent American Jewish neo-cons more or less hijacked the U.S. Israel Lobby, along with key policy makers within the Administration. Right wing pressures in Israel, plus the shift of the U.S. lobby drove Sharon to ultimately agree with and support the invasion.
There is no evidence that anyone at the time was seriously worried about relating 9/11, Saddam Hussein and the flow of oil through the Persian Gulf to a need for a quick invasion. Without imminent threat, the Administration had to build a case for invasion based on weak linkages of Hussein to 9/11, old WMD activities (which Hussein actually encouraged) and the general proposition that he was a very bad guy who killed his own people by the thousands. Indeed, thanks to the sanctions and the corrupt U.N. oil for food program, more Iraqi oil was folowing through the Gulf than we wanted.
In fact, other than the neo-con loony Weltanschauung, I see only one authentic national interest in the invasion (discounting for the moment the personal and political reasons of the President and assuming he hadn't been hoodwinked by the neo-cons around him), namely something called "Hubbert's Peak."
[one more to come]
The administration's reaction to 9/11 was initially "an emotion seeking a policy." They had been caught off guard by a relatively simplistic plot that had worked with unbelievable effectiveness and one that undermined many of the assumptions of globalization. The natural response to the attack, locking down the country, cancelling the tax cuts, mobilizing the country, ran contrary to many of these assumptions. The answer to the response problem was to, rather than retreat behind our own borders, strike outwardly and the neo-conservatives were right there, in DoD and CHeney's office, to assist them in this thinking.
The foreign policy element of this thinking had a long history within the Republican Party going back to John Foster Dulles and the concept of "roll-back" following WWII (many would trace it back further to Teddy Roosevelt or even the concept of manifest destiny in the 1840s, interrupted by the Civil War and continued in the late 1880s, calling for an expansion of American power).
Basically, roll-back following WWII called for a more aggressive American posture versus communism and the Soviet Union. Roll-back advocates called for things like the invasion of Cuba, direct military support for the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, support of revolutions from the right and, where necessary the pragmatic support of anti-communist dictatorships. One of their favorite witchhunts during this period was: Who Lost China? Although roll-back never achieved its goals and the official U.S. foreign policy of the Cold War became, in face of Soviet nuclear weapons, "containment," the wishful thinking of its supporters never completely went away.
This was also the hey day of the newly formed CIA and one of its great "successes" lay in the Iranian coup that ousted a communist leaning, but more or less democratically elected government and placed the Shah in power. This was a major cause of the subsequent Iranian Revolution which deposed the Shah and led to the seizing of our Tehran embassy, for which in turn, we've never forgiven the Iranians. [Note: if one is looking for a new start in U.S.-Iranian relations, we might start by "calling ourselves even" and each acknowledging our own errors].
So, following a relatively easy victory in Afghanistan, the administration having taken the first bite of the apple of regime change and nation building turned toward the "axis of evil." As part of the axis, North Korea was sort of a "no-brainer." An oppressive state, run by a deranged person, North Korea was on every body's list of rogue states. Another, on our list, if not the rest of the world's, was Iraq.
Iraq was from the Administration's viewpoint a "win-win" situation. Hussein wasn't exactly a poster boy for good deeds and had defied us in the first Gulf War and whenever thereafter he had an opportunity. Although an on-going nuisance of the first rank few other than ourselves (and subsequently Tony Blair in Britain and the others who joined the "Coalition of the Willing") considered Hussein an imminent threat to anyone other than the Iranian Kurds in northern Iraq and southern Iranian Shias.
There are only two strategic interests of the United States in the mid-east: Israel and Oil. It would be nice if the entire region was dominated by freely elected governments, respecting minority rights, women's rights, etc. It would also be nice if the same goals were achieved throughout Africa and elsewhere...but achievement of these goals (until the Bush Doctrine) is not essential to the national security of the United States. The security of Israel is essential if for no other reason than the Israel Lobby in the United States, a legitimate and important part of our own political system. The security of the Persian Gulf region is essential to the free flow of oil and its impact on the world economy. Other than that and despite a long history of missionary work and limited trade, its pretty much a large sand box inhabited by curious and quarrelsome people, who in the annuals of human civilization have seen better days (and hopefully will see better days again, although not at our expense).
For a long time following our invasion of Iraq I assumed that the "win-win" scenario within American politics consisted of pro-Israeli liberal Democrats and oil focused right wing Republicans. However, following a read of a controversial new book, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," I have revised my opinion.
I now believe that Israel did not initially want a U.S. invasion of Iraq and considered it likely to de-stabilize a region in which stability was a major component of their own national security, barring a real threat of nuclear proliferation in the region. Indeed, Sharon's initial advice seems to have been, "oh no, don't go there." I also believe that the Mossad (Israeli intelligence) to be among the most informed services on earth and that they did not buy into Hussein's possession of WMD. Rather, I now think that prominent American Jewish neo-cons more or less hijacked the U.S. Israel Lobby, along with key policy makers within the Administration. Right wing pressures in Israel, plus the shift of the U.S. lobby drove Sharon to ultimately agree with and support the invasion.
There is no evidence that anyone at the time was seriously worried about relating 9/11, Saddam Hussein and the flow of oil through the Persian Gulf to a need for a quick invasion. Without imminent threat, the Administration had to build a case for invasion based on weak linkages of Hussein to 9/11, old WMD activities (which Hussein actually encouraged) and the general proposition that he was a very bad guy who killed his own people by the thousands. Indeed, thanks to the sanctions and the corrupt U.N. oil for food program, more Iraqi oil was folowing through the Gulf than we wanted.
In fact, other than the neo-con loony Weltanschauung, I see only one authentic national interest in the invasion (discounting for the moment the personal and political reasons of the President and assuming he hadn't been hoodwinked by the neo-cons around him), namely something called "Hubbert's Peak."
[one more to come]
Iraq (Continued)
Bremer found the vast majority of pre-invasion assumptions regarding Iraq to be incorrect. People were not greeting us in the streets with flowers. The years of sanctions against the Hussein regime had virtually destroyed the country's vital infrastructure, ranging from electricity, to water, to oil. What middle class was left was fleeing, basically leaving middle (and upper) class Iraqi ex-patriots quarreling with Kurds who were playing for independence, Sunnis, divided between secularism and Baathists and a fractured Shia community, at least half of whom were motivated by little more than revenge.
Post World War II Germany and Japan, Korea, Vietnam, etc. all paled in comparison to the complexity of post invasion Iraq. Kurds who advocated a unified, but federalized Iraq, fought Kurds who favored independence. Secular Sunnis fought Baathists and Sunnis Al Qaeda. Iranian leaning Shias fought Iraq Shias. And, on and on. On top of all of this, key policy makers in Washington still fought for Plan A and the transfer of Iraqi sovereignty as quickly as possible to the now present former Iraqi exiles. The military seemed undecided in what its next role would be. In Plan A they were to be gone in a few months. The "coalition of the willing," aside from the Brits, in the south, was virtually worthless in the new situation, although through no particular fault of their own. Most had entered the coalition with only token forces and expected to be little more than a symbolic presence. Separate Rules of Engagement meant very little integration into the overall coalition structure and American military leadership found themselves dealing with political issues they were unprepared for and far fewer resources than they needed to deal with the military ones. And, the Iraqi Army had simply dissolved, complicated by a Plan A de-Baathification policy.
Perhaps, no other American diplomat in history faced as complex a situation as Bremer. That he physically survived was no mean feat. That he accomplished what he had been sent to do was nothing short of a miracle.
He did not do it alone. His first "Ally" came from a curious source, the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Sistani.
Sistani was the chief Shia cleric in Iraq and his religious authority in the country was un-questioned among Iraqis Shias. Bremer, a Catholic, compared him to the Pope, but that would be (as I am sure Bremer would admit) an oversimplification that failed to describe the complex relationship of state to religion within the Muslim world. I have tried to explain this relationship in earlier posts and won't dwell on it here. Suffice to say that as Sistani went, so would go Iraq and Sistani grasped the fundamental tenant of democracy...majority rule...and, of course, as the senior religious leader of Iraqis Shias, he spoke for that majority.
Although he and Bremer never met (Sistani refused to meet with any of the coalition), together and subtly through back channels, they prevented the Plan A transfer of power from occupation forces to the former Iraqi exiles, by simply and effectively demanding a democratic Iraq. Sistani accomplished this by insisting that the new democratic Iraqi Constitution could only be written by freely elected Iraqis, not by any coalition appointed Iraqis. The effect was that in an Iraq composed of 60% Shia, the Shia would rule. Minority rights, the extent of religious influence, women's rights, Kurdish autonomy, de-Baathification, etc. were all important issues to be debated and decided, but Sistani never waivered from the basic democratic principle of majority rule. He had caught and stimied the Bush neo-cons and Iraqis ex-patriots with their own words.
Bremer, in his book and in practice, never waivered from his own loyalty to President Bush and Bush's stated intentions in Iraq. But, he effectively destroyed Plan A (which was in reality dead on arrival) and in many ways came closer to Sistani's position than the positions being proposed by Washington.
To deal with Washington, Bremer turned to Rice and by highlighting the failures of the American military in the post-invasion milieu, finally managed to essentially transfer Washington decision-making from DoD to Rice and the NSC and away from Rumsfeld and the generals, who were sort of bumbling around without a Plan B.
There were unfortunate casualties along the way, both among the Iraqi ex-patriots and the American military. Among the latter was General Paul Abizaid, who was damned if he did and damned if he didn't. Abizaid, who had been Frank's second in command and promoted with Frank's retirement, was exceptionally well qualified but like Bremer, caught between the rock and the hard place. With a Plan A force structure and an American presidential election in the offing (2004) he was effectively prevented from any increase in that structure. Caught between a seriously changed situation on the ground and a Pentagon reluctant to pull the plug on Plan A, he was virtually doomed to failure. But, as a scapegoat, he played a part in Bremer's success in transferring decision-making from the Pentagon to Rice.
The United States military remains mired in Iraq. Perhaps, with a bit of luck, Petraeus, like Bremer, can pull it off. Increased U.S. forces (but not by much) coupled with the apparent growing exhaustion of the various insurgents may lead to some temporary stability, sufficient for us to declare "victory" and get out. However, similar to our backing elections and democracy in Palestian, the long term result in Iraq may be a quasi-democratic/religious state, allied more closely to Iran than the United States. A free and democratic Iraq may be in the interests of the Iraqi people, but not in the "real" interests of American national security. And, if as the President insists, we stay until victory...whose victory? Our victory may not be the same as that perceived by the democratically elected majority of Iraqis. If we stay longer than the Iraqis want, the policy of the neo-conservativism evolves into a policy of neo-colonialism.
In my next and last post on this subject, I'll try and tie things together with a bit of repetition regarding what I've said in earlier posts on why our intervention in Iraq was wrong and the changes I believe necessary in American foreign policy to bring about global stability and U.S. security.
Post World War II Germany and Japan, Korea, Vietnam, etc. all paled in comparison to the complexity of post invasion Iraq. Kurds who advocated a unified, but federalized Iraq, fought Kurds who favored independence. Secular Sunnis fought Baathists and Sunnis Al Qaeda. Iranian leaning Shias fought Iraq Shias. And, on and on. On top of all of this, key policy makers in Washington still fought for Plan A and the transfer of Iraqi sovereignty as quickly as possible to the now present former Iraqi exiles. The military seemed undecided in what its next role would be. In Plan A they were to be gone in a few months. The "coalition of the willing," aside from the Brits, in the south, was virtually worthless in the new situation, although through no particular fault of their own. Most had entered the coalition with only token forces and expected to be little more than a symbolic presence. Separate Rules of Engagement meant very little integration into the overall coalition structure and American military leadership found themselves dealing with political issues they were unprepared for and far fewer resources than they needed to deal with the military ones. And, the Iraqi Army had simply dissolved, complicated by a Plan A de-Baathification policy.
Perhaps, no other American diplomat in history faced as complex a situation as Bremer. That he physically survived was no mean feat. That he accomplished what he had been sent to do was nothing short of a miracle.
He did not do it alone. His first "Ally" came from a curious source, the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Sistani.
Sistani was the chief Shia cleric in Iraq and his religious authority in the country was un-questioned among Iraqis Shias. Bremer, a Catholic, compared him to the Pope, but that would be (as I am sure Bremer would admit) an oversimplification that failed to describe the complex relationship of state to religion within the Muslim world. I have tried to explain this relationship in earlier posts and won't dwell on it here. Suffice to say that as Sistani went, so would go Iraq and Sistani grasped the fundamental tenant of democracy...majority rule...and, of course, as the senior religious leader of Iraqis Shias, he spoke for that majority.
Although he and Bremer never met (Sistani refused to meet with any of the coalition), together and subtly through back channels, they prevented the Plan A transfer of power from occupation forces to the former Iraqi exiles, by simply and effectively demanding a democratic Iraq. Sistani accomplished this by insisting that the new democratic Iraqi Constitution could only be written by freely elected Iraqis, not by any coalition appointed Iraqis. The effect was that in an Iraq composed of 60% Shia, the Shia would rule. Minority rights, the extent of religious influence, women's rights, Kurdish autonomy, de-Baathification, etc. were all important issues to be debated and decided, but Sistani never waivered from the basic democratic principle of majority rule. He had caught and stimied the Bush neo-cons and Iraqis ex-patriots with their own words.
Bremer, in his book and in practice, never waivered from his own loyalty to President Bush and Bush's stated intentions in Iraq. But, he effectively destroyed Plan A (which was in reality dead on arrival) and in many ways came closer to Sistani's position than the positions being proposed by Washington.
To deal with Washington, Bremer turned to Rice and by highlighting the failures of the American military in the post-invasion milieu, finally managed to essentially transfer Washington decision-making from DoD to Rice and the NSC and away from Rumsfeld and the generals, who were sort of bumbling around without a Plan B.
There were unfortunate casualties along the way, both among the Iraqi ex-patriots and the American military. Among the latter was General Paul Abizaid, who was damned if he did and damned if he didn't. Abizaid, who had been Frank's second in command and promoted with Frank's retirement, was exceptionally well qualified but like Bremer, caught between the rock and the hard place. With a Plan A force structure and an American presidential election in the offing (2004) he was effectively prevented from any increase in that structure. Caught between a seriously changed situation on the ground and a Pentagon reluctant to pull the plug on Plan A, he was virtually doomed to failure. But, as a scapegoat, he played a part in Bremer's success in transferring decision-making from the Pentagon to Rice.
The United States military remains mired in Iraq. Perhaps, with a bit of luck, Petraeus, like Bremer, can pull it off. Increased U.S. forces (but not by much) coupled with the apparent growing exhaustion of the various insurgents may lead to some temporary stability, sufficient for us to declare "victory" and get out. However, similar to our backing elections and democracy in Palestian, the long term result in Iraq may be a quasi-democratic/religious state, allied more closely to Iran than the United States. A free and democratic Iraq may be in the interests of the Iraqi people, but not in the "real" interests of American national security. And, if as the President insists, we stay until victory...whose victory? Our victory may not be the same as that perceived by the democratically elected majority of Iraqis. If we stay longer than the Iraqis want, the policy of the neo-conservativism evolves into a policy of neo-colonialism.
In my next and last post on this subject, I'll try and tie things together with a bit of repetition regarding what I've said in earlier posts on why our intervention in Iraq was wrong and the changes I believe necessary in American foreign policy to bring about global stability and U.S. security.
Iraq (Coninued)
Paul Bremer apparently arrived in Iraq caught between "the rock and the hard place." As a professional diplomat, in all probability, he had a far better comprehension of the challenges he and the United States faced in post-invasion Iraq than did the policy makers in Washington who had sent him there.
The emerging picture of what our policy makers "thought they knew" about Iraq and how things would go following liberation is now reasonably clear. In a great sense, Iraq, as Afghanistan, as the U.S. post 9/11 economic recovery, etc., etc. would be "business as usual" and a cake walk. Based on information being fed policy makers in the Vice President's Office and DoD from Iraqi exiles (namely Ahmad Chalabi and the ex-patriot INC), Iraq was a reasonably prosperous middle class country (relatively speaking) waiting to be freed. This conception "fit" what the Administration wanted to hear, although it contradicted much of what the State Department, the CIA and the professional military believed.
Much of this willingness of the key policy makers to accept this misconception uncritically went to the neo-conservatives in the Vice President's Office and among DoD civilians. However, I would suggest that of almost equal weight in this fundamental error was the Bush decision-making process itself. Unlike democratic political processes, business hierarchies are not in essence "consensual." Politics is the art of the possible and with the exception of periodic elections not a "zero-sum game." As a result, in politics, there is a constant and on-going adjustment of strategy based on tactical capability. In business, it is much the reverse. The "Chief Decider" (CEO or President) approves the strategy and appoints subordinates to implement and carry out the tactics necessary to achieve the strategic goals. In politics, tactics are almost always "second guessed." In business, tactics are delegated and seldom second guessed in the absence of catastrophic failure.
"Loyality" in politics, is often talked about and seldom practiced. In business, it is seldom talked about, but always expected. If the American people come to understand this difference, Bush will be our first and last Harvard MBA President.
Having bought into a post 9/11 foreign policy strategy that required a forceful U.S. message to the world based on the proposition that a strong offense is better than a weak defense and to the "idea" of an "axis of evil" which included Iraq, the Chief Decider left the tactics to subordinates, namely the Secretary of Defense and the Vice President. And, most of the others (Powell, Tenant, Rice et al) jumped in line. When that occured, the decision making process bowed to "group think" along hierachical lines.
Bush's failure to seriously question tactical decisions made by subordinates, in the name of loyalty and delegation of authority led to an atmosphere wherein conflicting intelligence was not questioned. The plan then formed to take Baghdad as quickly as possible, with as few forces as possible and turn the government over to the Iraqi exiles, again, namely Chalabi. Forces needed to protect long communication lines weren't necessary because of the smooth transition anticipated. Troops to protect Iraqi borders weren't necessary, because it was originally intended to simply replace the Iraqi military top leadership and to continue with an Iraqi Army in place.
Small tactical changes, such as the Turks refusal to allow U.S. forces entry through Turkey, or the failure to achieve a "coalition of the willing" of any sizable scale, did not provide a reconsideration of the overall strategic objective. Nor did the initial opening of the invasion provide for a reassessment. Baghdad was taken; regime change occurred. And, then, around the time of Bremer's arrival, things began to fall apart.
"Falling apart" was incremental, thus adding to the fog of war. General Franks, who had achieved his portion of the plan (getting to Baghdad), was basically waiting for retirement. The State Department, which perhaps logically should have taken the lead at this point, was less than inspired, partially due to substantial opposition within the Department to preemptive war and partially due to the decision to have DoD lead the occupation. In sum, Plan A failed and there was no Plan B.
With the U.S. government now in an essentially "reactive mode" and reluctant to admit Plan A failure, Bremer's opening days as head of the CPA were spent picking up the pieces of a failed policy.
[continued in next post]
The emerging picture of what our policy makers "thought they knew" about Iraq and how things would go following liberation is now reasonably clear. In a great sense, Iraq, as Afghanistan, as the U.S. post 9/11 economic recovery, etc., etc. would be "business as usual" and a cake walk. Based on information being fed policy makers in the Vice President's Office and DoD from Iraqi exiles (namely Ahmad Chalabi and the ex-patriot INC), Iraq was a reasonably prosperous middle class country (relatively speaking) waiting to be freed. This conception "fit" what the Administration wanted to hear, although it contradicted much of what the State Department, the CIA and the professional military believed.
Much of this willingness of the key policy makers to accept this misconception uncritically went to the neo-conservatives in the Vice President's Office and among DoD civilians. However, I would suggest that of almost equal weight in this fundamental error was the Bush decision-making process itself. Unlike democratic political processes, business hierarchies are not in essence "consensual." Politics is the art of the possible and with the exception of periodic elections not a "zero-sum game." As a result, in politics, there is a constant and on-going adjustment of strategy based on tactical capability. In business, it is much the reverse. The "Chief Decider" (CEO or President) approves the strategy and appoints subordinates to implement and carry out the tactics necessary to achieve the strategic goals. In politics, tactics are almost always "second guessed." In business, tactics are delegated and seldom second guessed in the absence of catastrophic failure.
"Loyality" in politics, is often talked about and seldom practiced. In business, it is seldom talked about, but always expected. If the American people come to understand this difference, Bush will be our first and last Harvard MBA President.
Having bought into a post 9/11 foreign policy strategy that required a forceful U.S. message to the world based on the proposition that a strong offense is better than a weak defense and to the "idea" of an "axis of evil" which included Iraq, the Chief Decider left the tactics to subordinates, namely the Secretary of Defense and the Vice President. And, most of the others (Powell, Tenant, Rice et al) jumped in line. When that occured, the decision making process bowed to "group think" along hierachical lines.
Bush's failure to seriously question tactical decisions made by subordinates, in the name of loyalty and delegation of authority led to an atmosphere wherein conflicting intelligence was not questioned. The plan then formed to take Baghdad as quickly as possible, with as few forces as possible and turn the government over to the Iraqi exiles, again, namely Chalabi. Forces needed to protect long communication lines weren't necessary because of the smooth transition anticipated. Troops to protect Iraqi borders weren't necessary, because it was originally intended to simply replace the Iraqi military top leadership and to continue with an Iraqi Army in place.
Small tactical changes, such as the Turks refusal to allow U.S. forces entry through Turkey, or the failure to achieve a "coalition of the willing" of any sizable scale, did not provide a reconsideration of the overall strategic objective. Nor did the initial opening of the invasion provide for a reassessment. Baghdad was taken; regime change occurred. And, then, around the time of Bremer's arrival, things began to fall apart.
"Falling apart" was incremental, thus adding to the fog of war. General Franks, who had achieved his portion of the plan (getting to Baghdad), was basically waiting for retirement. The State Department, which perhaps logically should have taken the lead at this point, was less than inspired, partially due to substantial opposition within the Department to preemptive war and partially due to the decision to have DoD lead the occupation. In sum, Plan A failed and there was no Plan B.
With the U.S. government now in an essentially "reactive mode" and reluctant to admit Plan A failure, Bremer's opening days as head of the CPA were spent picking up the pieces of a failed policy.
[continued in next post]
Saturday, November 03, 2007
Positive News From Iraq
Within the last week, positive news has been emerging from Iraq. Casualties appear down significantly (both Coalition Forces and Iraqi) and Baghdad residents who had fled in fear of the insurgency are returning. It's an old clique from Vietnam, but there may be "light at the end of the tunnel."
Of course, it is a different story regarding whether or not stability in Iraq will ultimately lead to accomplishment of our professed goal...namely, the formation of a stable, democratic Arab state in the region and, in turn, whether or not the benefits of such a state really apply to American national security. Yet, for now, we should applaud the present progress if for no other reason than the safety and security of the Iraqi people themselves.
I've just completed two books: "The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War and Losing the Peace," by Ali A. Allawi and "My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope," by L. Paul Bremer. Allawi, related to the first post invasion Prime Minister, and former Minister of Defense and later Finance, is sort of the inside story of Iraq from the perspective of an Iraqi. Bremer, of course, was the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and led the Coalition's post invasion administration of Iraq from roughly April 2003 until June 2004.
The books agree to a remarkable extent. If one puts aside the argument over whether or not the invasion should have taken place at all, there seems to be common consensus that the two significant errors were: 1) insufficient Coalition troop commitment and 2) insufficient planning and/or erroneous assumptions about a post-invasion Iraq.
It is difficult to see how Bremer may now be blamed for either error. His book is both a textbook and warning for future "nation building." It was exhausting to read the book, much less to have lived it. In fact, on what I believe still to be only a slight chance, should Iraq turn out to be a "success," Paul Bremer may have two distinctions as a father of modern Iraq and as the spoiler of a misguided neo-conservative American foreign policy.
When evaluating Paul Bremer, one must keep in mind that while consistently pushing for the idealism of President Bush, he always kept one foot in the realist school of foreign policy thinking, ala Henry Kissinger. While his book is (as most biographies are) in places self-serving, it is largely the modern day story of a "founding father." The record is replete with those who backed democracy in Iraq for their own purposes, but Bremer appears to be a figure that took it all quite seriously and literally. In reading Bremer's book, I was constantly reminded of Madison's "Notes" on the Constitutional Convention.
It becomes more and more apparent that the reasons we entered Iraq understaffed and with poor planning may be attributed to those within the Vice President's office and Defense Department civilians who essentially accepted Iraqi exile's tactical interpretations of the Iraq milieu, while in pursuit of a larger, more theoretical construct for American foreign policy in the post 9/11 world, within the zeitgeist of globalization, otherwise known as the "neo-conservatives." Without trying to elaborate on neo-conservative principles, I'll contrast them with "realists" as those in pursuit of a defined ideology and who believe the United States has both a right and duty to actively shape the global political stage. Realists, on the other hand, believe that the pursuit of American national interests involves taking the world and dealing with it as it is given, without the "shaping" portion.
In large measure, the differences between the two are ones of degree and timing. Kissinger and Nixon "opened" China by dealing with the Chinese as they were and not on the basis of "as we wish they were." They sold this approach to the Republican Right with the logic that the recognition of China and improved relations would "eventually" lead China toward moderation and democratization. They sold the same approach to the Republican business interests with the promise of trade and the rest of us (loosely grouped as the American Consumer) on the basis of cheap goods at Wal Mart.
Neo-conservatism would presumably take a similar position vis a vie China, but with a somewhat more aggressive stance, insisting on faster and more significant Chinese internal reforms, coupled with the "always on the table" position of preemptive war, if necessary. No one minds the U.S. pressing for the former, but the latter scares the hell out of most of the world community. Yesterday it was Iraq; today, it's Iran; tomorrow it may be China.
Unfortunately, fear is seldom a good motivation for long-term cooperation. People or nations may temporarily acquiesce in being forced to "obey," but will simultaneously interpret their acquiescence as necessary to their survival in the face of evil (e.g. neo-colonialism, Zionism, Western dominance, etc.) - i.e. they'll wait for a time to get even.
So, I suspect much of the world views the present Bush Doctrine as little more than a means by which the United States continues its post World War II super power status and dominance within a New World Order, brought on by the end of communism and globalization, as opposed to a more desirable outcome of the increasing diffusion of power and equality among nations, large or small. Again, the differences between neo-conservatives and realists may lie not so much in end goals, as in the means to achieve them. Sort of the difference between say a Tip O'Neil and Tom DeLay...the difference between "do it this way because..." versus "do it my way or else..."
To return to Bremer, et al and post invasion Iraq, Bremer tried whenever possible to diplomatically guide the Iraqi people via a "do it this way because." In this, he had help from two significant individuals: the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Sistani and Condi Rice.
[continued in next post]
Of course, it is a different story regarding whether or not stability in Iraq will ultimately lead to accomplishment of our professed goal...namely, the formation of a stable, democratic Arab state in the region and, in turn, whether or not the benefits of such a state really apply to American national security. Yet, for now, we should applaud the present progress if for no other reason than the safety and security of the Iraqi people themselves.
I've just completed two books: "The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War and Losing the Peace," by Ali A. Allawi and "My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope," by L. Paul Bremer. Allawi, related to the first post invasion Prime Minister, and former Minister of Defense and later Finance, is sort of the inside story of Iraq from the perspective of an Iraqi. Bremer, of course, was the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and led the Coalition's post invasion administration of Iraq from roughly April 2003 until June 2004.
The books agree to a remarkable extent. If one puts aside the argument over whether or not the invasion should have taken place at all, there seems to be common consensus that the two significant errors were: 1) insufficient Coalition troop commitment and 2) insufficient planning and/or erroneous assumptions about a post-invasion Iraq.
It is difficult to see how Bremer may now be blamed for either error. His book is both a textbook and warning for future "nation building." It was exhausting to read the book, much less to have lived it. In fact, on what I believe still to be only a slight chance, should Iraq turn out to be a "success," Paul Bremer may have two distinctions as a father of modern Iraq and as the spoiler of a misguided neo-conservative American foreign policy.
When evaluating Paul Bremer, one must keep in mind that while consistently pushing for the idealism of President Bush, he always kept one foot in the realist school of foreign policy thinking, ala Henry Kissinger. While his book is (as most biographies are) in places self-serving, it is largely the modern day story of a "founding father." The record is replete with those who backed democracy in Iraq for their own purposes, but Bremer appears to be a figure that took it all quite seriously and literally. In reading Bremer's book, I was constantly reminded of Madison's "Notes" on the Constitutional Convention.
It becomes more and more apparent that the reasons we entered Iraq understaffed and with poor planning may be attributed to those within the Vice President's office and Defense Department civilians who essentially accepted Iraqi exile's tactical interpretations of the Iraq milieu, while in pursuit of a larger, more theoretical construct for American foreign policy in the post 9/11 world, within the zeitgeist of globalization, otherwise known as the "neo-conservatives." Without trying to elaborate on neo-conservative principles, I'll contrast them with "realists" as those in pursuit of a defined ideology and who believe the United States has both a right and duty to actively shape the global political stage. Realists, on the other hand, believe that the pursuit of American national interests involves taking the world and dealing with it as it is given, without the "shaping" portion.
In large measure, the differences between the two are ones of degree and timing. Kissinger and Nixon "opened" China by dealing with the Chinese as they were and not on the basis of "as we wish they were." They sold this approach to the Republican Right with the logic that the recognition of China and improved relations would "eventually" lead China toward moderation and democratization. They sold the same approach to the Republican business interests with the promise of trade and the rest of us (loosely grouped as the American Consumer) on the basis of cheap goods at Wal Mart.
Neo-conservatism would presumably take a similar position vis a vie China, but with a somewhat more aggressive stance, insisting on faster and more significant Chinese internal reforms, coupled with the "always on the table" position of preemptive war, if necessary. No one minds the U.S. pressing for the former, but the latter scares the hell out of most of the world community. Yesterday it was Iraq; today, it's Iran; tomorrow it may be China.
Unfortunately, fear is seldom a good motivation for long-term cooperation. People or nations may temporarily acquiesce in being forced to "obey," but will simultaneously interpret their acquiescence as necessary to their survival in the face of evil (e.g. neo-colonialism, Zionism, Western dominance, etc.) - i.e. they'll wait for a time to get even.
So, I suspect much of the world views the present Bush Doctrine as little more than a means by which the United States continues its post World War II super power status and dominance within a New World Order, brought on by the end of communism and globalization, as opposed to a more desirable outcome of the increasing diffusion of power and equality among nations, large or small. Again, the differences between neo-conservatives and realists may lie not so much in end goals, as in the means to achieve them. Sort of the difference between say a Tip O'Neil and Tom DeLay...the difference between "do it this way because..." versus "do it my way or else..."
To return to Bremer, et al and post invasion Iraq, Bremer tried whenever possible to diplomatically guide the Iraqi people via a "do it this way because." In this, he had help from two significant individuals: the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Sistani and Condi Rice.
[continued in next post]
Tuesday, October 09, 2007
This and That
On Blackwater: Since yesterday, Associated Press has been reporting on the Iraqi government's report regarding the September Blackwater incident regarding the death of Iraqi citizens caught up in a Blackwater convoy operation. Blackwater claims its people were responding to an attack. The Iraqi report, based on their own investigation, says this isn't so and is recommending that the U.S. turn over the Blackwater employees involved for possible trial in Iraqi courts; that the families of the 17 Iraqis killed be compensated with a total of $136M, and that Blackwater be out of Iraq in six months. The State Department, which was conducting its own investigation, has turned their investigation over to the FBI. Presumably, there is a third investigation being completed by the U.S. military.
The U.S. investigations have yet to be completed, however, a leak regarding the U.S. military effort pretty much confirms (thus far) the Iraqi government's story.
The curious thing is that although MSNBC, Fox News, AP, NPR, et al have reported the above, both the New York Times and the Washington Post have remained silent and have not reported the story, which is now more than 36 hours old. Why?
Meanwhile, the situation in Iraq apparently continues to deteriorate. The British have announced half of their remaining force will leave by year end, with the probability of a complete pull-out of their remaining 2,500 troops by the end of 2008. I would guess that these remaining 2,500 will basically be a "covering withdrawal force," and be unable to conduct large scale offensive operations from January 2008 on. The British Prime Minister, while not quite claiming "victory," stated "things are calmer." We may expect to see Iranian influence increase in the region.
To the north, the Turkish government has approved across-the-border "reconnaissance-in-force" by Turkish forces in pursuit of PPK Kurdish terrorists, who killed some 14 people in a Turkish village over the weekend. A projection of future events is pretty simple. If the Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq cannot control the PPK, Turkey will move into northern Iraq to do so, while making an "arrangement" with the Iranians to divide the oil resources.
In Baghdad, a number of prominent Iraq politicians announced that they've given up on "reconciliation" between Sunnis and Shites. This basically blows the argument of a surge for stability, needed in turn, for political progress.
Things in the third major area of Iraq (Anbar Province) seem to be remaining relatively calm. The U.S. decision to make peace with Sunni tribal interests in the region appears to be working for the moment. In fact, this shift of position in Anbar, which has NOT been greeted with approval in the central Baghdad government, may be an indication that the best we can hope for is a relatively stable and semi-independent Anbar, with ties to the Saudis. Anbar borders Saudi Arabia and Syria. It is mostly desert and relatively untapped regarding potential oil resources. And, it is predominately Sunni.
"Truth" in this region appears to be a matter of perspective. The Iraqis-in-the-Street appear to be convinced of Blackwater's guilt (right or wrong). Best course for the U.S. is to pay the $136M, get the Blackwater people out, with the promise of a trial in the U.S., and get rid of Blackwater in Iraq (replacing them with U.S. Marines) ASAP. The alternative may be a complete breakdown of the Maliki-U.S. relationship and/or an end to the Maliki government.
What is becoming abundantly clear is that Iraq per se is no more. It was largely a "phony country" created by the British and oil interests following WWI and held together largely by the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein.
Bush's options are running out. It's difficult to see how he can maintain his quest for "victory" through the end of his term in office. Events on the ground are beginning to move too fast.
An air attack on Iran would not change the situation in Iraq, but in all probability lead to increased Iranian infiltration (if not a stronger response), leading in turn to increased U.S. casualties. Further, the Administration has semi-committed to a withdrawal of 5,000+ U.S. troops by year end, thus they will not be available to fill-in for the British withdrawal.
If the U.S. withdraws an additional 50,000 next year, this leaves us with approximately 100,000 troops in-country by the end of 2008, most of whom will be needed in Anbar and the northern Kurish regions, if not simply to protect our new $160M embassy in an increasingly hostile Baghdad.
The U.S. investigations have yet to be completed, however, a leak regarding the U.S. military effort pretty much confirms (thus far) the Iraqi government's story.
The curious thing is that although MSNBC, Fox News, AP, NPR, et al have reported the above, both the New York Times and the Washington Post have remained silent and have not reported the story, which is now more than 36 hours old. Why?
Meanwhile, the situation in Iraq apparently continues to deteriorate. The British have announced half of their remaining force will leave by year end, with the probability of a complete pull-out of their remaining 2,500 troops by the end of 2008. I would guess that these remaining 2,500 will basically be a "covering withdrawal force," and be unable to conduct large scale offensive operations from January 2008 on. The British Prime Minister, while not quite claiming "victory," stated "things are calmer." We may expect to see Iranian influence increase in the region.
To the north, the Turkish government has approved across-the-border "reconnaissance-in-force" by Turkish forces in pursuit of PPK Kurdish terrorists, who killed some 14 people in a Turkish village over the weekend. A projection of future events is pretty simple. If the Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq cannot control the PPK, Turkey will move into northern Iraq to do so, while making an "arrangement" with the Iranians to divide the oil resources.
In Baghdad, a number of prominent Iraq politicians announced that they've given up on "reconciliation" between Sunnis and Shites. This basically blows the argument of a surge for stability, needed in turn, for political progress.
Things in the third major area of Iraq (Anbar Province) seem to be remaining relatively calm. The U.S. decision to make peace with Sunni tribal interests in the region appears to be working for the moment. In fact, this shift of position in Anbar, which has NOT been greeted with approval in the central Baghdad government, may be an indication that the best we can hope for is a relatively stable and semi-independent Anbar, with ties to the Saudis. Anbar borders Saudi Arabia and Syria. It is mostly desert and relatively untapped regarding potential oil resources. And, it is predominately Sunni.
"Truth" in this region appears to be a matter of perspective. The Iraqis-in-the-Street appear to be convinced of Blackwater's guilt (right or wrong). Best course for the U.S. is to pay the $136M, get the Blackwater people out, with the promise of a trial in the U.S., and get rid of Blackwater in Iraq (replacing them with U.S. Marines) ASAP. The alternative may be a complete breakdown of the Maliki-U.S. relationship and/or an end to the Maliki government.
What is becoming abundantly clear is that Iraq per se is no more. It was largely a "phony country" created by the British and oil interests following WWI and held together largely by the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein.
Bush's options are running out. It's difficult to see how he can maintain his quest for "victory" through the end of his term in office. Events on the ground are beginning to move too fast.
An air attack on Iran would not change the situation in Iraq, but in all probability lead to increased Iranian infiltration (if not a stronger response), leading in turn to increased U.S. casualties. Further, the Administration has semi-committed to a withdrawal of 5,000+ U.S. troops by year end, thus they will not be available to fill-in for the British withdrawal.
If the U.S. withdraws an additional 50,000 next year, this leaves us with approximately 100,000 troops in-country by the end of 2008, most of whom will be needed in Anbar and the northern Kurish regions, if not simply to protect our new $160M embassy in an increasingly hostile Baghdad.
Sunday, October 07, 2007
"The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy"
I am about half-way through this controversial book and, so far, the question that comes to mind is: What's the controversy?
The basic theme of the authors is that collectively the various pro-Israel lobbying groups constitute the single most powerful political lobby in the United States and that as a result U.S. foreign policy in the middle east is essentially a "rubber stamp" approval of whatever policy the Israeli government is following at the moment.
The book bends over backwards NOT to come across as anti-Semitic. It seems as if one sentence in every paragraph is devoted to the anticipated charge of anti-Semitism. They take pains to point out that the Lobby is entirely legal and in the tradition of the American politics and special interest groups. Their complaint is that the Lobby's effectiveness (in terms of organization, influence and money) occasionally distorts U.S. policy positions that are not in the "objective" interests of U.S. national security.
As a "read," the book is a bit tedious and reads more like a dissertation than a best seller. Also, the central theme is something akin to "The Emperor's New Clothes." Someone has finally written and documented what has been a fact of life for the political system for at least a half century. Despite that, it's a worthwhile read concerning "the elephant in the room."
However, to agree with the authors one has to accept their basic perspective regarding the formation of American foreign policy, i.e. the "realist" school of thought. While I personally agree with this perspective, I understand there are others, so while agreeing with the book, I'll play devil's advocate for a moment.
The counter perspective to the author's is that the formation of American foreign policy is no different than the process that is used for the formation of any other area of government policy and that special interest groups are vital for this process. Secondly, special interest groups are seldom, if ever, "objective." Be it the "oil lobby" or the "environmental lobby," NO lobby may be expected to pursue activities contrary to their essential purpose.
While the author's certainly seem to understand this, they do seem biased to the old school of thought that American foreign policy is best left to the "wise old men" who understand what American interests REALLY are and who may take a longer and more "reasoned" approach regarding those interests - i.e. American foreign policy issues are too important to be left to the normal democratic process. My personal belief is that the best approach lies somewhere in between the two extremes and I also believe that looking back on the historical record of American foreign policy, a case could be made for a middle ground. For example, one could argue that the "wise old men" approach took us into Vietnam and kept us there far too long. Or, conversely, had FDR listened more to the "wise old men," and been less worried about American public opinion, we would have entered WWII in 1939 instead of 1941, saving millions of European lives and, perhaps, avoiding war with Japan.
So, while I believe the author's have written something worthwhile for the literature of American political science, I am not sure I completely agree with the conclusions they reach.
What does interest me is a question the book poses, but has (thus far at least...I'm only half way through it) not addressed. Due to the enormous power of this lobby and the strategic importance of the United States to Israel, is it possible that the "tail is wagging the dog?" Rather than the lobby taking orders from Israel, is it possible that Israel takes its cues from the lobby?
Following that possibility, it is also reasonable to ask how the lobby arrives at it's stands on issues? Is there democratic debate and thought within the lobby or has it been "caputured" by neo-conservative thought, which I believe in itself may contain the seeds of racism.
The chief criticism of Israel by the authors lies in Israeli policies in the "Occupied Territories," Gaza and the West Bank. This is a complicated issue and there is, within Israel, no absolute consensus on what those policies should be. Aside from the problem of Jerusalem, the basic difficulty would seem to lie with the proposition: How do you reconcile Israeli security with indefensible borders? And, further, does the lack of Israeli security on the ground enhance the probability of nuclear warfare in the region?
It would seem to me that even the Likud government in Israel is wrestling with this problem. Without Israeli dominance and essential control of Gaza and the West Bank (and in the Golan Heights), the "buffer zones" seized by Israel disappear, thus leaving it more susceptible to physical invasion. This, in turn, makes the use of Israeli nuclear weapons, in the event of war, more likely, not less likely.
The solution lies in a viable Palestinian state that recognizes Israel's right to exist and, which is capable of ensuring Israeli security. The democratic election of Hamas in Palestine is an indication (without substantial changes in Hamas goals) that the region is moving further away from these two conditions than closer. [The other option is to redraw Israel's borders, but this seems less likely.]
Were it not for the U.S. situation in Iraq and current U.S.-Iranian relations, we would certainly be in a better position to act as arbitrators in the Israeli-Palestianan dilemma. Indeed, the "democratization" policies of the Bush Administration appear to have led to Hezbollah's election victory in Palestine and may well lead to pro-Iranian Shia election victories in Iran. "Wise old men" might have avoided both.
There is one part of the book that the author's and their critics seem to disagree on and the suggestion above of the "tail wagging the dog" might explain. The authors point to the Israeli influence in the decision to invade Iraq. Their critics point to Israeli advice to the U.S. government NOT to invade Iraq. On this apparent difference one must look to a) the timing of events and b) Israeli national security interests.
Let's take the latter first. The invasion of Iraq did nothing to help Israeli security. One supposes that the Mossad (Israeli intelligence) understood the Iraqi WMD issue better than we. Further, the sanctions imposed on Iraq were having a serious impact on the infrastructure and stability of the country. Saddam Hussein was a dictator with dwindling support, being squeezed slowly into a corner. He was a "threat" to no one outside of his own people in terms of resources, if not personal ambitions that amounted to little more than fantasy. Yes, he may have "sponsered" some terrorism directed toward Israel, but Israel has lived and controlled terrorist attacks for years. The threat he posed directly to Israel may well have been in the "continuing nusance" category, but it was not in the "strategic" category. The regional instability our invasion was likely to produce was a far greater threat to Israel than the regime of Saddam Hussein. This, then explains why Israel would advise the U.S. NOT to invade Iraq.
But the authors have missed a critical point. If we support Israel in actions not to the benefit of U.S. national security, Israel does the same toward American foreign policy. This brings me to the second point; Israeli policy on the U.S. invasion appears to have shifted only AFTER they came to the conclusion that the U.S. was going to invade regardless of their advice...i.e. after they consulted the Israel Lobby.
My suggestion that the tail may be wagging the dog would explain the Israeli shift, i.e. it was the Israel Lobby, dominated by neo-conservatives, that influenced the invasion decision, not Israel itself.
The basic theme of the authors is that collectively the various pro-Israel lobbying groups constitute the single most powerful political lobby in the United States and that as a result U.S. foreign policy in the middle east is essentially a "rubber stamp" approval of whatever policy the Israeli government is following at the moment.
The book bends over backwards NOT to come across as anti-Semitic. It seems as if one sentence in every paragraph is devoted to the anticipated charge of anti-Semitism. They take pains to point out that the Lobby is entirely legal and in the tradition of the American politics and special interest groups. Their complaint is that the Lobby's effectiveness (in terms of organization, influence and money) occasionally distorts U.S. policy positions that are not in the "objective" interests of U.S. national security.
As a "read," the book is a bit tedious and reads more like a dissertation than a best seller. Also, the central theme is something akin to "The Emperor's New Clothes." Someone has finally written and documented what has been a fact of life for the political system for at least a half century. Despite that, it's a worthwhile read concerning "the elephant in the room."
However, to agree with the authors one has to accept their basic perspective regarding the formation of American foreign policy, i.e. the "realist" school of thought. While I personally agree with this perspective, I understand there are others, so while agreeing with the book, I'll play devil's advocate for a moment.
The counter perspective to the author's is that the formation of American foreign policy is no different than the process that is used for the formation of any other area of government policy and that special interest groups are vital for this process. Secondly, special interest groups are seldom, if ever, "objective." Be it the "oil lobby" or the "environmental lobby," NO lobby may be expected to pursue activities contrary to their essential purpose.
While the author's certainly seem to understand this, they do seem biased to the old school of thought that American foreign policy is best left to the "wise old men" who understand what American interests REALLY are and who may take a longer and more "reasoned" approach regarding those interests - i.e. American foreign policy issues are too important to be left to the normal democratic process. My personal belief is that the best approach lies somewhere in between the two extremes and I also believe that looking back on the historical record of American foreign policy, a case could be made for a middle ground. For example, one could argue that the "wise old men" approach took us into Vietnam and kept us there far too long. Or, conversely, had FDR listened more to the "wise old men," and been less worried about American public opinion, we would have entered WWII in 1939 instead of 1941, saving millions of European lives and, perhaps, avoiding war with Japan.
So, while I believe the author's have written something worthwhile for the literature of American political science, I am not sure I completely agree with the conclusions they reach.
What does interest me is a question the book poses, but has (thus far at least...I'm only half way through it) not addressed. Due to the enormous power of this lobby and the strategic importance of the United States to Israel, is it possible that the "tail is wagging the dog?" Rather than the lobby taking orders from Israel, is it possible that Israel takes its cues from the lobby?
Following that possibility, it is also reasonable to ask how the lobby arrives at it's stands on issues? Is there democratic debate and thought within the lobby or has it been "caputured" by neo-conservative thought, which I believe in itself may contain the seeds of racism.
The chief criticism of Israel by the authors lies in Israeli policies in the "Occupied Territories," Gaza and the West Bank. This is a complicated issue and there is, within Israel, no absolute consensus on what those policies should be. Aside from the problem of Jerusalem, the basic difficulty would seem to lie with the proposition: How do you reconcile Israeli security with indefensible borders? And, further, does the lack of Israeli security on the ground enhance the probability of nuclear warfare in the region?
It would seem to me that even the Likud government in Israel is wrestling with this problem. Without Israeli dominance and essential control of Gaza and the West Bank (and in the Golan Heights), the "buffer zones" seized by Israel disappear, thus leaving it more susceptible to physical invasion. This, in turn, makes the use of Israeli nuclear weapons, in the event of war, more likely, not less likely.
The solution lies in a viable Palestinian state that recognizes Israel's right to exist and, which is capable of ensuring Israeli security. The democratic election of Hamas in Palestine is an indication (without substantial changes in Hamas goals) that the region is moving further away from these two conditions than closer. [The other option is to redraw Israel's borders, but this seems less likely.]
Were it not for the U.S. situation in Iraq and current U.S.-Iranian relations, we would certainly be in a better position to act as arbitrators in the Israeli-Palestianan dilemma. Indeed, the "democratization" policies of the Bush Administration appear to have led to Hezbollah's election victory in Palestine and may well lead to pro-Iranian Shia election victories in Iran. "Wise old men" might have avoided both.
There is one part of the book that the author's and their critics seem to disagree on and the suggestion above of the "tail wagging the dog" might explain. The authors point to the Israeli influence in the decision to invade Iraq. Their critics point to Israeli advice to the U.S. government NOT to invade Iraq. On this apparent difference one must look to a) the timing of events and b) Israeli national security interests.
Let's take the latter first. The invasion of Iraq did nothing to help Israeli security. One supposes that the Mossad (Israeli intelligence) understood the Iraqi WMD issue better than we. Further, the sanctions imposed on Iraq were having a serious impact on the infrastructure and stability of the country. Saddam Hussein was a dictator with dwindling support, being squeezed slowly into a corner. He was a "threat" to no one outside of his own people in terms of resources, if not personal ambitions that amounted to little more than fantasy. Yes, he may have "sponsered" some terrorism directed toward Israel, but Israel has lived and controlled terrorist attacks for years. The threat he posed directly to Israel may well have been in the "continuing nusance" category, but it was not in the "strategic" category. The regional instability our invasion was likely to produce was a far greater threat to Israel than the regime of Saddam Hussein. This, then explains why Israel would advise the U.S. NOT to invade Iraq.
But the authors have missed a critical point. If we support Israel in actions not to the benefit of U.S. national security, Israel does the same toward American foreign policy. This brings me to the second point; Israeli policy on the U.S. invasion appears to have shifted only AFTER they came to the conclusion that the U.S. was going to invade regardless of their advice...i.e. after they consulted the Israel Lobby.
My suggestion that the tail may be wagging the dog would explain the Israeli shift, i.e. it was the Israel Lobby, dominated by neo-conservatives, that influenced the invasion decision, not Israel itself.
Friday, October 05, 2007
Iraqi Corruption
Yesterday, I spent some 4 hours watching the CSPAN televised House Appropriations Committee hearing on corruption in Iraq (Rep Waxman, Dem, CA presiding as Chairman). There were various panels, but one of particular note was the one composed of the Comptroller General of the GAO, the Special IG for Iraq Reconstruction, and the former Iraqi Judge for Investigations into Corrupt Practices (who, in fear of his life, has recently requested political asylum for himself and family in the United States). This panel was followed by U.S. State Department testimony and a Republican requested witness representing some policy think tank "in defense of democratic governments," which I gathered was a neo-con leaning organization.
The hearing, which the State Department requested NOT be held, was informative. Waxman is doing useful oversight work and despite the obvious Democratic political overtones, should be of interest to both Republicans and Democrats.
I believe, however, there were two significant points or perspectives not touched upon. The purpose of this blog is to address both here, but first a general observation regarding the former Iraqi Judge of the Public Integrity Commission, Radhi al-Radhi.
Radhi testified that he estimated $18B lost to public corruption. He was also critical of the existing government and Prime Minister Maliki, whom he felt had squelched corruption investigations regarding several relatives. As is all too typical of Republican politics these days, Radhi was attacked by several of the Committee's Republicans (notably Dan Burton) on personal grounds, rather than challenging Radhi's actual testimony. Burton asked him what he position he had held under the Saddam Hussein regime ("Isn't it true you were a Public Prosecutor appointed by Saddam Hussein?"). The implication was, of course, that the Judge was a former regime member and therefore could not be trusted. This went on throughout Burton's question time; he would ask the "damning question" and then sit back, smiling smugly. Pure Joe McCarthyism. Unfortunate to his implication, Burton hadn't done his homework. The Judge replied that yes, he was for a period a Prosecutor in a Misdemeanor Court, and had been trained as a jurist in the University system. He had also been arrested and tortured twice and was Shia, not Sunni. There was no apology for Burton's attack; he simply got up and left the hearing.
Although Burton probably doesn't get it, he's one of Waxman's most supportive committee members; Waxman just let him hang himself.
Turning to what I believe were omissions, none touched on the legal status of the United States in Iraq or the possible cultural definition of "corruption" itself.
The U.S. panel members, head of GAO and the Special IG, went to pains to explain that the hearing was focusing not on corruption involving U.S. taxpayer funds, but on Iraq money. All agreed it was a somewhat vague distinction, but the GAO Comptroller General and Special IG both agreed that while we might have an overall interest in Iraqi corruption, we did not have a right to question (through audit) how efficiently or "cleanly" they spent their own money. And, there seemed to be a bipartisan consensus on the Committee on this point.
However, what I missed in this discussion was the question of whether or not we, in fact and international law, do have some fiscal oversight responsibility as the recognized "Occupying Power." While, I understand that we are transitioning from one Iraqi regime to another, I believe that we are still classified as an Occupying Power, with specific responsibilities. Whether or not those responsibilities include oversight of Iraqi internal financial affairs is a question in my mind and was not addressed.
The second issue that I believe the Committee omitted and that I would have liked to have seen was to attempt to define "corruption" in broader, cultural terms (although granted Waxman isn't the "philosopher type," more the "accountant.).
While there was a clear bi-partisan consensus that similar corruption had become almost the norm under the Saddam Hussein regime, it ended there. No one suggested that what we in the West might consider "corruption" was, in part, tied to a longer regional tradition extending much farther back than Hussein and possibly intertwined with Islam itself.
While I am not expert enough to draw conclusions, I would have enjoyed more discussion on this topic. For instance, what might well be considered "bribery" in Western culture, may simply be a means of "doing business" in the Middle East. This isn't so clearly right or wrong, but has to be understood within the context of the region's historical development and religion.
I would suggest that the historical development is essentially based on tribal perogitives. The money accepted in a "bribe" often goes not to merely enrich an individual, but to the older tradition of tribal organization. And, Islam, would seem to me, to deal with this in a unique way. First, there is no "clear" distinction between the state and the religion. Religious authority and principles regarding individual behavior are supreme and protected by a sort of "Supreme Court" of the religious hierarchy. But part of their authority (and success over the centuries) lies with this authority's reluctance to intrude on the day-to-day workings of the state. Bribery then is viewed much as part of the tribal system itself and, by extension, to the politics of the state. In other words, there is a subtle difference between how Western cultures and Middle Eastern cultures view and define "corruption." And, to, this provides for a curious form of democracy. The ultimate religious authorities do not draw their power from the state, but ultimately from the will of the people themselves, who have passed "power" to those recognized as their religious leaders. The result is that this produces, rightly or wrongly, a more "uniform" value system for the society, which the state then enforces, not in a dictatorial sense, but rather as religious principle.
Of course, as the Iraqi Judge pointed out, "corruption is corruption." In both cultures there is bribery amounting to "theft." A case in point is the former Iraqi Minister of Electricity who was convicted under Iraqi law of essentially stealing some $2B. This person, according to the testimony before the Committee, had been convicted in an Iraqi court of law and was being held in the Green Zone in Baghdad pending sentencing. Somehow, an American private security firm (not Blackwater), managed to get him out of confinement and he is now alive and well and living in Chicago.
The significance of the above lies in the difficulties (if not impossibility) of creating a westernized democracy in Iraq or elsewhere within the Islamic world. Just as with our own Christian fundamentalists and the American Israeli lobby, I do not expect we have much hope of totally "secularizing" Islam and that many of our efforts (and judgements pertaining to the Iraqi people) are perceived by the majority of the Iraqi people as attempts to do so.
The hearing, which the State Department requested NOT be held, was informative. Waxman is doing useful oversight work and despite the obvious Democratic political overtones, should be of interest to both Republicans and Democrats.
I believe, however, there were two significant points or perspectives not touched upon. The purpose of this blog is to address both here, but first a general observation regarding the former Iraqi Judge of the Public Integrity Commission, Radhi al-Radhi.
Radhi testified that he estimated $18B lost to public corruption. He was also critical of the existing government and Prime Minister Maliki, whom he felt had squelched corruption investigations regarding several relatives. As is all too typical of Republican politics these days, Radhi was attacked by several of the Committee's Republicans (notably Dan Burton) on personal grounds, rather than challenging Radhi's actual testimony. Burton asked him what he position he had held under the Saddam Hussein regime ("Isn't it true you were a Public Prosecutor appointed by Saddam Hussein?"). The implication was, of course, that the Judge was a former regime member and therefore could not be trusted. This went on throughout Burton's question time; he would ask the "damning question" and then sit back, smiling smugly. Pure Joe McCarthyism. Unfortunate to his implication, Burton hadn't done his homework. The Judge replied that yes, he was for a period a Prosecutor in a Misdemeanor Court, and had been trained as a jurist in the University system. He had also been arrested and tortured twice and was Shia, not Sunni. There was no apology for Burton's attack; he simply got up and left the hearing.
Although Burton probably doesn't get it, he's one of Waxman's most supportive committee members; Waxman just let him hang himself.
Turning to what I believe were omissions, none touched on the legal status of the United States in Iraq or the possible cultural definition of "corruption" itself.
The U.S. panel members, head of GAO and the Special IG, went to pains to explain that the hearing was focusing not on corruption involving U.S. taxpayer funds, but on Iraq money. All agreed it was a somewhat vague distinction, but the GAO Comptroller General and Special IG both agreed that while we might have an overall interest in Iraqi corruption, we did not have a right to question (through audit) how efficiently or "cleanly" they spent their own money. And, there seemed to be a bipartisan consensus on the Committee on this point.
However, what I missed in this discussion was the question of whether or not we, in fact and international law, do have some fiscal oversight responsibility as the recognized "Occupying Power." While, I understand that we are transitioning from one Iraqi regime to another, I believe that we are still classified as an Occupying Power, with specific responsibilities. Whether or not those responsibilities include oversight of Iraqi internal financial affairs is a question in my mind and was not addressed.
The second issue that I believe the Committee omitted and that I would have liked to have seen was to attempt to define "corruption" in broader, cultural terms (although granted Waxman isn't the "philosopher type," more the "accountant.).
While there was a clear bi-partisan consensus that similar corruption had become almost the norm under the Saddam Hussein regime, it ended there. No one suggested that what we in the West might consider "corruption" was, in part, tied to a longer regional tradition extending much farther back than Hussein and possibly intertwined with Islam itself.
While I am not expert enough to draw conclusions, I would have enjoyed more discussion on this topic. For instance, what might well be considered "bribery" in Western culture, may simply be a means of "doing business" in the Middle East. This isn't so clearly right or wrong, but has to be understood within the context of the region's historical development and religion.
I would suggest that the historical development is essentially based on tribal perogitives. The money accepted in a "bribe" often goes not to merely enrich an individual, but to the older tradition of tribal organization. And, Islam, would seem to me, to deal with this in a unique way. First, there is no "clear" distinction between the state and the religion. Religious authority and principles regarding individual behavior are supreme and protected by a sort of "Supreme Court" of the religious hierarchy. But part of their authority (and success over the centuries) lies with this authority's reluctance to intrude on the day-to-day workings of the state. Bribery then is viewed much as part of the tribal system itself and, by extension, to the politics of the state. In other words, there is a subtle difference between how Western cultures and Middle Eastern cultures view and define "corruption." And, to, this provides for a curious form of democracy. The ultimate religious authorities do not draw their power from the state, but ultimately from the will of the people themselves, who have passed "power" to those recognized as their religious leaders. The result is that this produces, rightly or wrongly, a more "uniform" value system for the society, which the state then enforces, not in a dictatorial sense, but rather as religious principle.
Of course, as the Iraqi Judge pointed out, "corruption is corruption." In both cultures there is bribery amounting to "theft." A case in point is the former Iraqi Minister of Electricity who was convicted under Iraqi law of essentially stealing some $2B. This person, according to the testimony before the Committee, had been convicted in an Iraqi court of law and was being held in the Green Zone in Baghdad pending sentencing. Somehow, an American private security firm (not Blackwater), managed to get him out of confinement and he is now alive and well and living in Chicago.
The significance of the above lies in the difficulties (if not impossibility) of creating a westernized democracy in Iraq or elsewhere within the Islamic world. Just as with our own Christian fundamentalists and the American Israeli lobby, I do not expect we have much hope of totally "secularizing" Islam and that many of our efforts (and judgements pertaining to the Iraqi people) are perceived by the majority of the Iraqi people as attempts to do so.
Tuesday, September 25, 2007
Iran
The general American media response to the Ahmadinejad visit to NYC and the United Nations illustrates why it is best to leave diplomacy to professionals.
For months the majority of this same media group has been decrying Bush's hard line approach to Iran and clamoring for more dialogue. Now, that the opportunity presents itself, that same media apparently wants to use it to insult Ahmadinejad, pin him down on the principle areas of contention and accuse him of being a crazy, petty dictator.
While the media may have valid, substantive points, it strikes me that the relationship between the two countries is far from a point wherein it is possible to make significant improvements on these points. Ahmadinejad is not going to make what he would consider to be major concessions for the sake of CBS or CNN ratings.
Certainly, in the interest of good journalism, the issues the media has raised with him should be raised, but not dwelt upon. Yet, the media interviews do not seem to be able to get beyond the most contentious issues between our countries: Israel, Iraq and nuclear proliferation. A word on each.
Although I completely support Israel's right to exist (to the point where I would prefer a formalized security pact with them guaranteeing them that right, even to providing a U.S. nuclear umbrella), I understand how and why we are losing the PR war in the Arab world on this point.
From the Arab viewpoint, Israel possesses nuclear weapons, why shouldn't they? Iran has, thus far, cooperated far more with the IAEA than Israel and its development of nuclear technology, thus far, has not gone beyond what the IAEA allows for the peaceful use of nuclear power. I hasten to also state that I suspect it is Iran's "intention" to utilize this development for nuclear weapons, but at this stage it's a "bargaining chip" with the West, not an imminent threat; that point is perhaps 2-3 years away.
In political philosophy, Israel might be described as a democratic-theocracy, while Iran might be described as a theocracy, with limited democratic ambitions. Some of our closest mid-east Arab allies fall into the same category: the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, although they are Sunni Arab, rather than Persian Shia.
The Israel-Palestinian conflict has, over the last fifty plus years acquired its own constituency. Roughly a quarter of Israel's GNP comes through foreign aid, most of which is based on the threat posed by the Arab world. And, there is still a minority expansionist element in Israeli politics. On the other side, one of the few things the Arab world has in common is hatred of Israel. It helps keep tyrants or benevolent monarchies in power. U.S. condemnation of Iran as a supporter of terrorism is chiefly based on Iranian support for anti-Israeli terror groups (certainly not Al Qaeda). I suspect that this support is more in line with Iran's ambitions to become the leading regional power and the intra-Islamic battle between Sunni and Shia for the hearts and minds of the middle eastern peoples than any genuine hatred of the Israeli people. I detect some "wiggle room" in the Iranian stance on these issues - i.e. support for the anti-Israeli terror groups, the situation in Syria, general relations with Israel and Ahmadinejad's weird and crazy views in regard to the Holocaust. Rather than reflexively respond to their current positions (which I agree are over the long run unacceptable), we should explore these areas with the Iranians.
Concerning Iraq, one needs to take a step backward. Remember that the CIA backed the overthrow of Iran's democratic government in the early fifties, when it believed it was leaning toward communism. We installed the Shah. While the Shah was a strong U.S. ally in the region and helpful toward the prosperity of Iran's upper and middle classes, over time he tended to adopt increasingly dictatorial methods in crushing popular movements (religious and democratic) among the Iranian people. The Iranian hostage taking of U.S. embassy personnel following the Shah's overthrow did not help U.S.-Iranian relations, but was subsequently resolved by President Reagan, followed by Reagan's Iran-Contra policy, which sold the Iranians weapons in their war against Iraq (whom we had earlier supported).
Following 9/11, the Iranians provided the United States with limited support in our defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, with assistance for downed U.S. aircraft, targeting and intelligence information. The Iranians, who were among the first to offer condolences for 9/11, followed this up by an apparent attempt to further an improvement of U.S.-Iranian relations with a secret diplomatic initiative, rejected hand-down by neo-conservative policy makers in Washington.
Bush's Axis of Evil speech ended that initiative and, I suspect, prompted acceleration of Iran's nuclear development program.
Today's Iranian support for Iraqi insurgents is another area upon which I detect wiggle room. For one, support to date (and based on what our government has released) is relatively minor compared to what it might be. On one hand, I am sure Iranian weapons are indeed showing up in Iraq, just as American weapons are showing up in Kurdish guerrilla attacks within Turkey. Some of their "support" may be unsanctioned. Yet, having said that, I also believe some percentage is sanctioned. The Iranians are undoubtedly supporting pro-Iranian, Shia militia groups within Iraq, just as we supported Contra guerrillas in Nicaragua; a country we felt was within our sphere of influence.
The pull-out of British forces from Basra pretty much ensures continued and increased Iranian support for a pro-Iranian, Shia regional government in southern Iraq. Having essentially accomplished their goal, the Iranians may now be in a position to negotiate a shut down in the flow of weapons to other areas of Iraq, with the agreement of their Shia allies in the south.
The nuclear issue. This issue is complex. From the Iranian perspective, there may be two motivations. The first is that they may have a genuine desire to develop peaceful nuclear power. Oil is not a renewable resource. As we use up what we have, the laws of supply and demand will become increasingly important. As world prices rise, it may be economically more profitable for Iran to export its oil resources than to utilize it for domestic consumption.
Weaponizing this capability is important within their greater goal for regional hegemony. The whole issue of nuclear proliferation in the mid-east began with Israel. I completely understand the pressures which led Israel to their own nuclear weapon capability. One of the most important factors in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute (and in the Golan Heights) is that Israel does not possess, within its original 1947-48 borders, militarily defensible borders. Developing nuclear weapons was the logical solution for a tiny country surrounded by hostile neighbors, who in turn would remain hostile as long has that attitude was essential to the continuance of regional dictatorships and monarchs. And, for us, it was/is easier to control the world market for oil by supporting these people than coping with the unpredictability of Islamic fundamentalist governments (aside from the issue of whether or not they support terrorism). The problem becomes circular.
So, what's the solution?
A first step is in ensuring Israel with permanent, defensible borders and a guarantee of its sovereignty. On the other hand, Israel cannot expect to achieve these goals without giving something up of their own. A possible "trade" is an Israeli move toward more secularization of its own society, acceptance of an internationalization of Jerusalem, a renunciation of "nuclear first strike," and a far reaching goal of eliminating its own nuclear weapon capability. Given the history of the Holocaust and the fact that the very establishment of Israel is based on religious premises, acceptance of these "goals" will not be easy, but with the nuclear proliferation issue, their survival may depend upon it. And, key toward even establishing these goals must be both a U.N. and Western guarantee (particularly by the United States) of Israeli security.
A second step is to begin preparing for civilization beyond oil, globally. On one level, Dubai appears to be a very small state now in this process. On a different level, Iran may be another.
What Iran requires is an end to sanctions and inclusion in the global community. To achieve this we cannot expect them to suddenly evolve into a western style democracy. Western market capitalism and democracy tends to play to the lowest common denominator of human nature. Many of the "improvements" in civilization accomplished by the West, frankly, have their down-side as well. If the Iranians wish to avoid these downsides by striking some type of balance between their religious beliefs and total western secularism, so be it. That's their business. But these differences should not stop their inclusion into the broader world community, to which they have much to contribute. At the moment, the cards they have to play are the restatement of their policy toward Israel, acceptance of nuclear non-proliferation, assistance in resolving the problem of Iraq and their oil.
More later.
For months the majority of this same media group has been decrying Bush's hard line approach to Iran and clamoring for more dialogue. Now, that the opportunity presents itself, that same media apparently wants to use it to insult Ahmadinejad, pin him down on the principle areas of contention and accuse him of being a crazy, petty dictator.
While the media may have valid, substantive points, it strikes me that the relationship between the two countries is far from a point wherein it is possible to make significant improvements on these points. Ahmadinejad is not going to make what he would consider to be major concessions for the sake of CBS or CNN ratings.
Certainly, in the interest of good journalism, the issues the media has raised with him should be raised, but not dwelt upon. Yet, the media interviews do not seem to be able to get beyond the most contentious issues between our countries: Israel, Iraq and nuclear proliferation. A word on each.
Although I completely support Israel's right to exist (to the point where I would prefer a formalized security pact with them guaranteeing them that right, even to providing a U.S. nuclear umbrella), I understand how and why we are losing the PR war in the Arab world on this point.
From the Arab viewpoint, Israel possesses nuclear weapons, why shouldn't they? Iran has, thus far, cooperated far more with the IAEA than Israel and its development of nuclear technology, thus far, has not gone beyond what the IAEA allows for the peaceful use of nuclear power. I hasten to also state that I suspect it is Iran's "intention" to utilize this development for nuclear weapons, but at this stage it's a "bargaining chip" with the West, not an imminent threat; that point is perhaps 2-3 years away.
In political philosophy, Israel might be described as a democratic-theocracy, while Iran might be described as a theocracy, with limited democratic ambitions. Some of our closest mid-east Arab allies fall into the same category: the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, although they are Sunni Arab, rather than Persian Shia.
The Israel-Palestinian conflict has, over the last fifty plus years acquired its own constituency. Roughly a quarter of Israel's GNP comes through foreign aid, most of which is based on the threat posed by the Arab world. And, there is still a minority expansionist element in Israeli politics. On the other side, one of the few things the Arab world has in common is hatred of Israel. It helps keep tyrants or benevolent monarchies in power. U.S. condemnation of Iran as a supporter of terrorism is chiefly based on Iranian support for anti-Israeli terror groups (certainly not Al Qaeda). I suspect that this support is more in line with Iran's ambitions to become the leading regional power and the intra-Islamic battle between Sunni and Shia for the hearts and minds of the middle eastern peoples than any genuine hatred of the Israeli people. I detect some "wiggle room" in the Iranian stance on these issues - i.e. support for the anti-Israeli terror groups, the situation in Syria, general relations with Israel and Ahmadinejad's weird and crazy views in regard to the Holocaust. Rather than reflexively respond to their current positions (which I agree are over the long run unacceptable), we should explore these areas with the Iranians.
Concerning Iraq, one needs to take a step backward. Remember that the CIA backed the overthrow of Iran's democratic government in the early fifties, when it believed it was leaning toward communism. We installed the Shah. While the Shah was a strong U.S. ally in the region and helpful toward the prosperity of Iran's upper and middle classes, over time he tended to adopt increasingly dictatorial methods in crushing popular movements (religious and democratic) among the Iranian people. The Iranian hostage taking of U.S. embassy personnel following the Shah's overthrow did not help U.S.-Iranian relations, but was subsequently resolved by President Reagan, followed by Reagan's Iran-Contra policy, which sold the Iranians weapons in their war against Iraq (whom we had earlier supported).
Following 9/11, the Iranians provided the United States with limited support in our defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, with assistance for downed U.S. aircraft, targeting and intelligence information. The Iranians, who were among the first to offer condolences for 9/11, followed this up by an apparent attempt to further an improvement of U.S.-Iranian relations with a secret diplomatic initiative, rejected hand-down by neo-conservative policy makers in Washington.
Bush's Axis of Evil speech ended that initiative and, I suspect, prompted acceleration of Iran's nuclear development program.
Today's Iranian support for Iraqi insurgents is another area upon which I detect wiggle room. For one, support to date (and based on what our government has released) is relatively minor compared to what it might be. On one hand, I am sure Iranian weapons are indeed showing up in Iraq, just as American weapons are showing up in Kurdish guerrilla attacks within Turkey. Some of their "support" may be unsanctioned. Yet, having said that, I also believe some percentage is sanctioned. The Iranians are undoubtedly supporting pro-Iranian, Shia militia groups within Iraq, just as we supported Contra guerrillas in Nicaragua; a country we felt was within our sphere of influence.
The pull-out of British forces from Basra pretty much ensures continued and increased Iranian support for a pro-Iranian, Shia regional government in southern Iraq. Having essentially accomplished their goal, the Iranians may now be in a position to negotiate a shut down in the flow of weapons to other areas of Iraq, with the agreement of their Shia allies in the south.
The nuclear issue. This issue is complex. From the Iranian perspective, there may be two motivations. The first is that they may have a genuine desire to develop peaceful nuclear power. Oil is not a renewable resource. As we use up what we have, the laws of supply and demand will become increasingly important. As world prices rise, it may be economically more profitable for Iran to export its oil resources than to utilize it for domestic consumption.
Weaponizing this capability is important within their greater goal for regional hegemony. The whole issue of nuclear proliferation in the mid-east began with Israel. I completely understand the pressures which led Israel to their own nuclear weapon capability. One of the most important factors in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute (and in the Golan Heights) is that Israel does not possess, within its original 1947-48 borders, militarily defensible borders. Developing nuclear weapons was the logical solution for a tiny country surrounded by hostile neighbors, who in turn would remain hostile as long has that attitude was essential to the continuance of regional dictatorships and monarchs. And, for us, it was/is easier to control the world market for oil by supporting these people than coping with the unpredictability of Islamic fundamentalist governments (aside from the issue of whether or not they support terrorism). The problem becomes circular.
So, what's the solution?
A first step is in ensuring Israel with permanent, defensible borders and a guarantee of its sovereignty. On the other hand, Israel cannot expect to achieve these goals without giving something up of their own. A possible "trade" is an Israeli move toward more secularization of its own society, acceptance of an internationalization of Jerusalem, a renunciation of "nuclear first strike," and a far reaching goal of eliminating its own nuclear weapon capability. Given the history of the Holocaust and the fact that the very establishment of Israel is based on religious premises, acceptance of these "goals" will not be easy, but with the nuclear proliferation issue, their survival may depend upon it. And, key toward even establishing these goals must be both a U.N. and Western guarantee (particularly by the United States) of Israeli security.
A second step is to begin preparing for civilization beyond oil, globally. On one level, Dubai appears to be a very small state now in this process. On a different level, Iran may be another.
What Iran requires is an end to sanctions and inclusion in the global community. To achieve this we cannot expect them to suddenly evolve into a western style democracy. Western market capitalism and democracy tends to play to the lowest common denominator of human nature. Many of the "improvements" in civilization accomplished by the West, frankly, have their down-side as well. If the Iranians wish to avoid these downsides by striking some type of balance between their religious beliefs and total western secularism, so be it. That's their business. But these differences should not stop their inclusion into the broader world community, to which they have much to contribute. At the moment, the cards they have to play are the restatement of their policy toward Israel, acceptance of nuclear non-proliferation, assistance in resolving the problem of Iraq and their oil.
More later.
Saturday, September 22, 2007
Miscellaneous
Blackwater may be creating their own market. Turkish authorities have apparently seized weapons from the terrorist group, which espouses Kurdish independence (PPK), that have been traced to weapons brought into Iraq by Blackwater employees.
Speaking of guns...a couple of negatives on General Petraeus, whom I defended yesterday in regard to the moveon.org NYT ad. Remember that between his earlier command of the 101st Airborne and his present assignment, he served for a time as head of the U.S. effort to train Iraqi forces, which has not been particularly successful to date. Further, he was also in charge over the process of providing weapons for these forces-in-training...but established no process by which these weapons could be traced (i.e. the simple recording of serial numbers, who they went to, etc.). His only defense of this lapse has been "we were too busy."
And, finally today, there is the upcoming Dubai buy-in to NASDAQ. Apparently Dubai is purchasing approximately 20% of NASDAQ and will open a sort of NASDAQ East in Dubaii. More on this later, but this is a good example of supply side economics in the new global economy. Indeed, it might be seen as the nail in the coffin for old fashioned nationalism and American patriotism...brought to us by who else but the Bush Administration.
Speaking of guns...a couple of negatives on General Petraeus, whom I defended yesterday in regard to the moveon.org NYT ad. Remember that between his earlier command of the 101st Airborne and his present assignment, he served for a time as head of the U.S. effort to train Iraqi forces, which has not been particularly successful to date. Further, he was also in charge over the process of providing weapons for these forces-in-training...but established no process by which these weapons could be traced (i.e. the simple recording of serial numbers, who they went to, etc.). His only defense of this lapse has been "we were too busy."
And, finally today, there is the upcoming Dubai buy-in to NASDAQ. Apparently Dubai is purchasing approximately 20% of NASDAQ and will open a sort of NASDAQ East in Dubaii. More on this later, but this is a good example of supply side economics in the new global economy. Indeed, it might be seen as the nail in the coffin for old fashioned nationalism and American patriotism...brought to us by who else but the Bush Administration.
Friday, September 21, 2007
Betraying Petraeus
The moveon.org NYT ad was a mistake and beneath them. "Cutesy," took precedence over intelligence and the organization needs to reevaluate its leadership, if not its mission in life.
The same thought had occured to me, but I decided that the play on words didn't fit the situation.
The Democrats in Congress, not Bush, did much to "politicalize" Petraeus. Remember that it was them, not Bush, who insisted Petraeus return and "report" to Congress on the Surge, at the time of his Senate confirmation. If he slanted his report to favor his boss, it was to be expected. Beyond that, what General, in any Army anywhere, is going to admit failure? Too much expectation had been placed in him to expect an "objective and unbiased report."
I listened to segments of the Petraeus testimony and it brought back memories of Vietnam. In the drawn out end of that war, how often did we hear military pleas for "just a little more time and a few more troops?" Petraeus' testimony struck me as basically honest, while emphasising the little positive news he could present.
While I favor the Democratic position (s) on Iraq more than the President's, there are plenty of shabby politicians on both sides of the aisle. Asking the General whether he felt the Surge had made the United States more secure was a nonesense political question, to a field general whose main concern is the day-to-day tactical situation on the ground in Iraq, and Petraeus answered it correctly and honestly with, "I don't know."
Overall, the military has done what I think possible with the little they have. In fact, I am now beginning to wonder if the "Surge" wasn't more to preserve the status quo in Iraq than it was to improve stability. The recent ban on all U.S. civilian travel outside of the Green Zone during the suspension of Blackwater activities tells me that things are worse than we imagine, not better.
Petraeus is not the villian of this piece; the President is. Many of our Iraqi errors may be traced to the underlying philosophy of this Administration...namely that while there is an Axis of Evil abroad, the focus of Evil at home is the United States Government. Much of the corruption and inefficiency of our present Government comes not from Government itself, but from the absurd lengths this Administration has gone to, to privatize as much as possible.
The same thought had occured to me, but I decided that the play on words didn't fit the situation.
The Democrats in Congress, not Bush, did much to "politicalize" Petraeus. Remember that it was them, not Bush, who insisted Petraeus return and "report" to Congress on the Surge, at the time of his Senate confirmation. If he slanted his report to favor his boss, it was to be expected. Beyond that, what General, in any Army anywhere, is going to admit failure? Too much expectation had been placed in him to expect an "objective and unbiased report."
I listened to segments of the Petraeus testimony and it brought back memories of Vietnam. In the drawn out end of that war, how often did we hear military pleas for "just a little more time and a few more troops?" Petraeus' testimony struck me as basically honest, while emphasising the little positive news he could present.
While I favor the Democratic position (s) on Iraq more than the President's, there are plenty of shabby politicians on both sides of the aisle. Asking the General whether he felt the Surge had made the United States more secure was a nonesense political question, to a field general whose main concern is the day-to-day tactical situation on the ground in Iraq, and Petraeus answered it correctly and honestly with, "I don't know."
Overall, the military has done what I think possible with the little they have. In fact, I am now beginning to wonder if the "Surge" wasn't more to preserve the status quo in Iraq than it was to improve stability. The recent ban on all U.S. civilian travel outside of the Green Zone during the suspension of Blackwater activities tells me that things are worse than we imagine, not better.
Petraeus is not the villian of this piece; the President is. Many of our Iraqi errors may be traced to the underlying philosophy of this Administration...namely that while there is an Axis of Evil abroad, the focus of Evil at home is the United States Government. Much of the corruption and inefficiency of our present Government comes not from Government itself, but from the absurd lengths this Administration has gone to, to privatize as much as possible.
Monday, September 17, 2007
Baghdad Cowboys
Blackwater, a private security firm operating primarily in Iraq, has apparently lost its license in Iraq. Following the attempted road bombing of a Blackwater seven SUV convoy carrying State Department officials, eight Iraqi civilians were killed in a shootout.
While Blackwater gets most of the bad press, they have only approximately 1,000 of the estimated 25,000 private security personnel pretty much roaming Iraq wherever they wish to go, without coordination with either U.S. or Iraqi forces and exempt from both U.S. and Iraqi law.
Despite numerous similar incidents, no private security contractor employee has ever been arrested for anything.
Sooo...it would appear that we are responsible for at least part of Iraqi lawlessness and instability. Great. I am really beginning to wonder if there is ANYTHING this administration can get right?
Privatizing security for U.S. government and even high-ranking U.S. military personnel was worse than dumb. While we are trying to enlist a patriotic Iraqi police force and Army, we are protecting our own VIPs with hired guns. And, no one at the White House gets it, because they think EVERYTHING should be privatized. Like what's democracy all about, if its not the right to profit?
It's time for the Administration idiots to rein in the other set of idiots they've unleashed on the Iraqis...the Baghdad Cowboys. Maybe Bush can hire them to protect the ranch in retirement and save the American taxpayer the expense of a Secret Service detail for life.
If I were Defense Secretary Gates, I would stop all privatization of security for U.S. military personnel immediately. Here's the simple rule: All U.S. military personnel shall be protected by U.S. military personnel...period. If the military can't protect its own people, what makes them think they can bring stability to Iraq? If the military doesn't have adequate numbers of trained people to do this...get them NOW and/or start getting Generals who will do so.
The same principle applies to ALL U.S. government employees in Iraq. Before the American military embarks on ANY strategy for the Iraqis, they need to first and foremost fulfill the security needs of our own personnel. Otherwise, pack it up and get out of town. Geez! Doesn't GW watch Clint Eastwood films? Didn't Clint make a series of films about teaching the town folk about standing together against bad guys and self-reliance? It's the Bad Guys who bring in the hired guns...not the Good Guys!
As we phase out privatized security, it is time to immediately bring these people under control. I would suggest the UCMJ initially and then, perhaps after one year, Iraqi law. And, since we are technically still official "occupiers" of Iraq (in terms of international law), I would suggest that the U.S. military has sole responsibility for the coordination of movement and security for ALL U.S. citizens in-country, civilian or otherwise. Nobody flies in with private security protection and does "deals" on their own.
How stupid can these people be?
From a different perspective, the fact that the Iraqi central government has seized on this latest insanity to crack down on American private security firms may be an indication of "push-back" in light of my comments above on partition. Sort of: "You want to go around us in dealing with the provinces? OK, see how you like it when we start prosecuting your own cowboys?"
Only a guy that hid from the Vietnam War in the Air National Guard and one who avoided military service with deferment after deferment would approve such a system. It's the "money can do anything," philosophy. "Need an Army, hire them." Or, "you can't trust anyone not in the top tax bracket." And these are the guys who won the last election based on PATRIOTISM! Hahahahaha.
Note: Regime change and bringing the fruits of democracy to the Iraqi people are two of the very, very few remaining reasons for invading Iraq, which have yet to be proven false. Small glitch. Although we apparently expected to be greeted in the streets with flowers by democracy hungry Iraqis, we did not think, from the beginning, they could be trusted enough to prepare meals for our troops, do the laundry, etc., etc. Sooo...we "privatized" support functions. Today, including the private security forces, these support people outnumber U.S. forces in Iraq (approximately 185,000 to 160,000). So..."withdrawal" means pulling out over a quarter of a million people. Aside from the logistics involved in getting these people out, withdrawal means terminating hundreds of contracts, many of which were "no bid" awards and alienating the "vested interests." If war is hell, for the many; it is also profitable for the few.
While Blackwater gets most of the bad press, they have only approximately 1,000 of the estimated 25,000 private security personnel pretty much roaming Iraq wherever they wish to go, without coordination with either U.S. or Iraqi forces and exempt from both U.S. and Iraqi law.
Despite numerous similar incidents, no private security contractor employee has ever been arrested for anything.
Sooo...it would appear that we are responsible for at least part of Iraqi lawlessness and instability. Great. I am really beginning to wonder if there is ANYTHING this administration can get right?
Privatizing security for U.S. government and even high-ranking U.S. military personnel was worse than dumb. While we are trying to enlist a patriotic Iraqi police force and Army, we are protecting our own VIPs with hired guns. And, no one at the White House gets it, because they think EVERYTHING should be privatized. Like what's democracy all about, if its not the right to profit?
It's time for the Administration idiots to rein in the other set of idiots they've unleashed on the Iraqis...the Baghdad Cowboys. Maybe Bush can hire them to protect the ranch in retirement and save the American taxpayer the expense of a Secret Service detail for life.
If I were Defense Secretary Gates, I would stop all privatization of security for U.S. military personnel immediately. Here's the simple rule: All U.S. military personnel shall be protected by U.S. military personnel...period. If the military can't protect its own people, what makes them think they can bring stability to Iraq? If the military doesn't have adequate numbers of trained people to do this...get them NOW and/or start getting Generals who will do so.
The same principle applies to ALL U.S. government employees in Iraq. Before the American military embarks on ANY strategy for the Iraqis, they need to first and foremost fulfill the security needs of our own personnel. Otherwise, pack it up and get out of town. Geez! Doesn't GW watch Clint Eastwood films? Didn't Clint make a series of films about teaching the town folk about standing together against bad guys and self-reliance? It's the Bad Guys who bring in the hired guns...not the Good Guys!
As we phase out privatized security, it is time to immediately bring these people under control. I would suggest the UCMJ initially and then, perhaps after one year, Iraqi law. And, since we are technically still official "occupiers" of Iraq (in terms of international law), I would suggest that the U.S. military has sole responsibility for the coordination of movement and security for ALL U.S. citizens in-country, civilian or otherwise. Nobody flies in with private security protection and does "deals" on their own.
How stupid can these people be?
From a different perspective, the fact that the Iraqi central government has seized on this latest insanity to crack down on American private security firms may be an indication of "push-back" in light of my comments above on partition. Sort of: "You want to go around us in dealing with the provinces? OK, see how you like it when we start prosecuting your own cowboys?"
Only a guy that hid from the Vietnam War in the Air National Guard and one who avoided military service with deferment after deferment would approve such a system. It's the "money can do anything," philosophy. "Need an Army, hire them." Or, "you can't trust anyone not in the top tax bracket." And these are the guys who won the last election based on PATRIOTISM! Hahahahaha.
Note: Regime change and bringing the fruits of democracy to the Iraqi people are two of the very, very few remaining reasons for invading Iraq, which have yet to be proven false. Small glitch. Although we apparently expected to be greeted in the streets with flowers by democracy hungry Iraqis, we did not think, from the beginning, they could be trusted enough to prepare meals for our troops, do the laundry, etc., etc. Sooo...we "privatized" support functions. Today, including the private security forces, these support people outnumber U.S. forces in Iraq (approximately 185,000 to 160,000). So..."withdrawal" means pulling out over a quarter of a million people. Aside from the logistics involved in getting these people out, withdrawal means terminating hundreds of contracts, many of which were "no bid" awards and alienating the "vested interests." If war is hell, for the many; it is also profitable for the few.
Sunday, September 16, 2007
A Method to the Madness? And, Impeachment of the Bushkie
Wow! Two posts in a single day! As a follow on to my last posting, I am now beginning to think the President is actually shifting policy on Iraq. As posted, the moves in Anwar and the Kurdish areas at the local level may be seen as additional pressure on Baghdad to do SOMETHING. One guesses that the primary concern of the Baghdad government is essentially two-fold: staying alive until tomorrow and getting their hands on as much American aid as possible.
Now that I think about it, the actions involving local decision-making in Anwar and the north go hand-in-glove with the British decision to abandon the city of Basra in the south and fall back to the Basra international airport to the west of the city. I have "war-gamed" an Iranian invasion of Iraq simultaneous with an upsurge of the insurgency throughout the country. A quick way to lose the game is to abandon Basra and retreat to the airport. This opens the door to Iranian invasion, over the Tigris River in Basra. Assuming the Iranians are not stupid enough to invade, as a minimum, the British redeployment opens the south to increased Iranian infiltration. Another sign that the alternative to doing nothing in Baghdad may be partition.
So, these three actions (in Anwar, the Kurdish north and Basra) coupled with what amounted to a commitment to withdraw 5,000+ by Christmas and another 50,000 to 100,000 by July 2008 may be a strategic shift and message to the Maliki government that our patience has run its course. [Hmmm...it could also be a means of suckering in Iran to do something stupid, which would justify a counter-strike against its nuclear facilities]. Either way, it would seem to be indication of a major forthcoming change in U.S. policy and an awareness by the Bushkies that they have only about 14 more months to influence ANY outcome in Iraq.
IMO it could go either way. While Bush's stubbornness is legendary, so is his political ability to co-opt the ideas of others as his own. Partition has been Joe Biden's plan. One guesses that Bush will keep his options open - i.e. if the Maliki government responds with significant benchmark improvements, the current shift to supporting regional decisions will go away and Bush will have cause to claim "victory." If it fails to work and Baghdad still fails to respond, the shift will continue toward partition, with Bush co-opting the Biden proposals as his own. Regime change and regional autonomy in Anwar and the Kurd provinces, plus the failure of the American people to support a sizable and costly occupation (in lives and dollars) will suffice to claim a partial victory and blame the failure part on a dysfunctional Maliki government and, of course, us.
Best case for Bush: Baghdad gets its act together and we have withdrawals based on stability between now and the 2008 elections. Second Best Case for Bush: Baghdad fails to get its act together and we have partition, with withdrawal from Shiite areas and retention of buffer forces (roughly 50,000) in semi-permanent bases in Anwar and the north, accompanied by reduced casualties for U.S. forces (the "Let'em fight it out" option).
Aside from the rhetoric to the Republican base about "freedom and democracy," what Bush really needs is time. Time to have another go at resolving, at least temporarily, the Palestinian/Israeli issue and time to transition away from our dependency on mid-east oil. Once both of those strategic goals are met, we can move to a mid-east policy of containment and who really cares how many Sunnis kill how many Shiites or vice versa among those left in Iraq? If there is any "up-side" to our policy to date it is that our presence (and almost 4,000 American lives) have given some 4 million Sunnis the opportunity to flee as refugees to camps in Jordan and Syria and to avoid being slaughtered by the Shiite majority. [I assume the 4 million refugees are overwhelmingly Sunni in Sunni Jordan and Sunni Syria and not Shiite].
None of this detracts from the colossal error of the invasion in the first place, which brings me to impeachment.
Personally, I would just as soon impeach the President as not...perhaps for incompetence equating to criminal negligence, if not simply for launching an aggressive war based on false intelligence regarding the extent of imminent threat to the United States of attack by non-existant WMD and the false association of a very evil regime with the events of 9/11.
However, in the last analysis, right or wrong, our founding fathers made the impeachment process basically a political one. No court of law within the United States will bring George Bush before it on the basis of what I have suggested above [although certainly the International Court of Justice might, but then we've already denied them jurisdiction]. Sooo...the removal of George Bush rests with the Legislative Branch...ergo a political decision....and there just aren't enough votes to bring a bill of impeachment in the House, much less the votes to convict in the Senate. If we impeached every politician who failed to act in the best interests of the country, we wouldn't have a government...and that's OUR fault, not theirs.
And, in a curious way, I really do not blame Bushkie for his incompetence, ignorance, stubbornness or any other invective one wishes to throw his way. I blame us. I didn't vote for him, but having very deep suspicions about his abilities, neither did I try and defeat him as hard as I might have. And, I suspect that had George himself known in advance that 9/11 was coming, he would have declined to run for the Presidency. Instead, he probably did the best he could, given his limited perceptions occasioned by the world in which he lived and grew up in; a world foreign to you and I and the vast majority of the American people; think about that long and hard before you make a 2008 Presidential decision.
Four thousand American lives, hundreds of coalition lives and many multiples of that in Iraqi lives leads, I suspect, to a great deal of self-justification, just to be able to get up in the morning, but that is something he will have to live with the rest of his life and it is relatively unimportant to our future about what George thinks about himself once he leaves the Presidency. I suspect that there are still sufficient Bush supporters that he may insulate himself from his own legacy. A huge Presidential library on the SMU campus. A staff of historians and research specialists all dedicated to rewriting the history of his administration and polishing the image (everybody has to eat). Friends and speaking engagements a plenty and a sufficient number of crazy rich people to ensure his financial security. GW will never need to worry about receiving a social security check or medicare and, if he chooses, will never have to worry about having been wrong.
But, I predict, the one single judgement regarding his tenure as President of the United States from which he cannot personally escape will be found in the fact that he will never become Commissioner of Baseball...and that will truly eat at his very soul.
And, with that, sports fans...I bid you goodnight.
Now that I think about it, the actions involving local decision-making in Anwar and the north go hand-in-glove with the British decision to abandon the city of Basra in the south and fall back to the Basra international airport to the west of the city. I have "war-gamed" an Iranian invasion of Iraq simultaneous with an upsurge of the insurgency throughout the country. A quick way to lose the game is to abandon Basra and retreat to the airport. This opens the door to Iranian invasion, over the Tigris River in Basra. Assuming the Iranians are not stupid enough to invade, as a minimum, the British redeployment opens the south to increased Iranian infiltration. Another sign that the alternative to doing nothing in Baghdad may be partition.
So, these three actions (in Anwar, the Kurdish north and Basra) coupled with what amounted to a commitment to withdraw 5,000+ by Christmas and another 50,000 to 100,000 by July 2008 may be a strategic shift and message to the Maliki government that our patience has run its course. [Hmmm...it could also be a means of suckering in Iran to do something stupid, which would justify a counter-strike against its nuclear facilities]. Either way, it would seem to be indication of a major forthcoming change in U.S. policy and an awareness by the Bushkies that they have only about 14 more months to influence ANY outcome in Iraq.
IMO it could go either way. While Bush's stubbornness is legendary, so is his political ability to co-opt the ideas of others as his own. Partition has been Joe Biden's plan. One guesses that Bush will keep his options open - i.e. if the Maliki government responds with significant benchmark improvements, the current shift to supporting regional decisions will go away and Bush will have cause to claim "victory." If it fails to work and Baghdad still fails to respond, the shift will continue toward partition, with Bush co-opting the Biden proposals as his own. Regime change and regional autonomy in Anwar and the Kurd provinces, plus the failure of the American people to support a sizable and costly occupation (in lives and dollars) will suffice to claim a partial victory and blame the failure part on a dysfunctional Maliki government and, of course, us.
Best case for Bush: Baghdad gets its act together and we have withdrawals based on stability between now and the 2008 elections. Second Best Case for Bush: Baghdad fails to get its act together and we have partition, with withdrawal from Shiite areas and retention of buffer forces (roughly 50,000) in semi-permanent bases in Anwar and the north, accompanied by reduced casualties for U.S. forces (the "Let'em fight it out" option).
Aside from the rhetoric to the Republican base about "freedom and democracy," what Bush really needs is time. Time to have another go at resolving, at least temporarily, the Palestinian/Israeli issue and time to transition away from our dependency on mid-east oil. Once both of those strategic goals are met, we can move to a mid-east policy of containment and who really cares how many Sunnis kill how many Shiites or vice versa among those left in Iraq? If there is any "up-side" to our policy to date it is that our presence (and almost 4,000 American lives) have given some 4 million Sunnis the opportunity to flee as refugees to camps in Jordan and Syria and to avoid being slaughtered by the Shiite majority. [I assume the 4 million refugees are overwhelmingly Sunni in Sunni Jordan and Sunni Syria and not Shiite].
None of this detracts from the colossal error of the invasion in the first place, which brings me to impeachment.
Personally, I would just as soon impeach the President as not...perhaps for incompetence equating to criminal negligence, if not simply for launching an aggressive war based on false intelligence regarding the extent of imminent threat to the United States of attack by non-existant WMD and the false association of a very evil regime with the events of 9/11.
However, in the last analysis, right or wrong, our founding fathers made the impeachment process basically a political one. No court of law within the United States will bring George Bush before it on the basis of what I have suggested above [although certainly the International Court of Justice might, but then we've already denied them jurisdiction]. Sooo...the removal of George Bush rests with the Legislative Branch...ergo a political decision....and there just aren't enough votes to bring a bill of impeachment in the House, much less the votes to convict in the Senate. If we impeached every politician who failed to act in the best interests of the country, we wouldn't have a government...and that's OUR fault, not theirs.
And, in a curious way, I really do not blame Bushkie for his incompetence, ignorance, stubbornness or any other invective one wishes to throw his way. I blame us. I didn't vote for him, but having very deep suspicions about his abilities, neither did I try and defeat him as hard as I might have. And, I suspect that had George himself known in advance that 9/11 was coming, he would have declined to run for the Presidency. Instead, he probably did the best he could, given his limited perceptions occasioned by the world in which he lived and grew up in; a world foreign to you and I and the vast majority of the American people; think about that long and hard before you make a 2008 Presidential decision.
Four thousand American lives, hundreds of coalition lives and many multiples of that in Iraqi lives leads, I suspect, to a great deal of self-justification, just to be able to get up in the morning, but that is something he will have to live with the rest of his life and it is relatively unimportant to our future about what George thinks about himself once he leaves the Presidency. I suspect that there are still sufficient Bush supporters that he may insulate himself from his own legacy. A huge Presidential library on the SMU campus. A staff of historians and research specialists all dedicated to rewriting the history of his administration and polishing the image (everybody has to eat). Friends and speaking engagements a plenty and a sufficient number of crazy rich people to ensure his financial security. GW will never need to worry about receiving a social security check or medicare and, if he chooses, will never have to worry about having been wrong.
But, I predict, the one single judgement regarding his tenure as President of the United States from which he cannot personally escape will be found in the fact that he will never become Commissioner of Baseball...and that will truly eat at his very soul.
And, with that, sports fans...I bid you goodnight.
Odds and Ends
A few brief observations. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) last week admitted that the nation's aviation system is close to collapse. It is unclear whether this is an admission of their own failings or a plea to the airlines to correct their own inadequacies? Given this administration's ideological bent, its probably both. Sort of, "we've been successful in that we've failed to regulate an industry that we should not have been regulating in the first place." Hmmm? Shades of "Great Job, Brownie."
Few in the media have picked up on this twisted logic. Given the ideological underpinnings of the Bush Administration, it succeeds when it fails. If you accept this premise, the President's legacy will be one of the most "successful," in American history.
Another case in point is the announcement last week of the signing of a contract between the Kurds and Hunt Oil for the exploration and exploitation of undiscovered oil reserves in Iraq's Kurdish north. The official U.S. position (I thought) was for a strong central Iraqi government and the equal sharing of oil derived income between all geographic and ethnic elements of the country - i.e. the central government also makes the deals with foreign contractors. So, the Kurd-Hunt Oil deal would appear to run contrary to U.S. policy. Ray (or maybe Roy) Hunt, head of Hunt Oil is one of Bush's strongest political supporters and was appointed by Bush to a civilian advisory committee on U.S. foreign policy.
Curiously, our shift in policies in the Sunni dominated Anwar province appear similar. There, and much to Baghdad's chagrin, the American military is making deals with the local Sunni powers that be.
So...the inconsistency of the Bush Administration remains consistent. On the one hand, we strategically support the strong centralized Iraqi government in Baghdad, while tactically pursuing policies which undermine that position. All, of course, consistent with achieving the ideological principle that the failure of government equates with success.
Few in the media have picked up on this twisted logic. Given the ideological underpinnings of the Bush Administration, it succeeds when it fails. If you accept this premise, the President's legacy will be one of the most "successful," in American history.
Another case in point is the announcement last week of the signing of a contract between the Kurds and Hunt Oil for the exploration and exploitation of undiscovered oil reserves in Iraq's Kurdish north. The official U.S. position (I thought) was for a strong central Iraqi government and the equal sharing of oil derived income between all geographic and ethnic elements of the country - i.e. the central government also makes the deals with foreign contractors. So, the Kurd-Hunt Oil deal would appear to run contrary to U.S. policy. Ray (or maybe Roy) Hunt, head of Hunt Oil is one of Bush's strongest political supporters and was appointed by Bush to a civilian advisory committee on U.S. foreign policy.
Curiously, our shift in policies in the Sunni dominated Anwar province appear similar. There, and much to Baghdad's chagrin, the American military is making deals with the local Sunni powers that be.
So...the inconsistency of the Bush Administration remains consistent. On the one hand, we strategically support the strong centralized Iraqi government in Baghdad, while tactically pursuing policies which undermine that position. All, of course, consistent with achieving the ideological principle that the failure of government equates with success.
Monday, September 03, 2007
This and That
The state of denial disease seems to be spreading throughout the Republican Party...and now apparently ranges from Baghdad to a Minneapolis Airport men's room. Only comment on the Larry Craig issue is that there is one obviously very sick man...whatever his gender preferences.
And, who does the Party trot out in defense...ah...Tom DeLay. Well, probably can't blame the Party itself for that, Tom was just using Craig's absurdity to promote his new book.
Prediction: If the Republican Party mainstream moderates and liberals (and, yes, even a few genuine conservatives) cannot get their Party back from the crazy Texas/Neo-Conservative/Fundamentalist Christian Wing that has control, the Party may well end up in the dust bin of history...to coin a phrase.
Bush, who this morning is in Iraq telling the Generals what they are to report to Congress next week, continues to flirt with impeachment, while the mood in the rest of the country (and among the Democratic Congress) seems to be one of "why bother?" The early arrival of the 2008 Presidential Campaign has indirectly hastened his lame duck status, which was confirmed last week by the departure of Gonzales, Rove, Snow, et al and sort of symbolically by the "Craig Affair." In a curious way, impeachment may be Bush's only hope for a positive legacy...i.e. he's impeached, along with Cheney, and the Presidency is assumed by Nancy Pelosi. Actually, I think Nancy would do a pretty good job, but she would certainly give the Nut Wing of the Republican Party some new ammunition.
Otherwise, it's 16.5 months to go and counting. Sixteen months is a very long time in politics. At the moment, I'd guess the odds on impeachment at roughly 1 in 10. And, the LAST thing Democrats would want to do is to be forced into taking responsibility for this mess BEFORE 2008. A "defanged Bush," is the ideal. More resignations, more investigations, a drawn out war, an economy slowly slipping into recession, etc. However, there are two potential "events" that could drive Congress to impeachment - Iran and scandal.
A number of pundits on the left and right have concluded that Bush will not leave office with the Iranians still pursuing nuclear weapons. Assuming the Iranians maintain their cool and simply continue with their nuclear development and avoid offerring any obvious excuse for U.S. action against them, Bush may think he has to go ahead and act without provocation. That, I suspect, would lead to significant resignations within the Administration (e.g. Gates, military, diplomats, et al) and probably demand "dual impeachment" (assuming Cheney agrees with Bush) and a constitutional crisis. [In this case, the original way the founding fathers envisioned the Presidency would be better than the Party system which has evolved. In the "good old days," the person who became Vice President was the one who received the second highest number of votes for the Presidency. Think about it. The minority was represented in the Vice Presidency. There was greater pressure on the President to "stay within bounds" between elections. The Vice President had little to do other than preside over the Senate and wait for serious Presidential mistakes.]
Impeachment might also be demanded due to scandal. I don't foresee this, but don't exclude it. Something could come up that was so "in your face" that Congress simply couldn't get by just ignoring it. Impeachment is essentially a "policial process," insomuch as it includes, in addition to "high crimes and treason," misdemeanors. The latter pretty much leaves the door open on impeachment for ANY politician today.
In Bush's case, I seriously doubt, at this stage in his Presidency, a "misdemeanor" would suffice - i.e. pretty much on the basis of what we would call "politics." Rather, the "scandal" would have to be a felony or treason of major magnitude. While there are a lot of Democrats who believe this, in fact, has occurred (e.g. the 2000 election, wiretapping, torture, energy policy, whatever) I would not think these sufficient to sway the Congressional Republican votes needed for impeachment. It would have to be on the magnitude of a major, proven felony or conspricay to overthrow the U.S. Government...such has calling off the 2008 election and assuming the title of "Chief Decider" for life. Since that is unlikely (unlikely, not impossible), the major cause for impeachment during the next 16.5 months lies in foreign policy and the misuse of military force.
More next time.
And, who does the Party trot out in defense...ah...Tom DeLay. Well, probably can't blame the Party itself for that, Tom was just using Craig's absurdity to promote his new book.
Prediction: If the Republican Party mainstream moderates and liberals (and, yes, even a few genuine conservatives) cannot get their Party back from the crazy Texas/Neo-Conservative/Fundamentalist Christian Wing that has control, the Party may well end up in the dust bin of history...to coin a phrase.
Bush, who this morning is in Iraq telling the Generals what they are to report to Congress next week, continues to flirt with impeachment, while the mood in the rest of the country (and among the Democratic Congress) seems to be one of "why bother?" The early arrival of the 2008 Presidential Campaign has indirectly hastened his lame duck status, which was confirmed last week by the departure of Gonzales, Rove, Snow, et al and sort of symbolically by the "Craig Affair." In a curious way, impeachment may be Bush's only hope for a positive legacy...i.e. he's impeached, along with Cheney, and the Presidency is assumed by Nancy Pelosi. Actually, I think Nancy would do a pretty good job, but she would certainly give the Nut Wing of the Republican Party some new ammunition.
Otherwise, it's 16.5 months to go and counting. Sixteen months is a very long time in politics. At the moment, I'd guess the odds on impeachment at roughly 1 in 10. And, the LAST thing Democrats would want to do is to be forced into taking responsibility for this mess BEFORE 2008. A "defanged Bush," is the ideal. More resignations, more investigations, a drawn out war, an economy slowly slipping into recession, etc. However, there are two potential "events" that could drive Congress to impeachment - Iran and scandal.
A number of pundits on the left and right have concluded that Bush will not leave office with the Iranians still pursuing nuclear weapons. Assuming the Iranians maintain their cool and simply continue with their nuclear development and avoid offerring any obvious excuse for U.S. action against them, Bush may think he has to go ahead and act without provocation. That, I suspect, would lead to significant resignations within the Administration (e.g. Gates, military, diplomats, et al) and probably demand "dual impeachment" (assuming Cheney agrees with Bush) and a constitutional crisis. [In this case, the original way the founding fathers envisioned the Presidency would be better than the Party system which has evolved. In the "good old days," the person who became Vice President was the one who received the second highest number of votes for the Presidency. Think about it. The minority was represented in the Vice Presidency. There was greater pressure on the President to "stay within bounds" between elections. The Vice President had little to do other than preside over the Senate and wait for serious Presidential mistakes.]
Impeachment might also be demanded due to scandal. I don't foresee this, but don't exclude it. Something could come up that was so "in your face" that Congress simply couldn't get by just ignoring it. Impeachment is essentially a "policial process," insomuch as it includes, in addition to "high crimes and treason," misdemeanors. The latter pretty much leaves the door open on impeachment for ANY politician today.
In Bush's case, I seriously doubt, at this stage in his Presidency, a "misdemeanor" would suffice - i.e. pretty much on the basis of what we would call "politics." Rather, the "scandal" would have to be a felony or treason of major magnitude. While there are a lot of Democrats who believe this, in fact, has occurred (e.g. the 2000 election, wiretapping, torture, energy policy, whatever) I would not think these sufficient to sway the Congressional Republican votes needed for impeachment. It would have to be on the magnitude of a major, proven felony or conspricay to overthrow the U.S. Government...such has calling off the 2008 election and assuming the title of "Chief Decider" for life. Since that is unlikely (unlikely, not impossible), the major cause for impeachment during the next 16.5 months lies in foreign policy and the misuse of military force.
More next time.
Thursday, June 28, 2007
Broken Military; Broken Government; Broken Society
If you've wondered why neither the Administration or Congress can seem to resolve pressing national issues such as immigration, the Iraq War, Social Security; Health Care; Global Warming; Energy Policy, etc., watch CSPAN for a week.
This morning's fare was typical. I began by watching the Senate vote on cloture on the "Comprehensive Immigration Bill." It failed. But rather than continue debate in hopes of reaching additional compromises which might result in a passable bill, Majority Leader Reid simply took it off the table. Thus, one of the most pressing issues facing the country today, from a national security perspective, has been removed from the Senate agenda, as a result of both Parties caving in to their respective special interests. Fundamentally, this means that both Democrats and Republicans who supported the Bill failed the country and that rather than return to their special interest constituencies and tell them that compromise was necessary for the sake of national security, have instead said, in effect: "Sorry, we couldn't get it passed the way you wanted it, but we did manage to kill it.
In regard to Congress, we have two courses open: continue to bombard our representatives with demands that these issues be resolved, even it means foregoing their summer break (aren't we asking the Iraqi Parliament to do the same?) and/or to vote all of them out in the next election. I recommend both.
In regard to Bush, the defeat of the "comprehensive bill," in no way relieves him of his responsibility to begin immediately to enforce the law. I should think that in view of the "War on Terror," that an unwillingness on his part to control our borders and begin registering the 12 - 20 million undocumented aliens now present, represents definite grounds for impeachment.
By failing to settle for anything less than comprehensive, the President is essentially holding national security hostage to a suitable "guest workers" program acceptable to business interests. If the President wants to continue being the "Chief Decider," now is the time for him to place national security above and beyond all other aspects of a new immigration policy.
I have no hard and fast agenda for how we resolve future immigration policy - i.e. who and how many people are approved for future immigration. Nor, do have any agenda for how the 12-20 million undocumented illegals are handled, but I do feel strongly that in the interests of all of us, we must begin immediately to control the borders by whatever means necessary and to begin the documentation of the undocumented. This isn't about economics; its about survival.
If the President fails to move now on these issues, he should be impeached; if he fails to move now, is not impeached and a terrorist attack on this country occurs through a lack of border enforcement and/or because of "undocumented persons," then he must not only be impeached, but held criminally negligent.
Following this morning's vote, the Senate moved on to other issues of pressing national concern: Senator Robert Byrd spoke for twenty minutes telling the Senate how he still felt healthy enough to carry out his senatorial responsibilities at his advanced age. This was followed by Senator Ted Stevens, taking up another 20-30 minutes in calling for a resolution recognizing the heroism of one of his constituents for his actions on December 7, 1941 during the attack on Pearl Harbor.
At that point, I switched to the House of Representatives, to find them debating - for the better part of one hour - over a $127,000 earmark for an economic development project in North Carolina. This debate enlightened me on an apparently excellent book entitled "The Perfect Christmas Tree." The book apparently inspired the development project.
If Congress was a revolutionary group, the revolution would fail; if it were a corporation board, the corporation would fail. Indeed, the majority of their time seems dedicated to passing nonsensical resolutions and standing around their respective chambers waiting for quorum calls.
The leadership vaccum is enormous and apparent.
The Bloomberg departure from the Republican Party and his annoucement as an "Independent," may be the handwriting on the wall. Whatever his politics, Bloomberg is not a dumb guy and his change may be the symbolic move annoucing the failure of our evolved Party system. More should and may follow suit. If the Parties continue to allow themselves to be driven by their respective special interests and ideolouges, then it is up to the majority of us, in the middle and looking for concrete solutions to national problems to go our own way and desert both.
A Note on the Vice Presidency and it's Constitutional role in government.
The fleeting claim of the Vice President's Office that it is neither a member of the Executive or Legislative Branches brings up an interesting point. The brillance of our Constitution, to me, has always been it's extreme concern with "balancing powers." The founders put this thing together prior to the rise of political parties (which began, in earnest, with Jacksoniam Democracy, in the early 1820's).
Initially, the Vice President was not voted upon separately from the President. Rather, the electors simply voted for a President. The person who received the most votes became President; the person receiving the second most votes became Vice President. The Constitution does not actually place the Vice President in the Executive Branch. It merely says that should something happen to the President, the Vice President will take the President's place. Obviously, this role does not mandate that the Vice Presidency be located within the Executive Branch. Beyond this "anticipated" responsibility, the Vice President has only one other duty and its a duty that very clearly places the office in the Legislative Branch of government; the duty to preside over the Senate, as President, and to vote in case of a tie.
It occurs to me that this arrangement may have been another founding father means of inserting "checks and balances." Without Parties, the founders expected the President would be the most respected, prominent, and liked person within the country (who was also willing to "run"). That person would become President and the second most respected, prominent and liked person, who might well hold contrary opinions, would become Vice President. Since, it would be unreasonable to place this person in the same branch as his/her opponent and directly "under" the President, the role of President of the Senate was created as sort of a "parking spot."
At the same time, originally, the Senate was not popularly elected, but rather through the respective state legislatures. The Senate was essentially our counterpart to the British House of Lords and represenative of the collective "establishment" of the times. People who tended to represent "state interests" rather than popular interests and therein the founders wisely again divided power by giving the power of originating money appropriations to the "People's Chamber," the House of Representatives.
Thus, the founders may have intended both the Vice President and the Senate to fullfill the role of "shawdow government" and a means of diffusing political differences, without excluding the minority (minority meaning the "establishment," who held more power, but fewer in number).
The rise of Parties and the popular election of the President and Senate, while more "democratic," may have destroyed the original intent.
Ah...just a thought. Doubt we'll go back to the original intent, but it might be a means of reforming a failed Party system and bringing more honesty to political debate.
I do, however, think that one may easily overdo "original intent." It strikes me that the founders themselves often reached Consitutional compromises, not in some carefully thought out and analytical way to ensure "checks and balances," but simply to "get on with it." Most apparently felt they'd overstayed their Philadelphia welcome, complained of the length of the Convention in the hot weather and wanted to get back to their more personally comfortable lives.
Hmmm? Speaking of which...back to CSPAN.
This morning's fare was typical. I began by watching the Senate vote on cloture on the "Comprehensive Immigration Bill." It failed. But rather than continue debate in hopes of reaching additional compromises which might result in a passable bill, Majority Leader Reid simply took it off the table. Thus, one of the most pressing issues facing the country today, from a national security perspective, has been removed from the Senate agenda, as a result of both Parties caving in to their respective special interests. Fundamentally, this means that both Democrats and Republicans who supported the Bill failed the country and that rather than return to their special interest constituencies and tell them that compromise was necessary for the sake of national security, have instead said, in effect: "Sorry, we couldn't get it passed the way you wanted it, but we did manage to kill it.
In regard to Congress, we have two courses open: continue to bombard our representatives with demands that these issues be resolved, even it means foregoing their summer break (aren't we asking the Iraqi Parliament to do the same?) and/or to vote all of them out in the next election. I recommend both.
In regard to Bush, the defeat of the "comprehensive bill," in no way relieves him of his responsibility to begin immediately to enforce the law. I should think that in view of the "War on Terror," that an unwillingness on his part to control our borders and begin registering the 12 - 20 million undocumented aliens now present, represents definite grounds for impeachment.
By failing to settle for anything less than comprehensive, the President is essentially holding national security hostage to a suitable "guest workers" program acceptable to business interests. If the President wants to continue being the "Chief Decider," now is the time for him to place national security above and beyond all other aspects of a new immigration policy.
I have no hard and fast agenda for how we resolve future immigration policy - i.e. who and how many people are approved for future immigration. Nor, do have any agenda for how the 12-20 million undocumented illegals are handled, but I do feel strongly that in the interests of all of us, we must begin immediately to control the borders by whatever means necessary and to begin the documentation of the undocumented. This isn't about economics; its about survival.
If the President fails to move now on these issues, he should be impeached; if he fails to move now, is not impeached and a terrorist attack on this country occurs through a lack of border enforcement and/or because of "undocumented persons," then he must not only be impeached, but held criminally negligent.
Following this morning's vote, the Senate moved on to other issues of pressing national concern: Senator Robert Byrd spoke for twenty minutes telling the Senate how he still felt healthy enough to carry out his senatorial responsibilities at his advanced age. This was followed by Senator Ted Stevens, taking up another 20-30 minutes in calling for a resolution recognizing the heroism of one of his constituents for his actions on December 7, 1941 during the attack on Pearl Harbor.
At that point, I switched to the House of Representatives, to find them debating - for the better part of one hour - over a $127,000 earmark for an economic development project in North Carolina. This debate enlightened me on an apparently excellent book entitled "The Perfect Christmas Tree." The book apparently inspired the development project.
If Congress was a revolutionary group, the revolution would fail; if it were a corporation board, the corporation would fail. Indeed, the majority of their time seems dedicated to passing nonsensical resolutions and standing around their respective chambers waiting for quorum calls.
The leadership vaccum is enormous and apparent.
The Bloomberg departure from the Republican Party and his annoucement as an "Independent," may be the handwriting on the wall. Whatever his politics, Bloomberg is not a dumb guy and his change may be the symbolic move annoucing the failure of our evolved Party system. More should and may follow suit. If the Parties continue to allow themselves to be driven by their respective special interests and ideolouges, then it is up to the majority of us, in the middle and looking for concrete solutions to national problems to go our own way and desert both.
A Note on the Vice Presidency and it's Constitutional role in government.
The fleeting claim of the Vice President's Office that it is neither a member of the Executive or Legislative Branches brings up an interesting point. The brillance of our Constitution, to me, has always been it's extreme concern with "balancing powers." The founders put this thing together prior to the rise of political parties (which began, in earnest, with Jacksoniam Democracy, in the early 1820's).
Initially, the Vice President was not voted upon separately from the President. Rather, the electors simply voted for a President. The person who received the most votes became President; the person receiving the second most votes became Vice President. The Constitution does not actually place the Vice President in the Executive Branch. It merely says that should something happen to the President, the Vice President will take the President's place. Obviously, this role does not mandate that the Vice Presidency be located within the Executive Branch. Beyond this "anticipated" responsibility, the Vice President has only one other duty and its a duty that very clearly places the office in the Legislative Branch of government; the duty to preside over the Senate, as President, and to vote in case of a tie.
It occurs to me that this arrangement may have been another founding father means of inserting "checks and balances." Without Parties, the founders expected the President would be the most respected, prominent, and liked person within the country (who was also willing to "run"). That person would become President and the second most respected, prominent and liked person, who might well hold contrary opinions, would become Vice President. Since, it would be unreasonable to place this person in the same branch as his/her opponent and directly "under" the President, the role of President of the Senate was created as sort of a "parking spot."
At the same time, originally, the Senate was not popularly elected, but rather through the respective state legislatures. The Senate was essentially our counterpart to the British House of Lords and represenative of the collective "establishment" of the times. People who tended to represent "state interests" rather than popular interests and therein the founders wisely again divided power by giving the power of originating money appropriations to the "People's Chamber," the House of Representatives.
Thus, the founders may have intended both the Vice President and the Senate to fullfill the role of "shawdow government" and a means of diffusing political differences, without excluding the minority (minority meaning the "establishment," who held more power, but fewer in number).
The rise of Parties and the popular election of the President and Senate, while more "democratic," may have destroyed the original intent.
Ah...just a thought. Doubt we'll go back to the original intent, but it might be a means of reforming a failed Party system and bringing more honesty to political debate.
I do, however, think that one may easily overdo "original intent." It strikes me that the founders themselves often reached Consitutional compromises, not in some carefully thought out and analytical way to ensure "checks and balances," but simply to "get on with it." Most apparently felt they'd overstayed their Philadelphia welcome, complained of the length of the Convention in the hot weather and wanted to get back to their more personally comfortable lives.
Hmmm? Speaking of which...back to CSPAN.
Saturday, June 16, 2007
More on Immigration
In my last post, I divided the Immigration Bill into three parts and suggested each be addressed separately: border security, what to do with the illegals already here, and future visa/immigration policy. The first is a no-brainier to virtually everyone living outside of the beltway: control the borders. To argue, on one hand, that we are in a global war on terror and NOT do everything possible to control our own borders is an idiotic contradiction, that the dumbest among us can understand (again, outside of the beltway).
I suggested that the second issue, what to do with those already here, be approached carefully, equitably and compassionately. The present bill that suggests a $5,000 fine, learning English, and waiting 8-12 years strikes me as too severe in some cases. I oppose blanket amnesty, but in view of the fact that we have collectively, through our representatives and Democratic and Republican administrations allowed the situation to grow to its present proportions, I believe "selective amnesty" to be appropriate. Congress would establish broad guidelines and turn the matter of the 12 million illegals over to immigration courts (which would need drastic expansion - but the entire judiciary has needed dramatic expansion for some time. In my opinion, this has to be accompanied by some type of national identity card, a temporary visa upon registration and resolution of individual cases within a reasonable time frame, say four to six years. As for English, I would suggest the requirement be "sufficiency such as to pass the standard citizenship test." And, the fine should be a range, from perhaps $500. to a $5000 max. I am afraid that the "path to citizenship" as presented will create obstacles to registration. Criminal illegals either go to or remain in U.S. jails for serious offenses; minor offenses, but not misdemeanors, gets the illegal a ticket back to country of origin. Back taxes need to be collected, at least at a rate of a certain percentage on the dollar. In general, if an illegal alien has been in-country for a substantial amount of time, has a family here, can proof employment, paid taxes and not abused our social services, I would be inclined to grant immediate amnesty or perhaps one involving a slap on the wrist. The further away from the "ideal," the more difficult the path to citizenship.
The "guest worker" program needs to be broken out from other visa types. There will always be political, family, medical, educational, etc. reasons for granting visas. The key in these areas is in evaluating the need and tracking to ensure a continuing situation wherein the visa is still necessary.
I also feel, the guest worker program must have two principal components: the burden for the need should be placed upon business (i.e. no limits, but a rigorous needs test) and such visas should offer a longer, more stringent path to citizenship.
Regarding the former, business should have to advertise for workers within the United States first, for a certain period (say 30 days). If there are no "qualified applicants" (tough to precisely define), then they may apply for an "guest worker visa." In conjunction with this request, they would have to post a "bond," in an amount equal to round-trip transportation costs and the equivalency of one month's additional pay. The Immigration Service would verify all of this and approve a four year visa. The employer would have to pay a "prevailing wage rate" less their costs (the transportation and the additional month's wages). If the person holding the visa proved to be unacceptable or the business need changed, the visa holder would have thirty days to find other employment, under the same conditions, with the employer's burden simply transferring to the new employer, or would lose the visa and be forced to return to the country of origin. The employer, perhaps through a "group insurance plan," would be required to provide basic health care insurance. The American people should not be expected to cover social services for "guest workers." The employer, however, would be entitled to withhold health care insurance costs from wages and be partially reimbursed through an appropriate tax deduction.
Overall, this would reduce the present business advantage to guest worker utilization, but not eliminate it and the reduction of these benefits would encourage employers to find suitable workers within our borders and become more involved in the education and training of U.S. citizens for their future needs.
These are only suggestions for what is, granted a complex issue. However, I believe that the current situation gives essentially a free ride to business (and certainly not entirely to big business) at the expense of taxing the rest of us (by government funding of social and educational services to non-taxing paying, undocumented illegals). My individual social conscience tells me we cannot simply deny these people needed services, but I would like to see a little more "social conscience" on the part of everyone. If, because of competitive pressures, they can't adopt such consciences individually, then that is what government is for, through regulation. Free markets, free trade, de-regulation and the Great Justification of Globalization just doesn't get it anymore, particularly when more often than not, these arguments are simply cover for individual, short term greed.
Finally, from the individual visa holder's perspective, I believe it against our history and values to create a permanent "underclass" of guest workers. In my opinion, one of our greatest strengths has been due to the rise of immigrant classes, from Chinese workers "imported" to build large portions of our railroads, to the Italians, Irish, and Vietnamese fishermen on today's Gulf of Mexico. Material wealth may be an across the board common denominator for most immigrant groups, but it is not the sole motivation. I would like to think that becoming a citizen of the United States means more than only increasing one's net worth. At the end of the guest worker's visa some provision must be made to transition to permanent residency and citizenship for those desiring such. The current bill addresses this issue, but the complex two year guest worker status, with renewal provisions requiring a year's absence in between seems overly complex and extremely difficult to track.
Next, back to Iraq, the War on Terror, the failure of the Bush Doctrine and a discussion of the question facing Congress: Cut Off Funding or Impeachment?
I suggested that the second issue, what to do with those already here, be approached carefully, equitably and compassionately. The present bill that suggests a $5,000 fine, learning English, and waiting 8-12 years strikes me as too severe in some cases. I oppose blanket amnesty, but in view of the fact that we have collectively, through our representatives and Democratic and Republican administrations allowed the situation to grow to its present proportions, I believe "selective amnesty" to be appropriate. Congress would establish broad guidelines and turn the matter of the 12 million illegals over to immigration courts (which would need drastic expansion - but the entire judiciary has needed dramatic expansion for some time. In my opinion, this has to be accompanied by some type of national identity card, a temporary visa upon registration and resolution of individual cases within a reasonable time frame, say four to six years. As for English, I would suggest the requirement be "sufficiency such as to pass the standard citizenship test." And, the fine should be a range, from perhaps $500. to a $5000 max. I am afraid that the "path to citizenship" as presented will create obstacles to registration. Criminal illegals either go to or remain in U.S. jails for serious offenses; minor offenses, but not misdemeanors, gets the illegal a ticket back to country of origin. Back taxes need to be collected, at least at a rate of a certain percentage on the dollar. In general, if an illegal alien has been in-country for a substantial amount of time, has a family here, can proof employment, paid taxes and not abused our social services, I would be inclined to grant immediate amnesty or perhaps one involving a slap on the wrist. The further away from the "ideal," the more difficult the path to citizenship.
The "guest worker" program needs to be broken out from other visa types. There will always be political, family, medical, educational, etc. reasons for granting visas. The key in these areas is in evaluating the need and tracking to ensure a continuing situation wherein the visa is still necessary.
I also feel, the guest worker program must have two principal components: the burden for the need should be placed upon business (i.e. no limits, but a rigorous needs test) and such visas should offer a longer, more stringent path to citizenship.
Regarding the former, business should have to advertise for workers within the United States first, for a certain period (say 30 days). If there are no "qualified applicants" (tough to precisely define), then they may apply for an "guest worker visa." In conjunction with this request, they would have to post a "bond," in an amount equal to round-trip transportation costs and the equivalency of one month's additional pay. The Immigration Service would verify all of this and approve a four year visa. The employer would have to pay a "prevailing wage rate" less their costs (the transportation and the additional month's wages). If the person holding the visa proved to be unacceptable or the business need changed, the visa holder would have thirty days to find other employment, under the same conditions, with the employer's burden simply transferring to the new employer, or would lose the visa and be forced to return to the country of origin. The employer, perhaps through a "group insurance plan," would be required to provide basic health care insurance. The American people should not be expected to cover social services for "guest workers." The employer, however, would be entitled to withhold health care insurance costs from wages and be partially reimbursed through an appropriate tax deduction.
Overall, this would reduce the present business advantage to guest worker utilization, but not eliminate it and the reduction of these benefits would encourage employers to find suitable workers within our borders and become more involved in the education and training of U.S. citizens for their future needs.
These are only suggestions for what is, granted a complex issue. However, I believe that the current situation gives essentially a free ride to business (and certainly not entirely to big business) at the expense of taxing the rest of us (by government funding of social and educational services to non-taxing paying, undocumented illegals). My individual social conscience tells me we cannot simply deny these people needed services, but I would like to see a little more "social conscience" on the part of everyone. If, because of competitive pressures, they can't adopt such consciences individually, then that is what government is for, through regulation. Free markets, free trade, de-regulation and the Great Justification of Globalization just doesn't get it anymore, particularly when more often than not, these arguments are simply cover for individual, short term greed.
Finally, from the individual visa holder's perspective, I believe it against our history and values to create a permanent "underclass" of guest workers. In my opinion, one of our greatest strengths has been due to the rise of immigrant classes, from Chinese workers "imported" to build large portions of our railroads, to the Italians, Irish, and Vietnamese fishermen on today's Gulf of Mexico. Material wealth may be an across the board common denominator for most immigrant groups, but it is not the sole motivation. I would like to think that becoming a citizen of the United States means more than only increasing one's net worth. At the end of the guest worker's visa some provision must be made to transition to permanent residency and citizenship for those desiring such. The current bill addresses this issue, but the complex two year guest worker status, with renewal provisions requiring a year's absence in between seems overly complex and extremely difficult to track.
Next, back to Iraq, the War on Terror, the failure of the Bush Doctrine and a discussion of the question facing Congress: Cut Off Funding or Impeachment?
Monday, June 11, 2007
Monday Morning Blog
I generally watch CNN and MSNBC for news, with the occasional foray to PBS, Fox and CNBC. I would like to note that CNN and MSNBC devoted more airtime to the trials and tribulations of Paris Hilton than last weeks Immigration Bill failure.
Bush finally found a place where he is loved, other than Midland, Texas...Albania. Ah, the world changes fast. The last thing I remember about Albania is that they were a close ally of China, but then its been hard to keep up with things since the end of the cold war.
Powell went on Meet the Press as the apologist for the Administration on the decision to invade Iraq. Curious. I believe that while most of what he said was honest and forthright, Tim Russett (who was once known as a tough interviewer) didn't really throw him many hard questions. Powell's line on the invasion decision was the usual, "we were all wrong," in regard to the WMD argument. No news there. What would have been a better issue to explore with Powell was what does he think about "preemptive war?" Indirectly, he implied he did not agree with it, unless faced with imminent attack, but Russett failed to pursue the issue.
Powell made it clear he was ready to return to government service (presumably after the 2008 elections). I would hope that he does, although his standing with me dropped significantly with his role in the Iraq mess. In view of what I think he believes policy-wise, I felt he should have resigned following the IAEA's request for more UN inspection time, which Bush rejected, leading to the invasion...leading to the mess.
As essentially a "soldier," Powell did say he believed we made significant mistakes in not sending in enough forces, etc. But, for me at least, the whole issue was more complex and threatening to our own democracy than Powell either understands or wished to avoid discussing.
And, then there is the Immigration Bill failure. Dumb...dumb...dumb. We seem to be trying to live in the 21st Century with 19th Century political leadership. Democrats would be wise to elect a new Senate Majority Leader. Failing in a cloture vote, Reid cut off debate himself by withdrawing the bill from the Senate calendar.
This guy whines as if he's just soooo overworked and tortured by it all. To me, Reid served too long in the minority and doesn't seem to grasp that if he can't get an Immigration Bill through the Senate, HE'LL be blamed, not the Republicans. IMO, he should have kept them in session until they'd voted...even if it meant foregoing the "long weekend."
Additionally, the whole approach to the Bill seems to have smelled of "backroom deals" between various "leading" Senators and their respective special interest groups. It was, as Buchanan noted, "a K Street product."
Beyond that, what doomed it was the Bush requirement for a "comprehensive solution." A comprehensive solution was taken to mean a "complex solution."
It's all pretty simple for me. There are basically three parts: border security, the fate of 12 million existing illegal immigrants, and economic issues (both labor and business). So, why not break the Bill up into those parts? First, secure the border. Second, find an equitable solution for the 12 million. Third, arrive at a balanced solution to the conflicting labor and business interests.
On the first, if we cannot devote the resources necessary to control our borders, what makes us think government can accomplish ANYTHING significant? My solution is some type of timetable for reducing illegal border crossings, i.e. taking the current estimates of annual illegal crossings, set goals to reduce such to as close to zero as we can get, over say a five year period.
And, tell the President that we (Congress) consider such a timetable to be essential to national security. Failure to adhere to the timetable will be considered an impeachable offense...i.e. if you can't get the job done, we'll fire you.
IMO, the Bill handled the second issue, what to do with the 12 million, poorly. What clouds the issue is the word amnesty. True, millions "broke" the law to get here, but it was a law only loosely enforced, under both Democratic and Republican administrations. So, I hold the politicians who allowed the situation to occur equally culpable and frankly am more inclined to give the 12 million some sort of amnesty than the politicians.
The problem to me is that these 12 million people need to be addressed almost individually and they range from solid, hardworking families to hard core felons. So, while because they are not citizens and entered illegally, we have a right to sit in judgement over what to do with them, that judgement should be equitable and compassionate, particularly in light of our "wink and a nod" past enforcement practices. Some are certainly worthy of immediate citizenship...amnesty if you will...others a "probationary period," and still others, deportation. Congress needs to set broad guidelines and allow Immigration Courts to determine outcomes on an individual basis. In other words, there is no "comprehensive solution" for 12 million individuals. Learning English, getting to the back of the line, paying taxes, paying a $5,000 fine all may be appropriate in some, even most cases, but not all.
One of the chief arguments against "amnesty" is that it failed to work when we granted such in the eighties. Probably...but this isn't the fault of the illegal immigrants; it is the fault of a lack of border enforcement.
Finally, there are the issues of business and labor. Herein, one has to separate the law of supply and demand from simple greed...on both sides. I would assume that there is a segment of Immigration policy that is NOT economic. There are family concerns, political concerns, education concerns, etc. Putting those aside for the moment, the economic issues fall under the concept of "guest workers," be they doctors, nurses, IT specialists or construction or agricultural workers.
I think the underlying principle for ALL guest workers, consistent with our values and history, is the assumption that all desire American citizenship and should be provided with a path toward citizenship.
Ah, but more on that later.
Bush finally found a place where he is loved, other than Midland, Texas...Albania. Ah, the world changes fast. The last thing I remember about Albania is that they were a close ally of China, but then its been hard to keep up with things since the end of the cold war.
Powell went on Meet the Press as the apologist for the Administration on the decision to invade Iraq. Curious. I believe that while most of what he said was honest and forthright, Tim Russett (who was once known as a tough interviewer) didn't really throw him many hard questions. Powell's line on the invasion decision was the usual, "we were all wrong," in regard to the WMD argument. No news there. What would have been a better issue to explore with Powell was what does he think about "preemptive war?" Indirectly, he implied he did not agree with it, unless faced with imminent attack, but Russett failed to pursue the issue.
Powell made it clear he was ready to return to government service (presumably after the 2008 elections). I would hope that he does, although his standing with me dropped significantly with his role in the Iraq mess. In view of what I think he believes policy-wise, I felt he should have resigned following the IAEA's request for more UN inspection time, which Bush rejected, leading to the invasion...leading to the mess.
As essentially a "soldier," Powell did say he believed we made significant mistakes in not sending in enough forces, etc. But, for me at least, the whole issue was more complex and threatening to our own democracy than Powell either understands or wished to avoid discussing.
And, then there is the Immigration Bill failure. Dumb...dumb...dumb. We seem to be trying to live in the 21st Century with 19th Century political leadership. Democrats would be wise to elect a new Senate Majority Leader. Failing in a cloture vote, Reid cut off debate himself by withdrawing the bill from the Senate calendar.
This guy whines as if he's just soooo overworked and tortured by it all. To me, Reid served too long in the minority and doesn't seem to grasp that if he can't get an Immigration Bill through the Senate, HE'LL be blamed, not the Republicans. IMO, he should have kept them in session until they'd voted...even if it meant foregoing the "long weekend."
Additionally, the whole approach to the Bill seems to have smelled of "backroom deals" between various "leading" Senators and their respective special interest groups. It was, as Buchanan noted, "a K Street product."
Beyond that, what doomed it was the Bush requirement for a "comprehensive solution." A comprehensive solution was taken to mean a "complex solution."
It's all pretty simple for me. There are basically three parts: border security, the fate of 12 million existing illegal immigrants, and economic issues (both labor and business). So, why not break the Bill up into those parts? First, secure the border. Second, find an equitable solution for the 12 million. Third, arrive at a balanced solution to the conflicting labor and business interests.
On the first, if we cannot devote the resources necessary to control our borders, what makes us think government can accomplish ANYTHING significant? My solution is some type of timetable for reducing illegal border crossings, i.e. taking the current estimates of annual illegal crossings, set goals to reduce such to as close to zero as we can get, over say a five year period.
And, tell the President that we (Congress) consider such a timetable to be essential to national security. Failure to adhere to the timetable will be considered an impeachable offense...i.e. if you can't get the job done, we'll fire you.
IMO, the Bill handled the second issue, what to do with the 12 million, poorly. What clouds the issue is the word amnesty. True, millions "broke" the law to get here, but it was a law only loosely enforced, under both Democratic and Republican administrations. So, I hold the politicians who allowed the situation to occur equally culpable and frankly am more inclined to give the 12 million some sort of amnesty than the politicians.
The problem to me is that these 12 million people need to be addressed almost individually and they range from solid, hardworking families to hard core felons. So, while because they are not citizens and entered illegally, we have a right to sit in judgement over what to do with them, that judgement should be equitable and compassionate, particularly in light of our "wink and a nod" past enforcement practices. Some are certainly worthy of immediate citizenship...amnesty if you will...others a "probationary period," and still others, deportation. Congress needs to set broad guidelines and allow Immigration Courts to determine outcomes on an individual basis. In other words, there is no "comprehensive solution" for 12 million individuals. Learning English, getting to the back of the line, paying taxes, paying a $5,000 fine all may be appropriate in some, even most cases, but not all.
One of the chief arguments against "amnesty" is that it failed to work when we granted such in the eighties. Probably...but this isn't the fault of the illegal immigrants; it is the fault of a lack of border enforcement.
Finally, there are the issues of business and labor. Herein, one has to separate the law of supply and demand from simple greed...on both sides. I would assume that there is a segment of Immigration policy that is NOT economic. There are family concerns, political concerns, education concerns, etc. Putting those aside for the moment, the economic issues fall under the concept of "guest workers," be they doctors, nurses, IT specialists or construction or agricultural workers.
I think the underlying principle for ALL guest workers, consistent with our values and history, is the assumption that all desire American citizenship and should be provided with a path toward citizenship.
Ah, but more on that later.
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