Thoughts on Iran

I've just begun to pay more attention to the "Iranian Problem," so the thoughts herein are based on my presently sketchy understanding of its history and the present situation. So, with that caveat, here goes.

Iran was, of course, historically the Persian Empire; one of the great Empires of human civilization. And, although Islamic (primarily Shites), Iranians are not Arabs and possess a long history of civilization prior to the inception of Islam. I think this history is important and it is useful to present U.S. foreign policy goals to bear this distinction in mind. In other words, Iranians are very conscious of a history prior to Mohammad.

Jumping across several thousand years of that history, Iran was in a sense also the birthplace of the Post World War II Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States emerged from WWII as the "conscious" replacement of the former European colonial powers. From a purely economical perspective, colonialism was generally a failure...to both the occupying Europeans, wherein colonies were somewhat of a status symbol, and the subjected peoples. I believe it was FDR's belief that the United States offered a "third way," beneficial to both the developed world and the former colonial world. We were, I believe, to be the "middle road" in the post war world between the former colonial powers and international communism, at that time represented by the Soviet Union.

The Russians, whose motivations ultimately proved to be more nationalistic than ideological, never left the areas it "freed" from Nazi Germany. The Yalta Conference, toward the end of the war, was not so much a "sell out" as the failure to more precisely define and agree on a post-war world. The Red Army occupied Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was not going to allow western democratic governments to emerge, no more than we would allow a radical Islamic cleric to assume control of Iraq today.

During the closing days of the war, the Russians sent the Red Army into northern Iran. At the end of the war, they began propagandizing for a post war communist government, while their tanks in northern Iran stayed in place, contrary to wartime joint planning. After a period of tension, which included additional threats and manoeuvring by both sides (including the famous Churchill "Iron Curtain" speech), they withdrew militarily, perhaps figuring what they could not win through force, they could win through subterfuge. A democratic election of sorts was eventually held and a Pro-Soviet government elected.

It is generally accepted today that the CIA intervened at this point. The elected Iranian leader was murdered and the Shah came to power.

It is important to have some understanding of what "communism" meant in the post-war era. It's success during this period was prior to the emergence of its obvious failures and it was perceived by many former "colonial subjects" from those in the Middle East to China, as "the wave of the future." Perhaps, had Roosevelt lived the Cold War would have turned out differently (not that the Russians would have taken a different course, but in the sense that had Lincoln lived Reconstruction in the South may have been more successful). I believe Roosevelt understood that the power and influence with which we emerged from the war could be used to present this "Third Way" of democratic-capitalism, that was neither old world colonialism or communism. Harry Truman, however, had traits similar to George Bush...things tended to be either "black or white." And, while I think Truman took the correct course of containment against the Soviets, we may have missed the opportunity to win the battle of propaganda in the Third World.

As a result, we have been and still are today largely identified in this Third World has the inheritors of western colonialism. There is some truth to this perception, but this isn't the purpose of this blog. The point is that when the Shah was finally overthrown by fundamentalist Islamics, which was for the most part a genuinely popular rebellion, we were already "the bad guys." The storming of our embassy and the imprisonment of its staff followed.

Reagan set the course of Iranian-U.S. relations in a promising direction. I do not remember the details of how he secured the embassy staff's release, but suspect it was indirectly related to his subsequent withdrawal from Lebanon following the attack on our Marines - as opposed to reinforcing them. And, of course, there was the Iran-Contra affair.

In Iran, between Reagan and now, moderation did in fact grow. The current Iranian political system is not unlike the Politburo of the Soviet Union. There are democratic elections held, but the candidates offerred are essentially chosen by a "committee" of religious clerics. If a "moderate" is elected as head of the Iranian government, it is a strong indication that the ruling clerics have approved his policies. Likewise if a fanatic is "elected."

At the time of 9/11, a generally moderate Iranian government was in power. The political milieu in Iran was toward reaching an accommodation with the west. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Iranians provided us with assistance in Afghanistan, allowing fly-over rights of military aircraft, putting us into contact with anti-Taliban forces within country, providing rescue operations for downed pilots, etc.

They were "rewarded" for these actions with the Bush "Axis of Evil" speech.

Apparently bewildered by this dubious distinction, and with the understanding that political leaders often say one thing to the "voters" and pursue another policy, following their inclusion in the axis of evil, and our invasion of Iraq, they tried again to open a dialogue with the U.S., suggesting in a letter forwarded through the Swiss that they were willing to continue to pursue a policy of moderation. This was apparently rejected by the newly empowered "neo-conservatives" who, in the post 9/11 period were running U.S. foreign policy.

It was only AFTER the axis of evil speech and the rejection of their suggested negotiations that the present Iranian radical President came to power...with the clerics blessings. THis is an extremely important possible "cause and effect," for the most part totally overlooked by our media.

I suspect that the Iranian clerics believe that they are "next" on the neo-con list. The fanatical pronouncements of the current Iranian President may be in the vein of "see...we can be just as ridiculous as you." But, of course, as his pronouncements gain favor with the "Iranian in the Street," his power vis a vie the clerics grows and there is an increasing risk that there is substance behind them.

This is not to say the Iranians have been "innocent victims." They have been, prior to 9/11 supporters of terrorist groups (although it is not likely that a Shite Iran supported Sunni Al Qaeda; most of the Arab world is Sunni).

And, we have been sending subtle signals that the days of the neo-cons running American foreign policy are over. Most have either left of their own accord, or been fired. [The post 9/11 story to be written is how they hijacked our policy in the aftermath of 9/11 and how they ultimately failed...thanks largely to the media, the American voter, bad policy and incompetence.]

One cannot however, expect a complete reversal of policy overnight. While I suspect that Condi Rice is busy explaining these intra government shifts to our traditional allies (I am not aware that she was a hard core neo-con), strains of this former policy remain. Bush has not renounced pre-emptive war, nor his mission from God to bring western democracy to the world, although his trip to Vietnam may have been another "signal" of an unstated policy shift.

In his current "policy re-evaluation," two outcomes would be beneficial: 1) a willingness to re-open Mid-East dialogues without pre-conditions and a renunciation, in some subtle manner, of pre-emptive war and regime change. As long as both of these elements remain part of official U.S. foreign policy, we cannot expect members of the "Axis of Evil" to abandon nuclear weapon ambitions.

In his broad attempt to reconcile foreign policy and domestic politics with national interests and security, he has failed and that failure does not make us any safer in the "war on terror."

However, mainly through his own post 9/11 errors, and even aside from domestic politics, he is stuck between the "rock and the hard place." On the one hand, direct talks with potential enemies would be advantageous; on the other hand it would convince allies that we are back to "going it alone." Our position on Iranian talks today largely mirrors our position with the other member of the axis of evil, North Korea. There is a consistent message being sent to our allies that we are returning to multi-lateral diplomacy...via the Six Party talks with North Korea and the EU/UN talks with Iran.

In resolving this dilemmia, Bush needs to study Roosevelt more than Truman. With domestic politics behind him, there is nothing that really prevents him from pursuing both approaches. Consistency, it is said and certainly FDR understood this, is the "hobgoblin of little minds." In my opinion, he could open direct talks through the medium of multi-lateral negotiations, with the understanding that agreements reached through direct talks would require the approval of the others involved in the multi-lateral talks.

Admitting that neo-cons hi-jacked our foreign policy is a more difficult task. PErhaps the best he could do in this area, short of my suggested "Pray at the Lincoln Memorial for forgiveness," is simply to state in his forthcoming speech on Iraq that after his review of the situation he has found errors in BOTH tactics and strategy and that he is seeking to correct both. Then, stop talking about his "mission from God," emphasis the differences in the Islamic world, and explain "pre-emptive war" not as policy, but soley in the sense of "last ditch defense." In other words, he can admit the Iraq failure (of policy) without saying as much and taking a new direction. In a sense, even if the "mission was wrong," it has been accomplished. There are no WMD in Iraq and we have secured regime change. The rest, he must emphasis, is up to the Iraqi people. Remaining in Iraq in force requires two elements: 1) the continued desire of the Iraqi people to have us there and 2) our desire to remain there. The latter should be based on our preception of genuine progress toward a reasonably stable democracy, which as a minimum ensures the basic rights of the minority...period.

As a final "aside," I regretably believe that such a stance will only provide a "way out." As noted in my comments re. the Iraq Study Group, I believe it may be "too late." Too much damage has already been done and the only long term solution may be through another form of containment for fundamentalist Islam (with the exception of genuine attacks such as the Al Qaaeda attack on 9/11; Bin Laden remains at large...which is perhaps the single greatest proof of current policy failure).

More in a following post over the next few days.